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Abstract 
 
Between 1939 and 1944 the underground forces of the Polish Government-in-Exile created 
an underground army in the Lublin region, which, at its height, numbered 60,000 men.  
The underground Army was created in order to facilitate the reestablishment of an 
independent Poland.  The Army that was created, the AK, was in effect, an alliance 
organisation comprising, to varying degrees, members of all pro-independence underground 
groups.  It was, in Lublin, to always suffer from internal stresses and strains, which were 
exaggerated by the actions of the region’s occupiers.  These strains were highlighted and 
exploited by the ‘liberating’ Red Army.  From the moment that they set foot in the province 
in July 1944, the forces of the Soviet Union aimed to put into place a Polish regime that was 
compliant and communist.  
 
The most interesting fact about the operation mounted by the AK to liberate Lublin province 
from the Germans, lies in the regional command’s reaction to both their orders and the 
demands made of them by the incoming Soviets.  The regional commander’s decision in July 
1944 to order his forces to hand in their weapons and disperse meant that the human stock 
of the underground would remain, that it would survive the first wave of NKVD arrests.  
This meant that, despite the massive setback of the post liberation era, a core, armed, and 
well structured underground still existed.  What destroyed this attempt to preserve the AK 
in Lublin was the halting of the eastern front for five months.  This meant that 2.2 million 
Soviets were operating in and around Lublin whilst the AK central command was fighting to 
liberate Warsaw.  The halting of the front, therefore, was to hasten the fate of those in the 
underground, both in the capital and to the east.   
 
Ultimately it was the mass repression in the aftermath of the Warsaw Uprising that fatally 
weakened the Lublin underground as an organised, coherent entity.  In many senses the 
crucial period for the AK in Lublin was the one from July until November 1944.  The alliance 
of the underground in the area had been an often-difficult one but after months of silence 
from London, and the failure of the Warsaw Uprising and the Moscow talks, this alliance 
began to collapse.   
 
Whilst the framework of the underground had been almost destroyed by the winter of 1944-
1945, crucially a framework of resistance had survived the NKVD’s concerted attempts to 
destroy it totally.  The importance of this framework was clearly shown after the Red Army 
restarted its attack at the heart of the Third Reich in January 1945, removing the vast 
majority of troops from the region.  The second underground was much more disjointed in 
its nature with weaker command structures.  Yet because a framework was in place, 
because some respected officers and their men had survived the winter of 1944-45, the 
underground was to remain more organised in Lublin than in most other areas of Poland.  
Whilst the anti-communist underground was ultimately defeated, in Lublin it was to remain 
a sizeable threat to the communist regime until 1947.   
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Polish military and civilian administrative units: 
 
* As there is often no exact match between British and Polish administrative units, 
the following translations have been made with this in mind and should be taken 
as approximations.  For example both gmina and rejon can be translated as 
district, however obwód seemed to better describe to an English-speaker the unit 
of a district. 
Województwo  – region, province 
Powiat  – County 
Obwód  – The literal translation in Polish is perimeter however in this thesis obwód 
has been translated to the English district 
Gmina  – The literal translation in Polish is community however in this thesis 
gmina has been translated to the English Parish 
Rejon  – This can be translated as area, district or beat.  In this thesis, rejon is 
used to describe the smallest level of AK administration, and thus is translated as 
post or outpost. 
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Select glossary of terms used in this thesis 
 
Acronym English name Polish name 
AK   Home Army  Armia Krajowa  
AL  People’s Army  Armia Ludowa  
BCh  Peasant Battalions  Bataliony Chłopskie  
BiP  Bureau of Information and 
Propaganda  
Biuro Informacji i 
propaganda  
“Kedyw”  Special Operations Directorate  Kierownictwo Dywersji 
MO  Citizen’s Militia  Milicja Obywatelska  
NOW  National Military Organisation  Narodowa Organizacja 
Wojskowa  
NSZ National Armed Forces Narodowe Siły Zbrojne 
PKWN  Polish Committee of National 
Liberation  
Polski Komitet 
Wyzwolenia 
Narodowego 
PPR Polish Socialist Party Polska Partia 
Robotnicza 
RBP  Department of Public Security Resort Bezpieczeństwa 
Publicznego 
RJN Council of National Unity Rada Jedności 
Narodowej 
SL Peasant Party Stronnictwo Ludowe 
SP  Labour Party  Stronnictwo Pracy  
SZP The Polish Victory Service Służba Zwycięstwu 
Polski 
TRJN  Provisional Government of 
National unity  
Tymczasowy Rząd 
Jednosci Narodowej  
UB Security Office Urząd Bezpieczeństwa 
WP Polish Army Wojsko Polskie 
WW Internal Army Wojska Wewnętrzne 
ZWZ Union of Armed Combat Związek Walki Zbrojnej 
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The existing Historiography 
 
 
The topic of this thesis, namely the study of the Polish Home Army (Armia 
Krajowa or AK) in the Lublin region (Lubelszczyzna) during the Second 
World War is one that has been long overdue.  The English language 
histories of Poland are still relatively few in number even though the 
Second World War in Poland is one of the most heavily researched topics of 
modern central European history.  Existing histories in the main focus on 
two elements of the wartime experience of Poland.  In English there is quite 
rightly no dearth of material on the Holocaust.  Whilst the other area of 
research into Poland’s wartime experience has focused primarily on 
Warsaw and in particular in the efforts made by the AK during the 
ultimately fruitless Warsaw Uprising of 1944.  These two events, the 
Holocaust and the Warsaw Uprising, were perhaps the two most 
emblematic and horrific events in Poland’s war.  They are symbols of the 
horrific nature of the rule of the General-Government, the occupying 
administration established by the Nazis, and the horrors of the Nazi 
occupation, yet they are not the full story.  As with the story of the Second 
World War in general, until relatively recently and the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, the war was often represented as a war between the good of the 
west (the democratic Anglo-Saxon powers) and the evil of Nazism.  Both the 
Holocaust and the Warsaw Uprising were symbols of the evil of Nazi power, 
and so both have been traditionally given far more coverage in the west 
than other aspects of Poland’s war.  To many casual observers and even to 
many students of history in the west, the story of Poland during the Second 
World War is one of concentration camps and the failure in Warsaw.  This 
is partly due to the relative lack of interest in the experience of Poland, as 
compared to Russia or the Soviet Union, with the result that for much of 
the post-war period English language historiography has been led in both 
Britain and America by Polish émigrés. 
 
There is no shortage of post war Soviet accounts of the war in Poland, or 
rather as their war passed through Poland.  These all put forward a very 
similar, dialectically correct, version of the war.  Marshalls Zhukov, The 
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Memoirs of Marshall Zhukov (London 1969), Konev, The Fall of Berlin 
(MacGibbon 1967), Chuikov and Rokossovskii, A Soldiers Duty (Moscow 
1970), all recorded their accounts of the battle through Poland within thirty 
years of the war ending, and all were predictably dismissive or scathing 
about the Warsaw Uprising and the AK in general.  The only mention they 
make to the force that helped them to clear Lubelszczyzna of the 
Wehrmacht in July 1944 is often along the lines of how unhelpful and 
aggressive the AK forces were towards them.  In all of these Soviet accounts 
it is clear that the AK had to be seen as reactionary, and therefore fascist.  
Being ‘the enemy’ they could not have helped at any stage and they could 
not be given any credit for the liberation of Poland.  What these accounts 
do help to provide, however, is an insight into the direction and speed of 
advance of the Red Any through Poland in the last years of the Second 
World War.  This Soviet stance was mirrored by the historiography in 
Poland during the Stalinist period, in which the AK was dismissed as the 
reactionary force that was responsible for the deaths of so many of its 
countrymen in Warsaw. 
 
For decades, research on the Polish Underground State was restricted both 
in Poland and abroad, largely because the communist People's Republic of 
Poland did not wish to acknowledge the role of non-communist resistance. 
Therefore, during the first post-war Stalinist years, efforts to explore this 
topic were regarded as both illegal and dangerous.  At best, the communist 
state promoted the view that the non-communist resistance movement was 
marginal, while the communist movement (Armia Ludowa or AL) was of 
primary importance; in fact, the opposite was true.    In the aftermath of the 
war, from their permanent exile in London, some of the survivors of the 
failed Warsaw Uprising attempted to battle this by publishing their 
accounts of what had happened.  Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski’s Secret Army 
(1951) provided an excellent account of the overall structure of the AK as 
well as providing an invaluable insight into the command’s thinking in the 
days leading up to the Uprising.  Equally, whilst In Allied London; The 
memoirs of Count Raczyński (1962) provides an overview of the thinking of 
the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, Stanislaw Mikołajczyk’s work 
The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet aggression (1948) put forward from 
the viewpoint of a senior member of the Government-in-Exile, the true 
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extent of Soviet intransigence during the Warsaw Uprising and afterwards.  
All of these books were published within twenty years of the war and 
represent an invaluable source for anyone attempting to understand the 
nature of the underground state which the AK succeeded in establishing.  
Komorowski’s account was particularly important as it represented an 
attempt to right the record of the AK in the face of the pro-Soviet lobby that 
had characterized the Warsaw Uprising as merely an attempt by 
reactionary fools to pervert the people’s will and install a reactionary regime 
in the capital.  At the time of publishing, however, the power of these books 
was by and large lost amongst a barrage of Soviet and communist literature 
on the war.  Undeterred, the émigré community in London and America 
continued to publish their accounts of the Polish war, in particular the 
invaluable Documents on Polish-Soviet relations 1939-45 volumes I and II 
(1967); this comprehensive collection is still an important starting point for 
any English speaker starting a study of the underground.  The importance 
of émigré publishing is highlighted when one considers that the absence of 
research by Polish scholars, along with obstacles presented to foreign 
scholars seeking access to source material in communist Poland, 
contributed to a situation in which there was virtually no discussion of one 
of Europe's largest resistance movements for many years.  
 
It was only during the 1980s that the Communist regime in Poland began 
to moderate its control over the historiography of the AK and allowed 
official publishing of some important books.  This was to lead to a 
schizophrenic attitude within Poland towards the AK in which Polish 
historians such as Mańkowski in Lublin were more or less unable to 
discuss the AK in terms of official scientific discourse whilst 
simultaneously being able to debate privately on the importance of such 
things as the Zamość uprising in 1942. One such example of the 
limitations of this time is Eugeniusz Duraczyński’s Między Londynem a 
Warszawa (1986).   As the title suggests, the book focuses on the links 
between the Government-in-Exile and the role of the Delegate, as well as 
the Delegate’s relations with the AK.  The contention of this work is that 
from early 1943 onwards, Sikorski developed a program of consolidation 
and devoted time to the role of the Delegate.  This work, therefore, touches 
clearly on themes developed in this thesis. It was able to explore the 
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problems between the Government-in-Exile and the AK as preparations for 
an uprising in the homeland began; preparations that were complicated by 
the death of Sikorski and the subsequent tension between Prime Minister 
Mikołajczyk and the Commander-in-Chief Sosnkowski.  It is Duraczyński’s 
contention that the start of Operation Tempest, “Burza”, simply served to 
highlight these problems.  Unfortunately, as with many books of this era, 
the publication date of this book had clearly marred the strength and scope 
of its discussion.  While the story of disagreements in London about the 
role of the Delegate and the RJN are clearly told, the formation of the PKWN 
is discussed in terms acceptable to the climate in 1986 Poland.  It is this 
fact that holds the book back, as much of the discussion of the period after 
the establishment of the PKWN reads very much like an official party line. 
Equally, in one of his earlier works, Kontrowersje i konflikty (1979), 
Duraczyński does briefly mention the Lublin region when giving the origins 
of the underground, and here there is some discussion of the controversy 
over who to appoint as Delegate. Here Duraczyński was able to show how 
this decision was partially the product of ongoing tension between two key 
figures in the Government-in-Exile, Sikorski and Sosnkowski. 
 
Outside of Poland a series of studies on the establishment of communism 
were written during this period such as Poland 1939-1947  (1986) by John 
Coutouvidis and John Reynolds, Krystyna Kersten’s The Establishment of 
Communist rule in Poland, 1943-48  (1991), or L. Swiąkowski’s, The Imported 
Communist revolution and the Civil War in Poland 1944-47  (1982).  Each of 
these studies reflects the limitations put on historians by the communist 
administration, in terms of access to key archival material.  They, therefore, 
focus either on the high level diplomacy of the period, or on the 
establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) by the 
communists and its attempts to gain popularity with the people.  They 
provide a discussion of the installation of the PKWN and the resulting 
arrests of the AK in the area, but their focus is the experience of the whole 
of the country.  Charting the establishment of communist Poland and 
challenging the notion of it being a truly ‘popular’ regime, they tend to look 
at the AK in Lubelszczyzna through the prism of arrests and do not provide 
a study of the organization that was fighting against the installation of 
communism.  They move the narrative beyond the confines of bitter post 
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war recriminations, but because of the lack of access to key archival 
material, their conclusions on the activities of the AK were necessarily light.  
Naturally, their brief focus on Lublin during the year of 1944 does not truly 
expand our knowledge about the AK in the area.  The more detailed English 
language studies from this period mostly focus on the Warsaw Uprising.  
Amongst the most important, Joanna Hansen’s The Civilian Population and 
the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 (1982), provided a sound study of the failed 
uprising and catalogued the experiences of the combatants and the 
civilians caught up in the battle.   
 
Access to new archival materials has meant that for the first time, detailed 
studies of both the AK in Poland and the Government-in-Exile have been 
written.  Both Eugeniusz Duraczyński’s Rząd Polski na Uchodźstawie, 
1939-45 (1993) and Maria Pestowska’s Uchodźcze Paje (1991) primarily 
explore the records of the Government-in-Exile to produce detailed studies 
of the tensions within that body.  There is exhaustive coverage of the 
disagreement between Sikorski and his ministers, exploring issues such as 
the pre-war heritage of Sanacja and opposition parties and relations with 
the host country, mostly Britain.  One of the central themes of these works 
is the concept that Sikorski’s willingness to engage with the Soviet Union 
was central to the disputes within the Government-in-Exile.  This was 
behind their first major crisis when the Government moved to London in 
the summer of 1940; a crisis which put Sikorski at loggerheads with the 
President, and ended in a compromise brokered by Sosnkowski.  
Thereafter, almost any issue could revive the latent antagonisms, and these 
studies chronicle such incidents as the reorganization of troop deployment, 
the confinement of troublesome forces on the Isle of Bute, and Sikorski’s 
pursuing of a personal foreign policy while on regular trips to Canada and 
the United States.  The issue came to a head with the establishing of 
diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in July 1941 and 
Sikorski’s subsequent visit to Stalin in December.  The ministerial crisis 
provoked, including Sosnkowski’s resignation, and the changes in the 
National Council are explored at length.  Thereafter, it is argued that such 
issues as the fate of the Anders Army and the discovery of the Katyn 
massacre was to mean that the issue of Polish-Soviet relations would never 
go away.  Of the two, Pestkowska’s Uchodźcze Pasje sees tension between 
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Sikorski and Sosnkowski as a constant theme. Yet, links with the 
homeland are only touched on in these studies, however.  One work from 
the immediate post-communist period that addresses the issue of the 
homeland is Jerzy Paśnik’s Prawny Status Delegata Rządu na Kraj, 1940-
45 (1991) which focuses specifically on the role of the Delegate.  It sees the 
period 1941-2 as essentially preparatory, but does not avoid detailed 
consideration of the concerns of the political parties at home to the powers 
the Delegate claimed.  The role of the Delegate during Operation Tempest, 
“Burza”, other actions during spring and early summer 1944, as well as the 
Warsaw Uprising and the clash with the new communist authorities are 
analysed in detail. 
  
Magdalena Hułas in her work, Goście czy Intruzi? Rząd polski na 
uchodźstwie wrzesien 1939 – lipiec 1943 (1996), takes a rather different 
approach.  Rather than being a chronological narrative, it explores themes.  
One theme – arguments on the composition of the government – involved 
many of the key discussions covered in both Duraczyński’s Kontrowersje 
and Pestkowska’s Uchodźcze.  Whilst a great deal of detail is devoted to the 
crisis of the summer of 1941, for the author, the height of the crisis was 
early 1943 when the Soviet Union made clear in Stalin’s statement of 1st 
March that the question of borders could no longer be avoided and that the 
Curzon Line was the Soviet Union’s preferred option.  Some of the other 
themes of the book do allow limited discussion of relations with the 
homeland.  In the “structure and organisation” section, the work of the 
KSK is discussed, with some references to Sosnkowski’s gradual ousting by 
the pro-Sikorski Kot.  This section also discusses the work of the Delegate, 
but only briefly and rather schematically.  The “Functioning” section also 
provides an opportunity to discuss contacts between the Government-in-
Exile and its forces in Poland, the use of couriers, contact points, radio 
contacts and the role of Radio Swiat.  Again this is rather summary in 
form, with discussion centring not on what was happening in Poland but 
meetings between Kot and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). 
 
In English there has been a similar evolution in the historiography of the 
Government-in-Exile and the AK.  The Polish historian, Marek Ney-
Krwawicz published his The Polish Home Army in 2001, which whilst 
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primarily being an analytical study of the working of the AK helped to 
provide a detailed look at the organisational structure of the AK as a whole.  
This reflected a trend in Poland in which several studies which limited 
themselves to attempting to chart the structure of the AK were published.  
Studies in Lublin such as Jerzy Jóźwiakowski’s Armia Krajowa na 
Zamojszczyźnie (2007) and Caban’s Oddziały Partyzanckie i samoobrony 
obwodu AK Tomaszów Lubelski (2000) have been good at establishing an 
empirical framework, but they are much weaker on interpretation.  Such 
works are very well researched but they are primarily about presenting the 
documentary evidence in a more coherent manner.  Ney-Krwawicz’s 
English language work was written very much with the notion that it was 
to introduce or to update an English speaking audience to the advances 
being made amongst the Polish archives.  In this he is not alone, and even 
Norman Davies in his well researched Uprising 44; the battle for Warsaw 
(2003), attempted this type of ‘introductory history approach’ to the AK.  
 
One of the major British historians to have gone significantly beyond this 
has been Anita Prażmowska who has been able to link in the politics of the 
Government-in-Exile with its followers on the ground in Poland.  In doing 
this she has provided a bridge between the post 1989 work of Polish 
historians and the historiography of the English speaking world.  In Britain 
and Poland 1939-1943; the betrayed ally (1995) she was able to relate the 
expectations of the Polish Government-in-Exile to the realities of allied 
policy, thus building on the arguments and research of Polish historians 
such as Duraczyński.  Of particular importance to the study of the AK is 
Prażmowska’s Civil War in Poland 1942-1948  (2004) which is the most up 
to date study of the AK in English.  Prażmowska focuses on the split within 
the Polish populace during the period of the Civil War, and in doing so 
reveals much about the nature of the AK and its relations with both those 
groups allied to it such as the Peasant Battalions (BCh) formed by the 
Polish Peasant Party, or its Polish communist enemies. In such arguments 
there has been a clear move away from the discourse of the early 1990s 
which had often sought to stress the weakness of communist support as 
opposed to the weaknesses within the Government-in-Exile’s support. 
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From the early 1960s, mirroring a slowly and cautiously developing trend 
across Poland, both of Lublin’s Universities, the Catholic University and 
Marie Curie University (UMCS) became involved in serious research on the 
topic of the AK.  In particular, Zygmunt Mańkowski and Ireneusz Caban 
were the first locally based historians to look into the activities of the 
independence underground in any great detail.  Any serious study of the 
underground in Lubelszczyzna must still begin with Mańkowski and 
Caban’s ZWZ i AK Okręgu Lubelskim 1939-1944  (1971).  Even though this 
book was researched during the communist period and is more than thirty 
years old, it was the first study to provide a template of underground 
activities.  This work, using documentation that is now mostly in the Lublin 
City archive, is a general study that for the first time exposed the size and 
organisation of the AK in Lubelszczyzna.  It was part of a growing trend in 
the historiography in Poland that started in the 1970s but grew in the 
1980s.  This trend tolerated ‘independentist’ historians interested in the 
wartime struggle for Poland’s independence.  Yet such historians had to be 
happy working on the fringes of the profession and mostly confined 
themselves to reconstructing the activities of the AK underground without 
fully commenting on its scale and importance.  No access was available 
then to communist archives, so the work only covers the period up until 
Operation Tempest, “Burza”, in July 1944.  Yet the work is still a touch-
stone for all subsequent studies of the AK in Lubelszczynza.  In addition to 
this work, both historians have been prolific writers on the independence 
underground as a whole in Lubelszczyzna.  In 1962 and 1964 Mańkowski 
along with Jerzy Markiewicz, and Jan Naumiuk, produced studies on the 
area’s Peasant Party underground the BCh, most notably Bataliony 
chłopskie na Lubelszczyźnie; 1940-1944, (1962).  This study again provided 
a sound and well-researched version of the activities of this force during 
the German occupation.  However, all such works were essentially studies 
of the underground’s role in the fight against the Nazis and therefore they 
were able to pass communist censorship.  Such studies raised awareness 
of the extent of the AK’s activities but because of the constraints of the 
period they were unable to construct a narrative on AK-communist 
relations. 
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Since the fall of the communist regime in 1989 work on the AK and their 
destruction by the Soviet Union and PKWN has literally exploded.  The 
many blanks in Poland’s war time experience captured the collective 
imagination of Poles in the first decade after communism’s fall.  Of the 
many delicate issues that had been largely ignored prior to 1989, the 
destruction of the AK was probably one of the most important and the early 
1990s were witness to a glut of new works focusing on the contribution of 
the Polish non-communist underground.  As already discussed, this 
phenomenon was apparent at the national level, but it was also a process 
that was to be replicated throughout Poland at a regional level.  In this 
process Lublin was not exceptional.  Caban’s work of 1996, Okręg Armii 
Krajowej Lublin, was in effect an update of his work with Mańkowski from 
1972 by utilising new-found access to communist sources.  In this book 
Caban was able to take the AK story in the region into the period of the 
Soviet occupation.  This work, whilst not being detailed on the Soviet 
period, was important in so far as it provides a sense of continuity from the 
German to Soviet periods.  In addition, Caban’s work of 1995, Ludzie 
Lubelskiego Okręgu Armii Krajowej, was a study of the backgrounds of 
many of the men and women who were involved in the upper levels of the 
conspiracy during the 1940s.  These two books, in addition to Caban and 
Mańkowski’s work of 1971 really provide the framework for any study of 
the region’s underground.  Building on this framework other historians 
have began to expand our knowledge of the independence underground in 
the Lublin region.  For example, a series of studies of AK inspectorates in 
Lubelszczyzna were undertaken in the 1990s.  Amongst this number, of 
particular note is J. Kopiński’s Inspektorat Radzyń AK-WiN 1944-56 (1998).  
Anna Kister added to this increasing knowledge of the underground’s 
activities in the region by publishing her work on the activities of the 
command in Lubelszczyzna, Komenda Okręgu Lublin; Armii Krajowej w 
1944 roku, (2000).  This study was amongst the first to focus exclusively on 
the central command structure in Lublin during its most crucial year 1944 
and Kister was able to successfully show that the AK in Lublin was able to 
remain functioning as a coherent entity throughout the whole of 1944, and 
not just up until the August of that year.  Aside from Caban’s work of 
1996, Kister’s study is the only one to focus in depth on the AK through 
into the communist period and utilises both AK documents and those of 
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the communist secret police (UB) from archives in Lublin.  Yet as a study of 
the AK command it has a very narrow focus.  There is yet to be an in depth 
study that focuses on the AK military organisation throughout 1944. 
 
As a part of the national rehabilitation of the AK many different primary 
accounts of the war have been published during the last fifteen years.  
Some accounts are sensational in tone and reflected a post 1989 trend in 
some sections of Polish society to claim ownership of their past via clinging 
to a romanticised notion of  the AK’s fight against the ‘evils’ of the Soviet led 
take over.  Other accounts, which were not intended for publication, are 
important.  One of the later is most definitely the Diary of Zygmunt 
Klukowski.  Klukowski, had been a Polish socialist, and soldier during the 
inter-war period.  By the time of the Nazi occupation he had become the 
local doctor and AK underground information officer in the town of 
Szczebrzeszyn near Zamość.  During the 1940s he faithfully kept a diary of 
the events in his isolated corner of the Lublin region.  The results provide 
any would be historian of the Lubelszczyzna AK with a fascinating people’s 
history, a window, and often a critical window, on the underground in the 
area.  His diaries have been published in both Polish and English, but the 
translation is uneven in quality and accuracy.  Where quoted in this thesis, 
I have attempted to use the most accurately translated passages from the 
English versions or used the Polish version.  The most recent publication of 
his diaries in Polish was in 2007, Zamojszczyzna 1944-1959. 
 
Of course, one of the most important developments in the post 1989 study 
of the AK in Poland has been the creation of the Institute of National 
Remembrance, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (IPN).  IPN was established in 
late 1998 by a special bill and it began its activities in July 2000.  This new 
body, with large government funding was given a mission to research and 
to preserve the memory of losses suffered by the Polish nation during the 
Second World War.  In line with this IPN has conducted (and still conducts) 
several projects on Poland’s wartime experience. It has followed a broad 
spectrum of research, of which the Polish Underground State has been one 
of the most significant.  This has meant that access to the archives of the 
Polish communist security forces has never been better.  Part of IPN’s role 
is to increase public understanding of their past, to help the victims of 
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communism to find out the fates of friends or relatives.  As a part of this 
IPN Lublin currently employs some of the most able researchers on the 
topic of the destruction of the independence underground in the region, 
among them Sławomir Poleszak and Rafał Wnuk,  During the last ten years 
IPN Lublin has continued to publish from their archive, both in the form of 
printed documents ad research papers.  Wnuk was responsible for 
publishing Inspektorat Zamojski AK (1996) along with one of the most 
valuable works on the arrests of the independence underground in 
Lubelszczyzna; Lubelski Okręg AK DSZ i WiN 1944-1947  (2000).   I am 
personally indebted to the help of the researchers at IPN Lublin, and in 
particular to Rafał Wnuk.   
 
However, after the victory of the Right and Justice Party in the 2005 
parliamentary and presidential elections, IPN was visibly subordinated to 
that parties politics.  The new president of the Institute, Janusz Kurtyka as 
well as the new head of the Public Education Office, Jan Żaryn made little 
attempt to conceal their political preferences and this influenced the profile 
of the Institute’s historical studies.  In particular, as was shown at their 
2007 regional conference in Lublin, IPN’s research became weighted 
towards either a narrative of mainly nationalist and right wing 
underground groups or on the suffering and loses of ethnic Poles during 
the war and afterwards.  This focus was apparent not only in written 
research but also in television programmes in which IPN researchers were 
used.  The local television current affairs programme, Panorama Lubelska, 
was witness to a spate of such programmes which emphasised the personal 
role of local ‘heroes’ such as Zapora and their suffering at the hands of the 
communist security forces.  By contrast, more controversial figures in the 
independence underground were often glossed over.  After the defeat of the 
Right and Justice Party in the elections of 2007, the new liberal Prime 
Minister, Donald Tusk did not attempt to exert such control over the focus 
of IPN’s research.  Such attempts to control the historical discourse on the 
AK has equally had an impact on the study of other underground forces.  
Piotr Gontarczyk’s Polska Partia Robotnicza; Droga do władzy 1941-44 
(2006) is a classic example of how the discourse on subjects such as the 
role of the communist underground and their relations with the AK is still 
polarised twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain.  The counterpoint 
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to such works are sympathetic portrayals such as that espoused by 
Ryszard Nazarewicz in Armii Ludowej dylematy i dramaty (1998).  
 
In addition to the existing secondary sources, for this thesis I have used 
archival materials from three main sources.  Firstly, I have been able to 
make use of materials at the Polish Underground Study trust, in Ealing, 
London.  This archive is an often underused resource, especially by English 
language historians.  The archive is home to deciphered reports sent from 
the AK to the UK during the period of my study.  The strength of utilising 
such materials lies in the fact that whilst ciphers from central command in 
Warsaw have been often gone over, the reports from regional centres such 
as Lublin are much less used.  In particular, such reports offer a rich vein 
of evidence on the tactics and organisational state of the AK in the region of 
Lublin up until the last months of 1944.  They therefore cover the crucial 
first six month period of the Soviet Red Armies presence in the region. 
 
I was lucky enough to live and work in Lublin for two years and during my 
time there I was able to access two archives, the first of which was the 
Lublin City Archive.  In this archive I was able to study both the regional 
AK and BCh’s internal reports and communiqués during the last months of 
the German occupation.  In such reports contained much new evidence 
about the planning for the Soviet Army and its arrival in the province and 
by studying this information it enabled me to highlight the strength and 
organisation of the regional AK and BCh in the spring and summer of 
1944.  When attempting to build on our current understanding of how the 
underground alliance worked in practice, access to such materials were of 
the utmost importance. 
 
The third archival source was the IPN archive in Lublin.  As already 
mentioned, I am indebted to several of the researchers at this archive as 
they were constantly helpful and supportive in my attempts to finish my 
thesis.  The strength of the IPN archives lies in the fact that it is the home 
to the secret police (UB) files on the underground and its activities in the 
Lublin region in the crucial first year after the Red Army’s arrival in the 
province.  The filing system at this archive reflects the county by county 
structure of the UB and the files on the ‘illegal underground movement’ 
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have been split down into ‘characteristic’ files that outline the activities and 
characteristics of the underground in given counties.  There are limitations 
to the empirical usefulness of these files as many were reordered by local 
historians from UMCS during a period between the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  Some files are simply an overview of the ‘characteristics’ of county 
level AK groups that were written during this period of ‘reorganisation’ 
thirty years after the fact.  However, many of these files contain the original 
orders and communiqués of the AK and its successor organisations during 
1945 and 1946 and they are therefore an invaluable source of information 
for historians attempting to gain a greater understanding of the activities of 
the underground in the province.  They have enabled this thesis to track 
the moves of the Lublin AK command beyond August 1944.  As is shown 
from the evidence in the Lublin IPN archive, the AK in Lublin did not 
simply fold after August 1944 and neither did it simply collapse into a 
myriad of tiny guerrilla groupings.  As this thesis shows, the collapse was 
long and painful, and the anti-communist underground was to remain 
significant for over a year after the arrival of the Red Army.   Access to this 
archive has been crucial, therefore, as it has enabled this thesis to chart 
the often painful dilemmas that faced and ultimately defeated the 
underground alliance of the Government-in-Exile in Lublin. 
 
 Between these three archival sources I have been able to construct a thesis 
that is unique in so far as it is a regional study of the Polish underground 
in English.  It uses the idea of a local case study to re-examine some of the 
strategic dilemmas faced by the AK and explore alternative tactics that 
could have been followed. 
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Introduction 
 
September 1939- March 1944 
 
 
Creating an underground state 
 
Poland Fights 
 
The Government-in-Exile and its supporters in Poland managed to create 
an underground army as an integral part of a functioning and well 
structured underground state.  Within five years, the entire fabric of a 
government was formed in Nazi occupied Poland, an underground military, 
underground press, underground courts, and underground political 
institutions.  This process was to be framed by the nature of the occupiers 
of Poland and it was a process that was to be uneven.  Given the size and 
range of the forces operating in Poland throughout the war, the forces loyal 
to the Government-in-Exile had to attempt to unify as much of Polish 
society behind its banner as politically possible.   
 
At the end of the September War, the access routes to Hungary and 
Romania had remained open in the middle of September long enough for 
70-80,000 Polish troops to escape into exile. 8 In anticipation of future 
Polish resistance on 27th September 1939 The Polish Victory Service, 
Służba Zwycięstwu Polski (SZP), was formed in order to provide an 
organisational umbrella for the new underground fight.  It began as the 
result of separate initiatives from, firstly, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz, the 
Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces at the start of the war, and 
Major-General Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz.  It was to be, from its very 
inception, an extension of the exiled government in occupied Poland.  The 
SZP was not only to wage an armed struggle against the occupiers but it 
was also to provide civilian centres of administration; namely the new 
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underground force in Poland would be both a civilian and military force, it 
would provide defence for the Polish people and government. 2 
 
In the Lubelszczyzna region, a new branch of the SZP was created.  What 
was to become the Lubelszczyzna SZP and then eventually the AK grew out 
of the Lublin Defence Committee, Komitet Obrona Lublin (KOL).  This 
organisation was formed during the September War and many of the 
members of this organisation were to form the core of the underground 
struggle during the German occupation.  At the time of the September war 
Senator Stefan Lelek, a judge at the Lublin court of appeal, led the KOL.  3 
When Lublin fell to the Germans the role of the KOL was to change to that 
of an underground force.  On 21st September the commander of the 
“Lublin” Army, General Tadeusz Piskor began the process of establishing 
an underground conspiracy in the city.   The other fledgling underground 
force in the area was the White Eagle Organisation, Organizacji Orla 
Białego (OOB), which was commanded by Major Kazimierz Kierzkowski.  
On 27th Senator Lelek met with Kierzkowski to begin talks on creating a 
unified elected position of chairman and on creating a unified, 
administrative structure for the underground in the Lubelszczyzna area.  
By the middle of October this regional unit had established links to General 
Michał Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz and the central SZP command. 4  
 
 
Stefan Lelek 
(I. Caban and Z. Mańkowski, Związek Walki Zbrojnej i Armia Krajowa w Okręgu 
Lubelskim 1939- 1944, Lublin 1971) 
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The Commander of SZP from 26th September 1939 until 4 th December 1939, 
General Michał Tokarzewski, “Torwid”. 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 2007) 
 
 
At the same time that the SZP was being formed in Poland, another 
resistance force was being forged abroad.  On 13th November Polish 
military leaders in exile created the Union of Armed Combat, Związek Walki 
Zbrojnej (ZWZ), with the new force’s leader being General Kazimierz 
Sosnkowski.  The ZWZ remit was to stimulate national resistance through 
armed combat.  Once liberation was achieved, it was to dissolve itself back 
into the regular armed forces.  The ZWZ was to be a disciplined, 
hierarchical and uniformed military force.  In fact, it was to be the only 
force in Poland with the right to wear Polish military uniform.  Therefore, 
initially the Polish underground consisted of two forces one, the ZWZ, a 
military force, and the SZP a civilian-military organisation.  In practice 
however even from the end of 1939 these two forces had a relatively close 
working partnership.  On 4th December 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of 
all Polish armed forces, General Władysław Sikorski, sent the first 
organisational instructions for the underground to Colonel Stefan Rowecki, 
the Chief of Staff of the SZP High Command in Poland.  From this point on 
the operating structures of the SZP and ZWZ became in effect one. 5 
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The Commander of ZWZ-AK from 30th June 1940 until 30 th June 1943, 
General Stefan Rowecki, “Grot”. 
(M. Ney-Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army 1939- 1945, PUMST 2001) 
 
In Lubelszczyzna the process of unification and growth of the regional 
command mirrored the increased organisation of the force at a national 
and international level.  From November 1939 commanders of SZP units 
were appointed and placed into their commands in the regions of 
Lubelszczyzna.  However the first real increase in the size and organisation 
of the underground in Lubelszczyzna came during the spring of 1940.  
During this period the SZP extended its reach to the whole of the region 
and fine-tuned the organisation towards the ‘military struggle’ against the 
occupiers.  From July 1940, Tadeusz Pełczynski headed the SZP in 
Lubelszczyzna.  Subsequent leaders of the government’s military forces in 
Lubelszczyzna under the German occupation were Ludwik Bittner, 1st 
August 1941 - January 1943, and Kazimierz Tumidajski, from January 
1943 until his arrest by the Soviets in August 1944.  6  
 
The message of these developments was clear: in exile, and in the face of 
defeat, the Polish freedom fight would carry on.  In these events lay the 
seeds of the future Home Army.  The underground state that was to emerge 
by 1944 was composed of three main strands.  The ZWZ-AK was the official 
army of the underground state and the only force that was recognised by 
the Government-in-Exile as a part of the Polish army, Wojsko Polskie.  In 
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addition to this many of the most important Polish political parties were to 
be represented in the Council of National Unity, Rada Jedności Narodowej 
(RJN).  Finally the third main strand of the underground state as it was to 
eventually emerge was the administration apparatus the Government 
Delegate’s office at home, Delegatura Rządu RP na Kraj.   
 
 
The Armia Krajowa 
 
As a vital part of the establishing of an underground loyal to the exiled 
government, the newly formed government in exile very quickly began to 
establish their links to the underground in Poland, firstly via runners who 
went across the continent from Gibraltar to the motherland, and then via 
daily wireless reports.  From 1940 to 1944 the underground and its links to 
London were strengthened and refined.  During this time the underground 
went from being a cadre to an underground army.  However it must be 
stressed, that as was to be expected in such extreme operating 
circumstances, the AK was to always suffer from hazily defined allegiances 
with those operating on its fringes.   
 
The use of the actual term Home Army dates mainly from a telegram that 
General Sikorski sent to the ZWZ Commander-in-Chief and to the 
government Delegate of the Polish Republic at Home on 3rd September 
1941.  In the telegram he repeatedly referred to the 'Military Organisation 
at Home' 7.  From this point onwards General Rowecki, one of the 
recipients of the telegram, began using the term Armed Forces at Home to 
refer to forces under his command.  On 14 th February 1942 Sikorski 
officially merged the ZWZ with the SZP to create a unified underground 
army.  The result became known as the Armia Krajowa or Home Army.  
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The organisation of the Home Army (AK) General Headquarters by the 
summer of 1944 
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The new combined force was run from this central command in Warsaw 
and by the time of its height in the spring of 1944 it was subdivided into 
sixteen regional branches, 89 inspectorates and 278 districts.  Its sixteen 
regional branches were as follows: Pomerania, Poznan, Łódź, Silesia, Kielce, 
Krakow, Lublin, Lvov, Stanisław, Ternopol, Volhynia, Polesie, Białystok, 
Novogrudok, Vilna and Warsaw.  8 By mid 1944 each district was in daily 
radio contact with the Polish high command in London and Warsaw.  Each 
regional branch had a centrally appointed commander who along with his 
deputy, the regional Chief-of-Staff, would supervise and co ordinate the 
activities of the region.  They received their orders directly from Warsaw 
and passed instructions down the chain to the inspectorates.  Each region, 
such as Lublin had its own version of the central command set up that 
contained Bureaus I-VI.  Below this level, the commanders of the 
inspectorates co-ordinated the activities of the Districts that formed the 
grass roots battalions and infantry units of the force.  In turn, officers 
within the district command who received their orders from inspectorate 
command, were appointed to specialise in and supervise specific activities, 
such as sabotage, intelligence and diversions.  The smallest administrative 
units were at village level where around three to four villages on average 
would make up a unit that was subordinate to the district commanders. 9 
 
In the Lublin region the internal division of the command was, as in other 
areas, based on the pre-war administrative map of the area.  By the spring 
of 1941, the regional command had been structured into three 
inspectorates: Inspectorate North, Inspektorat Północ; Inspectorate Centre, 
Inspekorat Środek; and Inspectorate South, Inspektorat Południe.  As the 
organisation of the Lubelszczyzna underground grew and the number of 
recruits increased, so the command structure was enlarged accordingly.  
The original three-inspectorate structure was enlarged to four during the 
second half of 1941.  The four Inspectorates were at this point: Pu ławy, 
Radzyń, Lublin and Zamość.  In September 1942 this was then enlarged to 
five inspectorates.  10 From this point on, each one of the fourteen pre-war 
districts within the region matched one AK district.  In addition to this, 
three to four districts made up an inspectorate and the commanders of 
these units as described above were directly sub-ordinate to the regional 
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commander. The outline of the regional command as it was to emerge in 
Lubelszczyzna follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 It was clear that the ZWZ/AK was to be a highly organised and disciplined 
army, not merely a loose grouping of partisan bands.  In fact within a 
relatively short time it had the numbers to back up this claim.  By the time 
of the height of its membership and influence in mid 1944, the AK's ranks 
numbered at around 350,000. 12 Within four years the Poles had created 
the largest and most organised underground network in Europe. 
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The above map shows the inspectorate boundaries of the ZWZ-AK-DSZ-WiN 
command in Lubelszczyzna 
(IPN Lublin) 
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Creating a unified AK in Lubelszczyzna 
 
The government that had been created in Paris before the fall of France was 
an interesting mixture of the opposition parties of pre-war Poland.  The 
original government of the Polish Second Republic had been interned in 
1939 at the Romanian border town of Czernowiec and whilst this 
government had refused to consider broadening its political base before its 
internment, the government that was formed in Paris was a government of 
national unity.  Yet tellingly, it was due to French pressure that the Polish 
Government-in-Exile had included all shades of Polish political opinion.  
Thus the government of national unity was to be composed of parties that 
had enjoyed popular support in the pre-war era but had remained out of 
power due to the Sanacja regime’s undemocratic government bloc.  The 
four main groupings in the new political alliance were the Peasant Party 
(PSL), the Socialist Party (PPS), the National Democrats (ND) and the 
Christian Democrat Labour Party (SP).  The new government represented 
both in Poland and in the exiled community, a broad cross section of Polish 
society and Politics.  Their united goal was the liberation of Poland, yet 
consensus was to rarely stretch beyond this broad aim. This was to be 
something that was to be a feature of the Government-in-Exile from its 
inception; Polish society and politics suffered from serious divisions, both 
the Government-in-Exile and the resistance which it helped to foster in 
Poland often reflected this fact.  13 
 
Therefore, the forces of the underground in Poland, as an arm of the exiled 
government, were ultimately to reflect the nature of that government; it was 
a resistance coalition that represented a cross section of Polish politics and 
society.  Throughout the period of the German occupation the original core 
of the underground attempted to create a coalition in the homeland that 
would reflect the government in London.  This was a task that was to meet 
with varying levels of success.  The AK after all was a military force that 
was manned by many of the pre war Polish Army and was therefore linked 
in the minds of many in the Peasant and Nationalist camps to the 
militarization of Poland during the late 1930s.  This meant that for some 
Poles, the AK was initially a source of mistrust–both the National and 
Peasant parties had created their own functioning military undergrounds 
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and they were not alone in this.  The number of organisations which were 
originally operating independently of the SZP-ZWZ, what was to become the 
AK, in fact was huge: the total number of organisations operating in 
Lubelszczyzna is estimated by Rafał Wnuk as being over 100.   In the 
attempt to construct a form of unified ‘front’ it was necessary for the forces 
of the SZP-ZWZ/AK in Lubelszczyzna to work with as many of these other 
groups as politically possible.  This was eventually to mean that all sizeable 
non-communist groups that were fighting for an independent Poland were 
brought mostly within the AK.   
 
In particular, the largest, most influential group outside of the AK, the 
Peasant Battalions, Bataliony Chłopskie (BCh) were amongst one of the 
most important groupings to be brought under the AK umbrella.  In 
addition to this the Lubelszczyzna AK worked with and absorbed the 
following groupings: Komende Obronców (KOP), Organizacje Wojskowa 
(OW), Organizacje Orla Białego (OOB), Związek Czymu Zbrojnego (ZCZ), 
Polska Organizacje Zbrojne (POZ), Konfederacje Zbrojna (KZ), and the 
Konsolidacje Longinusów Organizacje Niepodległościowych (KPN).  All of 
these forces were eventually brought under the AK banner by the local 
command to form larger more uniform units. 14 However the number of 
underground networks initially operating in the region varied from area to 
area, for example in Lublin the KOP was the initial dominant force in the 
underground but it was only one of several underground groupings 
operating in the area before integration.   However, in other districts such 
as Tomaszów Lubelski, there were only a small percentage of people who 
started the underground conspiracy in the ranks of an organisation other 
than the ZWZ. 15  
 
This process of integration was often pushed by a myriad of different 
factors.  It should not be seen as a simple case of organisations being 
absorbed evenly into a government led force, some forces were never 
effectively merged into the Lubelszczyzna AK’s ranks whilst others joined 
the AK only after German actions had weakened their ability to act 
independently.  For example, during 1940-41 mass arrests of KOP 
members by the Germans meant that the structure of this force was 
massively undermined.  As a result, the KOP effectively ceased to have a 
 31
coherent operating structure and effectively disappeared by 1943.  A large 
part of the forces that had been a part of the KOP went into the ZWZ-AK, 
fold but other parts of the KOP moved into groupings such as the 
Nationalist underground, NOW, in Włodawa, POZ in Chełm or the military 
organisation “Unia” in Lublin.  Units of the POZ were joined to the AK 
during the second half of 1942, whilst “Unia” units were integrated during 
the spring of 1943.  All of the aforementioned forces were often localised to 
a few districts of Lubelszczyzna.  For example when “Unia” was integrated 
the force provided an additional 1000 members to the ranks of the local 
AK.  Yet this force had been operating since 1940 only in the central 
districts of the region.  16 In contrast to this the ZWZ-AK was able to 
integrate forces that were operating throughout the region such as ZCZ. 17 
 
Nationally, perhaps the bulk of the AK's manpower came from its 
sometimes-uneasy alliance with the BCh, the military wing of the Peasant 
Party.  Given the rural nature of much of Poland, the peasants made up the 
largest part of the population and their support was crucial for the AK.  
This was especially so in Lubelszczyzna, which was an overwhelmingly 
rural province, and which was to become home to one of the largest 
regional branches of the BCh.  The history and organisation of this force 
was quite similar to that of the AK.  From September 1940 onwards 
peasant military bands had started to form throughout occupied Poland 
and by 1941 they had created a nationwide underground force.  By the end 
of 1942 the BCh had organised a command structure in all of the districts 
of Lubelszczyzna.   This region was to become Region IV of the national 
organisation.  Its structure was to become very similar to that of the AK 
with commands divided and sub-divided equally throughout the country.  
In Lubelszczyzna the BCh as it was to emerge took the following structure: 
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Within each of these areas BCh units were split down into tactical units, 
territorial units, special units and forest partisan units.  Like the AK, BCh 
units played a large part in actions against the German authority’s 
deportations of Poles from the south of the province during 1942-43. After 
this point, from 1943-44 BCh tactical units remained but territorial units 
were changed into units of the Panstwowy Korpus Bezpieczeństwa (PKB), 
and Straż Samorządowa, which were now directly subordinated to the 
Delegatura to act as police forces in the future.  The remaining units were 
formed into the Ludowa Straż Bezpieczeństwa, which would act as a 
security force. 18  
  
The AK estimated that at the beginning of 1944, BCh total strength 
nationally was around 50,000 men, 19 with the bulk of this number 
operating in the Lublin, Warsaw, Krakow and Radom regions.  The BCh 
was officially incorporated into the AK by the beginning of 1944, however, 
some BCh bands were to remain outside the AK command structure, 
fighting their own private war against Ukrainian nationalists, Soviet 
partisans and Polish communists.  It is important to remember that 
Poland, like many other eastern European societies experienced a large 
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cultural divide between its town and country folk.  Rural Poland was very 
much a subculture of its own, and the traditional rural suspicion towards 
the ruling classes, the towns, and vice versa, had a large part to play.  In 
this respect the experiences of the Lublin AK were not unique.   So it must 
be emphasised that whilst the BCh contributed around 12,000 men to the 
ranks of the AK in the Lublin region, the integration of these two forces was 
to remain very much at a surface level in many areas. 20 
 
The process of integration was complicated therefore by several factors.  
Perhaps first above all in Lublin was the fact that the Pi łsudski coup d’ etat 
and subsequent militarization of Polish political life in the 1930s had 
meant that many of the main political parties and the people that they 
represented had been marginalized.  Therefore, there existed even before 
the war an often-considerable antipathy to the ‘officer class’ that had been 
at the forefront of this process.  In regions such as Lublin, where the AK 
had a considerable officer core, this antipathy was often directed against 
them - certain sections of the peasantry were determined that the military 
were not to deny them political power in the new Poland as they had in the 
old. This was especially true of members of the Peasant Party, Stronnictwo 
Ludowe (SL).  The SL was consistently suspicious of the AK and its 
members were to withhold their arms and resources even after integration.  
 
These suspicions in the main were exasperated by the AK's refusal to 
consistently share their weapons’ stash with the BCh.  This was to prove to 
be a running sore throughout the war.  The perception that the AK had 
more weapons than they needed was a common one, and it was often 
interpreted that the AK were withholding weapons for Political reasons.  
Rumours went around the countryside that the AK had huge stashes of 
weapons hidden from 1939 and that these had now been added to by large 
allied air-drops.  Many peasants therefore felt that the AK command was 
too representative of the old Sanacja hierarchy and believed that to retain a 
degree of autonomy for their units would guarantee a stronger peasant 
voice in the future of Poland. 21 Such ideas were typical of the peasant 
movement, if indeed it can be referred to as such at a local level.  Many 
peasants had joined local bands in order to defend their villages and their 
homes from attack.  The rationale for fighting was often, therefore, down to 
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parochial considerations; in such a situation it was to be expected that the 
AK's attempt to weld such men into a unified army produced uneven 
results to say the least.  
 
Therefore, in some areas of the province the integration was successful and 
in other areas it was decidedly limited.  One area in which the BCh 
integration was successful was in Lubartów, in the north of Lublin 
inspectorate.  In this area during the first years of the occupation the 
National Party’s underground had been the largest grouping, with a strong 
SL presence in the parishes of Michów, Tarło and Łuck.  The BCh in the 
region had been established in 1940, whilst the AK didn’t start to effectively 
organise itself until the second half of 1943.  This meant that when the AK 
began its development it was being formed at the same time as the BCh 
and, as a result, the two had a close operating relationship from the 
beginning.  The integration of the BCh began in the second half of 1943 
and by June 1944 the staffs of the AK and BCh were fully integrated in 
Lubartów.  The region’s deputy commander, Aleksander Fil, “Foch”, was 
from the BCh and in most of the posts of Lubartów the rank of assistant 
commander was ultimately to be filled by BCh officers - in post IV Jan 
Jarmoszuk, “Ryś” of the BCh was the assistant commander, as was Józef 
Białek, “Wiarus”, of post III.  22 
 
 
 
This picture shows the meeting of the Zamość district AK and BCh on 25th 
May 1944.  At this meeting Stanisław Książek, “Wyrwa”, and Michał Polak, 
“Żelazny” signed the integration protocol. 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 2007) 
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However, this was not the case throughout the Lublin region.  In 
Lubelszczyzna as in many parts of the country the SL, the socialist wing of 
the peasant movement, had a virtual monopoly on positions in the 
Delegatura and other non-military posts in the underground, and members 
of this group often adopted a negative stance to the AK.  In addition to this, 
the BCh had more soldiers in certain areas of Lublin province by 1944 than 
the AK itself.  This meant that when integration was attempted in 
Lubelszczyzna, the prevailing attitude amongst many in the BCh was that 
the AK was a competing organisation.   
 
The argument over officer appointments, as I. Caban has pointed out, 
served to reinforce other problems.  The key to this lay in the fact that the 
AK attempted, wherever possible to incorporate officers of other forces into 
the officer corps of the AK.    However in a large portion of Lubelszczyzna 
the BCh lacked a strong officer corps of its own meaning that the local AK 
weren’t willing to appoint many BCh men to positions of command.  
Despite BCh NCOs and other ranks willingness to fill officer posts, the AK 
was unwilling to appoint non-trained personnel to the rank of officers.  
Many of the BCh’s small officer corps felt that they were entering into a 
union between equals and not entering into a commitment of subjugation.  
However if BCh officers met the grade then they were integrated into the 
AK’s command structure; this was the case in Krasnystaw, Chełm and 
Zamość, in which BCh officers were functioning in positions of integrated 
command with the AK from as early as 22nd February 1944.   
 
The reasoning behind the AK’s officer policy lay in the fact that the AK 
represented the Polish Army in Poland, and forces such as the BCh were 
officially seen as militias that were allied to the army.  Officers from the 
‘militias’ were used wherever possible in the integrated command structure, 
but only when those officers had undergone the same military training as 
their AK equivalents. The problems of integration were often aggravated 
when large numbers of BCh soldiers were subjugated to smaller AK forces 
under such conditions, as was often the case in the far south-east.  Viewed 
from a parochial perspective, resentment was not therefore surprising.  
Because of the friction between the AK command and BCh units in the 
area on this issue, AK soldiers began to swear the BCh’s oath of allegiance 
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as a symbol of unity.  But as I. Caban has pointed out, even after this, 
many in the BCh felt that it was a case of the AK joining the BCh and not 
of the BCh joining the AK.  23  
 
In districts such as Tomaszów Lubelski, in the far south of the region, the 
main driver for integration of the BCh and the AK was the Ukrainian-Polish 
conflict in this area.  This was also true of the integration of these forces in 
Biłgoraj and a part of Zamość district.  The operations of forces such as the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia (UPA) created 
unity in these areas, much more so than any unified political ideology; a 
sense of shared defence accelerated the integration.  The result of this was 
that many underground posts in the south of Tomaszów Lubelski, such as 
Łukawica or Lipsko, were manned overwhelmingly by BCh men, who were 
still integrated into the command of the much smaller AK company “Narol”.  
Yet in areas such as the ones already mentioned, or in post IV of the 
Tomaszów Lubelski district, Krynice-Tarnawatka, this was to lead to bigger 
problems in the long run.  It seemed to be the case that Polish unity was 
fine, as long as the numerically dominant force in the area was in charge.  
In post IV the vast majority of the underground was composed of BCh and 
as late as the 1st July 1944, the area commander, Tomasz Niedzialkowski, 
“Tomasz”, was reporting that: ‘(There is) a difficult atmosphere during 
operations.’  24 Indeed in some areas BCh units were not integrated into the 
local AK command until a matter of weeks before the Red Army arrived in 
the province.  
 
The integration of NOW forces into the regional command in Lublin was no 
easier for the AK.  The regional branch of the military arm of the National 
Party, Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa, had been formed in 1939 and by 
1942 this force was operating in all the districts of Lubelszczyzna.  Yet this 
organisation was not strong throughout the region, for example in the 
Biłgoraj district NOW units never held influence outside of the Krzeszów 
parish.  The districts in which NOW was operating in strength at the time 
of the integration were: Chełm, Włodawa, Lubartów, Lublin, Kraśnik and 
Hrubieszów.  In addition to this NOW units were operating in the forests of 
the districts of Siedlce, Łuków and Biała Podlaska.25 
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In 1942, NOW forces signed a contract of integration within the local AK, 
which like the BCh’s integration allowed NOW units to retain a degree of 
autonomy.  However, the AK did not find it easy to reconcile the most 
nationalist elements within the NOW camp into its structure.  Whilst the 
contract of integration that NOW units signed stipulated that NOW units 
were to remain whole and not be spilt up amongst AK units, this autonomy 
was insufficient for many.  According to I. Caban, most of the NOW units in 
Chełm district did not integrate with the AK, and in addition to this a 
significant number of NOW forces in Janów Lubelski, Krasnystaw, 
Tomaszów Lubelski and Biłgoraj failed to merge. 26 This meant that when 
NOW units were incorporated into the Lubelszczyzna AK out of a 
membership of around 4,000 only 2,000 of that number joined the AK.  
Once integrated NOW commanders played a full role in the command 
structure of the AK in Lubelszczyzna with some becoming district 
commanders and deputy commanders.   
 
NOW units that did not integrate into the AK joined a variety of factions but 
many of the remainder joined the National Armed Forces, Narodowe Siły 
Zbrojne (NSZ).  Created in November 1942, the NSZ, was to become the 
extremist nationalist underground force in occupied Poland.  This force was 
to act primarily as a destabilising influence in the region throughout this 
period and by 1944 was estimated to have around 4,700 members in 
Lubelszczyzna.  27 This force was at its strongest in Lubelszczyzna in the 
districts of Janów Lubelski, Łuków and Chełm.  It was also operating in the 
districts of Lublin, Lubartów, Krasnystaw and Puławy, although not as 
strongly.  Therefore, whilst small in relation to the rest of the underground, 
its force was sizable in local terms, and the AK command started 
negotiations with the NSZ to bring it within the overall umbrella of the 
regional command in June 1944.  These negotiations were in part 
successful, but again only loosely brought what was in effect a far right 
organisation within the AK fold.  This was to have significant implications 
later under the new Soviet administration, as it would add a certain fuel to 
the communist claim that the whole of the AK was fascist and reactionary. 
28 However, in practice it was clear that the NSZ would not be acting as an 
integral part of the AK in Lubelszczyzna, resistance from many officers in 
the NSZ to subordinating themselves to the AK command saw to this.  In 
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addition, due to the late timing of the negotiations it was not practical to 
achieve an actual merging of the two groups.  This meant that the AK in 
Lubelszczyzna had the dubious honour of officially including a right-wing 
nationalist group in its organisational structure, and yet and at the same 
time have little direct control over it when the fight for liberation began.     
 
 Whilst officially still separate from the AK during the period from the end 
of 1943 to the beginning of 1944, the NSZ had launched punitive 
campaigns against communist and Ukrainian bands throughout the south-
east of Poland.  After the revelation of the massacre at Katyn, NSZ bands in 
effect involved themselves in a mini civil war with the Polish communist 
underground and this characterised the nature of events in Lubelszczyzna 
during spring 1944.  In the south-west of the region, around Kraśnik and 
in the Janów Forest, the local NSZ were involved in a series of tit-for-tat 
killings with AL units, in particular with the infamous “Cień” unit.  For 
example in the village of Monaki in response to an earlier communist 
attack, a NSZ unit killed the father of a local AL member “Mewa”.  On 20th 
March 1944 soldiers under the command of captain “Cich” killed a radical 
local peasant who had been ‘co-operating’ with the PPR.  29 From the spring 
of 1944 onwards these anti-communist units were officially militias allied 
to the forces of the Government-in-Exile.  
 
The development of the Lubelszczyzna AK 
 
The AK in the Lublin region started partisan activities exceptionally early 
when compared to other AK regional commands.  Yet, as the research of 
Zygmunt Mańkowski and I Caban shows in their study of the area’s 
underground, until 1943 the activities of the Lubelszczyzna AK were often 
half-hearted and many initiatives were to remain permanently in the 
developmental stage. 30 The main reason that the Lubelszczyzna AK was to 
become one of the AK’s largest command groups by 1944 was due to the 
nature of the brutality meted out by the province’s German occupiers.  As 
part of the German administration’s implementation of Generalplan Ost, a 
large proportion of the region’s Polish population was displaced.  Under 
this plan, the districts of Zamość, Tomaszów and Hrubieszów were to be 
made into bastions of ethnic German settlement in the east.  The beautiful 
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Polish city of Zamość was renamed ‘Himmlerstadt’ in anticipation of the 
city’s new, ethnically German future.  Between November 1942 and August 
1943 the German authorities displaced around 100,000 Poles from the 
Zamość area. 31 The rapid and early growth of large partisan forces in the 
Lublin region can be directly linked to this action, and the response to it 
was virtually immediate, with new partisan groupings springing up from 
the grassroots level.  This can be seen by the fact that already by the 
beginning of 1943 there were six partisan units operating in Lubelszczyzna.  
By the middle of the year, at the height of the deportations, this number 
had grown hugely to fourteen partisan units.  By the year’s end this 
number stood at seventeen units. Perhaps what is more telling is that the 
overwhelming number of these units were based in the Zamość 
inspectorate.  In addition to this the geography of Lubelszczyzna helped to 
reinforce this precise concentration of partisans to the south and east of 
the region, as the area to the south of Zamość was very suited to this type 
of operation.  To the south lay forests, rolling hills and moor-land, all 
perfect for hiding increasingly numerous underground units. There were 
other woods in the centre and north of the region such as the Parczew and 
Lubartów forests, but they were much smaller, and the areas surrounding 
them were not witness to mass deportations on the scale witnessed in 
Zamość, meaning that the development of the AK was much slower than in 
the south.  
 
 
The Warsaw Company from the Zamość inspectorate presenting arms, 
summer 1943 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 2007) 
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Tactical units from Zamość district concentrating for operations, 15th August 
1943 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 2007) 
 
In Lubelszczyzna therefore, the growth of underground units was uneven.  
The table below provides a breakdown of the growth of partisan units and 
their Inspectorate of origin.  It helps to show quite clearly how the 
exceptional circumstances in the Zamość inspectorate led to that area 
being home to the largest number of forces in the region.  Indeed one of the 
worst effected areas of the ethnic conflict and deportations, the Tomaszów 
Lubelski district, had a huge 2,459 AK members in its ranks by as early as 
October 1943.  Whereas most of the development of the Tomaszów AK took 
place during the turn of 1943-1944, it was still months earlier than the 
development of the AK in other areas, most of which had only organised 
40-60% of their forces by the spring of 1944. 32 The table below excludes 
the 27th Division and other units whose origin was outside of the 
Lubelszczyzna region: 
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Table of the number of Partisan units in Lubelszczyzna and their 
Inspectorate of origin 
 
Inspectorate 1942 First half of 1943 Second half of 1943 1944 Total 
Lublin   -            1             1   10  12 
Chełm   -            2             1   7  10 
Puławy   -            -             4   1  5 
Radzyń   -            -             3   3  6 
Zamość   2            13             8   14  37 
Total   2            16             17   35  70 
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As the above table shows, the German clearing of the south of 
Lubelszczyzna for settlement had a huge impact on the development of the 
AK in the area.  It was also to mean that from the end of 1942 until the end 
of 1944, the bulk of the AK’s support and manpower was heavily tilted 
towards the south of the province.  It should also be remembered that it 
was in the east of the AK’s Zamość inspectorate that the UPA started their 
operations during 1943.  In the Chełm and Radzyń inspectorates, to the 
east and north of the city of Lublin, perhaps the development of the AK can 
be best described as showing more ‘natural growth’, i.e. steadily increasing 
support as the result of the German occupation and the approach of the 
front. 
 
From September 1943 onwards, the AK operated what was in effect a 
three-tier force.  The front tier included all soldiers in active units or units 
with distinctive functions i.e. sabotage, intelligence (BIP) communications.  
Part of such front tier forces were the “Kedyw” units.  “Kedyw”, an 
acronym for Kierownictwo Dywersji, the Special Operations Directorate, 
were formed from existing organisations within the AK on 22nd January 
1943.  Initially these units were town-based, but as they grew in number 
they moved into the forests.  Specifically “Kedyw” units, such as the 
“Zapora” unit in Puławy inspectorate, were responsible for active and 
passive sabotage and propaganda against the occupiers and collaborators.  
The second tier of the AK was the reserve force.  Reserve forces were those 
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without specific orders or units that had been withdrawn from action.  For 
example, once a unit had been discovered by the German authorities it 
would be “burned”, i.e. it would be dispersed or hidden to protect the 
remaining troops.  Equally, reserves could be created if individuals or units 
were suffering from ill-health or fatigue.  Finally, the third tier of the AK 
was for the suspended units, which, as the title suggests was composed of 
units that had been frozen by the regional command.  For example, a unit 
could be suspended for not following orders, for failing to remain in contact 
with command, or for ill-discipline.  This structure is important to 
remember when attempting to assess the AK’s manpower in Lubelszczyzna, 
as only a certain amount of its manpower was on the ‘front line’ at any one 
time.  34 
Protecting the population 
 
Yet the plans on how to use and deploy these Homeland forces did not 
emerge from the thinking of a united Polish Government in London.  As 
Maria Pestowska has pointed out, there were disagreements between 
Sikorski and his ministers from the beginnings of the Government-in-Exile, 
due to the pre-war heritage of Sanacja, opposition parties and relations 
with the host country, mostly Britain.  Such disagreements were 
compounded by Sikorski’s willingness to engage with the Soviet Union and 
this was behind their first major crisis when the Government moved to 
London in the summer of 1940; a crisis which put Sikorski at loggerheads 
with the President, and ended in a compromise brokered by Sosnkowski.  
After these early and fundamental disagreements, any issue could revive 
the latent antagonisms, and the issue came to a head with the establishing 
of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in July 1941. 
This issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union was kept to the fore via the 
issues of the Anders Army and the discovery of the Katyn massacre. 35 After 
the death of General Sikorski in 1943, the splits, already apparent in the 
Government-in-Exile, became worse as the key issue for the Poles, the 
question of where Poland’s eastern border would be set, remained an issue 
on which the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union fundamentally 
disagreed.  36 With such issues creating a near constant rift between senior 
figures in the Government-in-Exile such as Sosnkowski and Mikołajczyk, 
the planning for the AK’s role in the liberation of the Homeland was 
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extremely contentious.  As it became clearer that Poland would be liberated 
by the forces of the Soviet Union, the Government-in-exile became 
increasingly split on how this affected the role of its forces in Poland.  
Indeed, such divisions were not only unique to the Poles in London, the 
issue of relations with the Soviet Union was to compound tensions between 
the leadership in London and the leadership in Warsaw. 37 
 
The early disagreements between the Homeland forces and the 
Government-in-Exile were to become increasingly important as the Soviet 
Red Army moved into pre-war Polish territory in the middle of 1944.  As the 
mixed results of the BCh and NOW integration had shown, the reality of 
the position of the AK was that it was the official army of a government that 
did not control its own territory and therefore could not mobilise its 
citizens.  The AK was, therefore, in reality a de facto volunteer force.  
Likewise, the existence of the civilian branch of the underground, the 
Delegatura, enabled the Government-in-Exile to exercise at least a symbolic 
and moral authority over the population in Poland.  By 1944, it was this 
body that was charged with the task of not only organising resistance, but 
of also making arrangements for the takeover of power after liberation.  38 
The rub lay in the fact that moral and symbolic authority could disappear 
after the expulsion of the Germans.  Divisions at the top over the type of 
Poland that would emerge after liberation often mirrored divisions at grass 
roots level.  Ultimately many people were only integrated into the 
Government-in-Exile led underground state because they shared one aim - 
the re-establishment of a free Poland.  It is worth emphasising such 
problems, as during the Soviet occupation they were to become very 
important. 
 
Whilst the policy of the Government-in-Exile was to an extent dictated by 
divisions within that body and by the pressures of allied politics, the AK 
and its tactics were shaped by both the orders of its divided leadership in 
London and by the methods of Poland’s German occupiers; it had to defend 
its population whilst simultaneously preserving and expanding its 
manpower in the teeth of occupation.  From 1943 onwards the German 
authorities were increasingly launching terror operations throughout the 
General-Government often in retaliation to the attacks of Polish 
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underground partisan groups.  Unlike the communist AL, the AK often 
attempted to mask their acts of sabotage as accidents or mechanical 
failures.  In addition partisan units and operations were kept to specific 
tasks, meaning that most of the time AK members were living in their home 
villages in readiness for given operations.  The logic of this was clear; 
violent actions meant a huge and disproportionate response from the 
Germans on local Poles.  As the government force, the AK could not be 
openly aggressive as it defeated its own purpose yet it had to act in order to 
protect its people and its legitimacy.  In many senses the story of the AK in 
Lublin from 1943 until the Soviet entrance into the region is the story of 
how the AK struggled to follow its policy of limited action against forces 
over which it had little control.  
 
In March 1944 Bór-Komorowski, the AK Commander-in-Chief issued, order 
No 116.  It was an order that was to have an impact on both AK-Soviet 
relations in the Polish provinces and to sap the AK of vital manpower in the 
build up to liberation.  This order, and the subsequent operations that 
followed it, highlight the unique position of the AK and the unique 
responsibilities that it was attempting to shoulder.  Komorowski’s order 
116 stated that: 
 
Robbery assaults, often accompanied by murders, are being 
perpetrated either by forest based Soviet partisan detachments or by 
ordinary gangs of robbers....I have instructed the regional and 
district commanders to resist the elements responsible for pillage, 
banditry or subversion, by force if need be. 39 
 
This order led to what became known as operation 'Swill', which was an 
aggressive action designed to protect the population from the excesses of 
banditry.  The true intent of this order has long been a hot topic of debate 
amongst American historians.  The Jewish American historian Joseph 
Tennenbaum amongst other post-war historians, saw order No 116 as an 
implicitly anti-Semitic order aimed primarily at the elimination of Jewish 
bandit brigades.  The counter argument to this line of thought is, however, 
that the order was not aimed at any group in particular, that it was an 
attempt by the 'Polish authorities' to instil order in the countryside.  The 
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order was issued as a response to increased criminal activities in the Polish 
countryside by numerous bandit gangs.  In Bór's definition, 'bandits' were 
groups who were stealing from and crippling rural communities in order to 
survive.  What with the heavy and exhaustive imposition of German food 
requisitions, the added imposition of such ‘bandit’ actions was creating 
extreme hardship for an already oppressed populace.  Order No. 116 was a 
direct response to this.   
 
In fact, the question of bandits and banditry is one of the most contentious 
issues in the study of the AK.  According to the Dictionary a bandit is: ‘A 
robber; especially, an outlaw who belongs to a gang.’  40 The problem with 
this definition is that it is open to wildly differing interpretations, this is 
especially so in the case of Poland during the period under study.  Equally 
the usage of the term ‘bandit’ is often pejorative - it is used in a context in 
which those labelled as such are signalled out for violent reprisals in the 
name of the law.  The problem with using this term during the period of 
study lies in the fact that there were many claimants to the title of law 
enforcer.  Dependent on who was doing the labelling a ‘bandit’ could be an 
AK soldier, an AL soldier, a Soviet partisan or an UPA fighter.  However, the 
use of the term by the AK is indicative of their role as the government 
military force.   Irrespective of their political or ethnic composition as far as 
the AK was concerned ‘bandit groups’ had to be stopped, if the AK’s claim 
to be a government agency was to be substantiated.  Therefore, those 
groups and individuals that were acting in breach of the laws of this 
government were ‘bandits’ and were to be stopped.  This was to lead to the 
AK taking on a great deal of responsibility in areas such as Lubelszczyzna.  
 
 
It is instructive to look a little further at the composition of these ‘bandit 
groups’ targeted by the order.  Aside from the Communist AL, there were 
many others who in order to survive had to steal from the very 
communities that they were claiming to defend.  Some were Soviet soldiers 
who had escaped from their units or from German camps, alongside such 
men were Jewish escapees and Poles and Ukrainians who had been exiled 
from their communities.  All such men needed food and shelter, something 
they could not afford and something which many Polish peasants were 
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loathed to give them.  However some bands were merely thugs who as is 
often the case were taking advantage of their current situation to terrorise 
local communities.   One such gang was led by “Kiełbasa” (sausage).  
“Kiełbasa” led a gang that terrorised a large area in the Lublin province 
throughout 1943 and 1944, stealing and burning homes and farms. 
Another group operating in the same region, as John Armstrong states, 
pretended to be part of the resistance even taking part in actions with 
Polish and Soviet partisans.41  
 
This shows how complex the question of banditry was in Poland 
throughout the period of this study.  Indeed, whilst the AK was able to 
supply themselves in terms of weapons and food without stealing from the 
local population, banditry was none the less a problem within some AK 
units during the German occupation.  The AK, as a government agency 
that attempted to act as such, was able to deal with such incidents and to 
restrict their occurrences as much as possible.  Operating within the 
underground was a functioning court structure that enforced the laws of 
the Polish Second Republic; equally AK soldiers were subject to the pre-war 
army code of discipline.  This meant that discipline was maintained in the 
force, and when it was not, those in breach were punished.  According to 
the research of Jarosław Kopiński, there were several cases of AK members 
engaging in what that force defined as banditry throughout the first years 
of the occupation in the Radzyń district of northern Lubelszczyzna.  In 
Lubelszczyzna, the forest partisan units were ultimately responsible for 
eradicating banditry, yet they sometimes had to eliminate this problem 
from within their own units.  For example, members of the post IV AK 
district Radzyń had been found operating in a Polish bandit group in the 
area.  As a result they were court marshalled and shot.  Another example 
was in the “Zenon” unit in which on two separate occasions, members of 
the unit were found stealing.  The first time that these men were caught, 
they were flogged, the second time they were executed by firing squad in 
front of the rest of their unit.  Similarly, in the “Muller” unit Stefan 
Lukasiewicz was executed in front of the other men of his unit for raping 
and murdering a Jewish woman.  The effect of such hard responses to 
crime and criminality in the ranks of the AK meant that these forces were 
to keep banditry in their units to a minimum. 42 
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The question of Soviet partisan activity and order No. 116 raised issues 
which would impact on future Polish-Soviet relations.   It is, a fine example 
of the fluctuating nature of the AK-Soviet relationship from the beginning of 
Soviet activity in Poland.  John Armstrong in The Polish Underground and 
the Jews: A reassessment, quotes at some length AK reports of accounts of 
Soviet partisans fitting into the AK definition of 'bandits' as defined by 
Order No. 116: 
 
On January 30 (1944) ...five Bolshevik saboteurs killed a farmer in 
the locality of Kozly..... 
On the day of 2 February of this year, at 1.00 p.m., five Bolsheviks 
came riding on the two wagons into the locality of Korczowka and 
wanted to kill one farmer and his son, but they did not find them at 
home.  So they completely burnt down their farm.  43 
 
Yet, there are also many reports of Soviet partisan bands fighting alongside 
AK detachments, such as that reported by Zygmunt Klukowski in the 
Józefów forest later in the year.  What policy was the AK to take in the light 
of such actions by the ally of its allies?  Order No. 116 was the response, 
therefore, to continued bandit type activity by Soviet partisan bands.  Yet 
Bór-Komorowski, in his order of 20 th November 1943 which specified the 
AK attitude towards Soviet forces as liberation approached, had clearly 
stated that: 
 
In no case should Soviet partisan units be hampered in their fight 
against the Germans.  Any fighting against Soviet units should be 
avoided.  Units that have been involved in such incidents should be 
shifted to other places.  Only acts of self defence are allowed. 44 
 
Thus the AK had clearly stated its official policy towards Soviet partisans 
and the Soviet forces in general almost six months prior to the issuing of 
Order No. 116.  Yet, because of the nature of Soviet partisan activity, many 
of them could, potentially, become a target of Order No. 116.  Clearly, the 
AK felt that it had the strength to enforce an order that committed them to 
effectively police the Polish countryside.  They were taking steps to act as 
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the alternate administration that the government in London hoped they 
would become.  From the start, this put the AK in a position of conflict with 
the often lawless behaviour of the Soviet partisans operating on Polish soil.  
Indeed, how else could the rightful government of Poland act in the face of 
such activity?  Clearly Bór was mindful of giving the Soviets an excuse for a 
clamp down on the AK, and at this stage he was still committed to an 
attitude of openness towards them.  However, if the AK were to maintain 
any pretence that it represented the government in waiting then they could 
not stand by and watch their population terrorised by the Soviets, 
Ukrainians and Germans.  
 
 
 
Dr Zygmunt Klukowski 
(Z. Klukowski, Diary from the Years of Occupation, 1939- 44, University of Illinois 
Press 1993) 
 
Order No. 116 was symptomatic of a greater problem that the AK faced at 
this time, however.  The attempt to control banditry in a war zone was a 
never-ending struggle.  As soon as the AK had 'liquidated' one band, 
another would appear.  As the front line got nearer, many Germans 
deserted into the woods swelling the problems for the AK.  Perhaps the 
greatest effect of such orders, therefore, was to tie down a large percentage 
of the AK in anti-bandit activity - ultimately the AK in Lublin were to fight 
as much against the Ukrainian partisans and Polish communists as they 
were to fight the Germans.  It is difficult to give numbers on this issue, but 
there are many reports and accounts of AK units in Polish rural areas 
which were, in effect, still fighting operations such as 'Swill' by the time the 
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Red Army arrived in July 1944.  In fact, of the 350,000 45 members that the 
AK is reckoned to have had in July 1944, many were not active for a 
sustained period during the year.  If inactive members are added to the 
ones still concerned with fighting 'Swill' type actions then the AK clearly 
faced a debilitating loss of potential manpower at a crucial moment.   
 
This was a problem unique to the AK during the period 1943-45.  As the 
one group that enjoyed enough cross level public support to legitimately 
claim to be the ‘government’ force, the AK had to care for its constituency.  
In the face of the harshest occupation in Polish history, the AK had to act 
against the various communist groups, and the UPA, which attacked and 
even wiped out entire Polish villages. Failure to act would mean a loss of 
legitimacy.  However, over a sustained period this policing role could prove 
to be corrosive.  The official policy of the AK was one of limited struggle, but 
this pragmatic approach was to be constantly challenged by events and 
groups beyond its control.  This was the unenviable position in which the 
AK found itself in Lublin and across the east of Poland.  The AK, whilst 
large, was still an underground force on the run from the Germans, with 
limited arms and limited supplies; and yet it had to launch military 
operations against other underground groups and against the occupying 
power often at the same time.   
 
Preparing for the Red Army 
 
Bór-Komorowski's order of 20th November 1943 not only addressed the 
question of Soviet partisans, it, perhaps more than any other set out to and 
in many senses helped to define the AK's official approach to the Soviets 
from November 1943 until September 1944 as the Red Army approached 
then entered Polish territory.  As far as this study is concerned the part of 
the order worth closer attention is point 5.3: 
 
We should play the role as hosts to the regular Soviet Army.  The 
Polish commander who has taken part in the fight against the 
Germans and who therefore has the right to act as host, should meet 
the Soviet troops.  Much more difficult conditions arise for the 
commanding officer and the Polish population where liberation from 
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the Germans is solely the result of Russian efforts.  The local Polish 
commander jointly with the representative of the civil administration 
who will come out into the open should call on the commander of 
the Soviet troops and follow the wishes of the latter, keeping in mind 
that: 
a) the severance of contacts with the Polish supreme authorities is 
only temporary and that the latter, not the Russians, remain the 
competent authorities... 
b) All attempts to force Polish troops to join either the Soviet troops 
or Berling's units should be avoided 46 
 
This order represents the mixture of hope and suspicion that the AK High 
Command had towards the Soviet Union at this time.  In October 1943 the 
Government-in-Exile had issued new instructions to the underground 
stating that it should be prepared for an insurrection against German 
forces.  However, this insurrection should be attempted only at the point of 
German collapse.  In these instructions it was rather confusingly stipulated 
that the insurrection was only to continue until the arrival of the Soviet 
Army.  In the likely event that diplomatic relations had not been restored 
between the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union, the underground 
units were advised to return to their former role of being a force in hiding.  
Bór-Komorowski and the command in Warsaw felt that such an order was 
a recipe for disaster.  His command, therefore, as the above quote shows, 
intended to address the problem of how to act towards the incoming 
Soviets.  Bór-Komorowski felt that to go back underground would hand the 
political initiative, and a huge propaganda victory, over to the Soviets.  In 
the event, Bór–Komorowski ignored his superiors in London and issued the 
above order. The decision to disclose AK units to Soviet forces, however, 
was not recognised by the Government in London until February 1944.  
From this point on the policy of disclosure became a key element in the 
AK’s approach to the Soviets. 47 
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General Tadeusz Komorowski, “Bór”, Commander of the AK from 17th July 
1943 until 2nd October 1944. 
(M. Ney-Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army 1939-1945, PUMST 2001) 
 
In November 1943, the calls to 'act as host' and to 'come out into the open' 
did not seem to be hopelessly naïve.  They represented a clear attempt by 
the AK to work with, and not against the Soviets; they would welcome them 
and fight alongside them.  The AK would not give the Soviet Union any 
excuse for repression. Perhaps this is the key point here: the 
AK/Delegatura would set up its administration and let the incoming Soviet 
forces pass through their territory.  Equally the need to stipulate points a) 
and b) betray a suspicion of the Soviets.  Even at this stage, the AK 
command felt it necessary to make clear that its forces remain under 'free 
Polish' command.  The Command would not allow its forces to be absorbed 
into the Soviet dominated Berling Army. Perhaps the final observation to 
make is that this order committed the civilian branch of the underground 
to announce themselves to the Soviet Army.  Clearly, the AK did not want 
any confusion as to who was the new governing force in Poland.  They were 
the representatives of the Government-in-Exile they were the only true 
legitimate Polish Government. 
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PhD thesis, University of Glasgow 
Chapter 1 
 
Preparing for the Soviets: The last months 
of the German occupation of 
Lubelszczyzna, March 1944- July 1944 
 
The first months of 1944 were a period of organisational consolidation for 
the AK in Lublin. By the end of spring 1944, the Lublin AK was 
increasingly organized, well supplied and well trained.  The greater strength 
that this process gave to the AK, both nationally and locally, meant that 
during this period the force was able to launch successful offensive actions, 
yet ultimately, the phase of operational consolidation was put into effect to 
prepare the regional AK for the liberation of the province.  In the course of 
its preparation, the AK inevitably drew on the experience of the eastern 
territories where the AK had been used, marginalized and victimised by the 
Soviet Army.  When it entered the region, the AK regional commanders who 
were to meet Soviet representatives had no idealistic illusions about the 
international brotherhood of communism.  Communists had murdered 
their fellow Polish Army officers at Katyn and now they were arresting AK 
members to the east.  In addition, antagonism towards the communists 
was reinforced by the Lublin AK’s own confrontation with the communist 
AL.  As a constant backdrop to this, from the spring onwards, preparations 
for liberation were still further complicated by the continued activities of 
the Ukrainians, which became a serious distraction.  And none of this 
planning and development was happening in a vacuum, it was all being 
undertaken against the backdrop of the Nazi General-Government.  Shortly 
before the Red Army arrived in the Lublin area, the Germans launched a 
series of anti-partisan operations.  These operations were to bring out some 
of the tensions within the AK, especially regarding the arming of Peasant 
Battalions; this weakened its preparations for liberation. 
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This combination of events meant that the mood of the regional command 
was distinctly nervous.  This would lead to the local AK command 
modifying the instructions of central command.  A sense of the threat of 
communism creeping up on the province was clearly evident.  The Red 
Army was operating on the soil of the old Polish Second Republic and the 
AL was operating in Lublin with increasing support from Soviet partisans, 
NKVD and Soviet regulars.  This sense of unease was manifested by the 
fact that the regional commander, “Marcin”, ordered that a shadow 
command should be created in case disclosure backfired.  The events in 
Lublin were to be dictated both by orders from central command and by 
the experiences of the east.   
 
Operational Consolidation 
 
The increase in AK activity from spring 1944 onwards was in accordance 
with plans devised during the time of General Sikorski.  The AK had laid 
out a clear and pragmatic process of escalation in their war with the 
Germans.  This was to follow three stages: “Mucha”, “Burza”, and 
“Powstanie”.  The first stage, “Mucha” or “Fly”, was to be a period of 
organisation, of intelligence gathering and sporadic sabotage.  This was 
then to be followed by “Burza” or “Tempest”, the operation at the moment 
of liberation.  Originally, the third stage of the AK's war was to be known as 
“Powstanie” or “Rebellion”.  This was to be a nation wide rebellion that 
would engulf the German regime at the moment of its collapse.  This final 
stage of planning was ultimately abandoned as the likelihood of a Soviet 
liberation of Poland changed the situation radically.   In this operational 
escalation, the first six months of 1944 were of key importance since they 
helped to shape the force in Lubelszczyzna and its ability to fight.  As part 
of this first stage of operations, the Lublin AK was to undergo a period of 
organisational consolidation during early spring 1944.  Once this had been 
achieved, the region’s AK was to start to fulfil both its role as a government 
force, attempting to protect its people, and to attempt to prepare for stage 
two of its operational escalation, Operation “Tempest”.   
 
Since the beginning of the occupation, “Fly” had been gathering pace, with 
the British dropping wirelesses and supplies to the ZWZ-AK from 1941 
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onwards.  On the ground in Poland the Warsaw authorities had been 
tidying up the AK's structure, creating a strong central authority with the 
ability to command offensives in any part of the country.  The process of 
organising and standardising its forces was mostly carried out in 
Lubelszczyzna during the period of spring 1944 and in fact, in 
Lubelszczyzna the AK officer corps was to become relatively well developed.  
According to Mańkowski and Caban, at its height the AK in the Lublin 
region had around 1,000 officers and reserves in its ranks.  This meant 
that officers were to make up around 2% of the regional AK, with a ratio of 
officers to men of 60 soldiers to one officer.  This ratio of officers to men 
was pretty consistent throughout the region, with no large variation 
between areas.  For example, in Lublin officers made up 1.2% and cadet 
officers 15% of the force, whereas in Tomaszów Lubelski officers made up 
1% and cadet officers 14% of the force.  The area with the largest 
percentage of officers was Zamość where officers made up around 3.5% of 
the force in the 9th Infantry.  This meant that in the vast majority of cases, 
AK units were led by trained officers, which gave their formations a level of 
discipline and orderliness that other underground units often lacked. 1 
These officers had come to positions of command in the underground army 
via many different routes.  By the time of “Tempest” around thirty of its 
officers in the Biała Podlaska inspectorate were ex- Polish Army officers.  2 
Whereas in the Lubartów district a large percentage of the AK’s officers had 
been schoolteachers before the war, amongst this number was “Lekarz” 
who had taught in Polesie. 3 Some, such as the regional commander  
“Marcin”, had entered the region during the occupation from another part 
of the General-Government, whilst others, such as “Adam”, had been based 
in and around Lubelszczyzna all of their lives.  One of the most famous and 
successful underground officers in the Lubelszczyzna AK, “Zapora”, had 
been parachuted into the region.  Major Hieronim Dekutowski, “Zapora” 
had been in the field since 1939 having fought with the Polish forces in the 
September War and with the Free Polish forces in the west.  “Zapora” was a 
trained commando who was to lead one of the most successful and long 
lasting AK units in the area.   4 
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“Fly”, therefore, was the phase during which the AK went from being a 
loose grouping of resistance fighters to truly becoming an underground 
army, the developed officer corps and command structure provided the 
framework for the expansion of the rank and file during spring 1944.  
Equally, communications and links were strengthened between Lublin, 
Warsaw and the UK by the establishment of radio communications.  
Already by the end of 1943 the AK had used Fly to develop a sophisticated 
radio and intelligence gathering network that led all the way back to 
London.  Indeed, Polish intelligence gathering was vital at times for the war 
effort and was based around wireless operators who once a day to twice a 
week, would send reports to Barnes Lodge on everything happening in their 
area.  As it was impossible to organise and maintain a radio 
communications centre in Warsaw, Barnes Lodge acted as the focal point 
for communications with messages from Lublin to Warsaw being sent via 
Britain.  This also meant that reports and orders would be sent from 
command to the regions, but not between the regions.  In addition, signals 
were often sent via listening stations in Sweden. 5 
 
 
The two leaders of the Lubelszczyzna AK during 1944 
Kazimierz Tumidajski “Marcin”                              Franciszek Żak “Wir”,                   
“Żak”, “Ignacy” 
(Z. Mańkowski and I. Caban, Związek Walki Zbrojnej i Armia Krajowa w Okręgu 
Lubelskim 1939- 44, Lublin 1971) 
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Polish GHQ and the AK radio network by the summer of 1944 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
In order to remain concealed, special mobile radio units were created in 
Lublin, and each radio station, or “Wanda”, was given a special cryptonym 
and number. For instance in the Puławy inspectorate, the “Pająka” mobile 
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radio unit was directly subordinated to the regional command and operated 
in the north of the inspectorate.  7 The Lublin command radio unit was 
“Wanda 28” whereas the “Pająka” unit was known as “Wanda 30” and the 
Zamość unit was “Wanda 77”.  In addition, every branch of the Lublin AK 
was given a cryptonym that was used when communicating with other 
branches or national or district commands.  Below are the radio 
cryptonyms of the Lublin AK during 1944: 
 
Regional command: 997 
Regional chief of staff: 998 
Unit 1: 999 
Unit 2: 1000 
Unit 3: 1001 
Unit 4: 1002 
Unit 5: 1003 
Constant cells: 1004 
BiP (propaganda and information unit) 1005  
8 
  
As a part of this organisational consolidation, the AK also undertook 
changes to their basic cells: the platoons.  The spring of 1944 was to be 
witness to a massive expansion to these front line forces in Lublin.  
Initially, from the beginning of the occupation, groups of men often as 
small as three or five in number had started to join with other small 
groups, and these were to eventually form platoon units.  Originally the AK 
had operated both full platoons, numbering around fifty people, and 
skeletal platoons, which numbered around twenty to thirty.  However, from 
June 1944 onwards the regional command began the liquidation of skeletal 
platoons; it was intended to merge the smaller groups to create larger, more 
uniform platoon units that, beneath the commander and his assistant, 
were split into three teams that numbered around 54 people in total.  In 
addition to this, platoons were supposed in future to consist of the platoon 
commander, his assistant, two orderlies, two sappers, two runners, two 
messengers and two observers.  A team consisted of a commander plus 
thirteen riflemen.  In addition to this there were independent teams that 
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were placed in towns or remote areas.  The independent teams could 
number anything above ten riflemen. 9  However, given the circumstances 
in which these units were operating, the size and experience of units in the 
Lublin AK varied as a result of the locale in which they were based.  It 
should always be remembered that partisan units were constantly 
changing in size and staff; at times units were amalgamated in line with the 
above standardisations, whilst some units gained new recruits, and others 
were destroyed or incurred serious losses as a result of enemy actions.   
 
Of course, each of these platoons would need to be armed and, nationally 
speaking this was often a problem for the AK. 10 Yet in this respect, the 
Lubelszczyzna AK was more fortunate than other AK regional commands.  
Because the Polish Government had briefly been located in Lublin during 
the September War, huge battles such as that at Kock had been fought in 
the region.  Literally hundreds of weapons had been taken from these 
battlefields in the days following the defeat of the Polish Second Republic.  
In the main, these seem to have been taken into the woods and buried until 
the moment that they could be used in the fight to free the region.  A report 
of the ZWZ central command from 1st September 1940 shows how many 
weapons the Lubelszczyzna AK had at this early stage, the vast majority of 
which were taken from the battlefields of the previous year.  The report 
states that the Lublin region AK had 834 pistols, 10,943 grenades and over 
1 million pieces of ammunition. 11 According to I. Caban such weapons 
formed the bulk of the arms used by the underground in Lubelszczyzna, 
and it was from the spring of 1944 onwards that these weapons stashes 
were starting to be dug up and used.  In addition to this, Allied air-drops 
had helped to top up these weapons stores.  For example, in Tomaszów 
Lubelski district between 11th-31st May 1944, the local AK received 22 
Smith and Westerns, 2 Colts, 50 kg of plastics, 200 sapper detonators and 
around 40 boxes of ammunition. 12 In total, there were an estimated 483 
airdrops to the Polish underground during the period of the Nazi 
occupation, of this the Lublin region received around 23-25; Lublin and 
Puławy inspectorates received 8-10 drops, Zamość 8, Radzyń 3, and Chełm 
3.  The lion’s share of these drops took place during spring 1944.  In 
addition to these sources of weapons, the local AK was also operating a 
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weapons ‘factory’ in Lublin city.  According to a report of the AK central 
command, this factory was able to produce 36,000 grenades during the 
period of the Nazi occupation.  13 
 
 
Captain Czesław Tchórz, “Kowal”, (centre) of the well-equipped 2nd Platoon, 
1st company, part of the “Podkowa” partisan unit. 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Lublin 2007) 
 
Between these three main weapons sources, forces such as the one in 
Tomaszów Lubelski were reasonably well armed.  In an action against 
Ukrainian forces mounted on 2nd June 1944, the district was able to arm 
around 1,000-1,200 troops for the operation. 14  In the main, however, the 
AK was armed with the tools for sabotage work and with light weapons; in 
Tomaszów Lubelski the AK had only twenty machine guns at its disposal by 
July 1944.  Elsewhere in the Lublin region it was a similar story, for 
instance by July 1944 the Lubartów district had around 1,500 arms, only 
fifty of which were automatic.  Three groups had the lion’s share of the 
weapons: “Lekarz”, “Uskok” and “Brzechwa”.  These groups had around 
200 weapons per unit, with the rest of the district’s weapons being spread 
62 
 
around the other members of the six regional posts.  15 In Lublin city it is 
not really known how many guns the AK had by July 1944.  However, 
when the “Kmicic” unit was disarmed by the Red Army near Majdan Forest 
on 24th July, it handed in 36 semi-automatic LKMs, 6 grenades and a lot of 
ammunition. 16  To the south, reports from April and June 1944 show that 
the Kraśnik AK had 46 Sten guns, 4 LKM, 10 Colt pistols, 7 Nagan pistols, 
115 grenades, 12,333 pieces of ammunition for the Stens, 4,989 pieces of 
ammunition for the LKMs and 252 pieces of ammunition for the Nagans.  17 
 
In addition, the AK operated a strict policy regarding the issuing of 
weapons.  In the main, weapons were only given out to units for the 
Tempest operation, for the actions in Zamość during the deportations of 
1942-43 and for defensive operations such as the one mentioned in 
Tomaszów Lubelski when weapons were handed out at the discretion of 
“Marcin”- the regional AK commander. 18 
 
Once platoon structures had been standardised and trained officers put in 
place to lead them, the local command began to organise its platoons into 
larger military units in readiness for the “Tempest” stage of operations.  The 
first force to emerge in the spring of 1944 was the 9 th Infantry, which was 
based in Zamość inspectorate. According to Jan Turowski it was between 
22nd-23rd April that the 9th Infantry Regiment, which was later to become 
part of the 3rd Infantry Division AK was concentrated in the woods to the 
south of Zamość.  After concentrating, the unit carried out an inspection 
and training.  Units such as this had been terminated during the winter of 
1943-44 and were reformed, again at this point in the forest. This force was 
composed of several dozen partisan units in addition to the following units: 
the joint “Norbert” and “Dolina” unit, “Podkowa”, “Grom”, “War”, “Ciąg”, the 
staff platoon “Osa”, the mounted reconnaissance unit “Sęp”  ( or “Dniestr”) 
and the communications platoon “Leszcz”.  19 
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The photograph shows an inspection of the 9th Infantry after its 
concentration.  The picture was taken on 23rd April 1944 somewhere in the 
Puszcza Solska 
(I.Caban and Z. Mańkowski, Związek Walki Zbrojnej i Armia Krajowa w 
Okręgu Lubelskim 1939- 1944, Lublin 1971) 
 
What was in effect happening in the villages and forests of Lublin during 
the spring was the completion of the AK’s military framework – with this in 
place each of the above units experienced a huge growth in their numbers.  
The experience of the Lublin county district was typical of the Lublin region 
at this point.   For most of the occupation its troops had been mainly 
composed of large groups in the villages, yet by June 1944, these village 
groups had joined partisan bands in readiness for “Tempest” and gone into 
the 8th Infantry.  20 A good example of the massive growth experienced by 
the Lublin region AK during the late spring of 1944 can be seen in the size 
of its units in the Puławy inspectorate:  
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Partisan unit Number in June 1944 Number at the start of Operation Tempest 
“Zagonczyka” 30 170 
“Przepiórka” 30 170 
“Orlik” 20 200 
“Hektor” 30 100 
“Argil” 15 100 
 
(In addition in the Puławy Inspectorate, the “Zapora” unit also operated in 
the north and so did the special communications unit “Pająka” which was 
subordinated directly to the regional command.) 21 
 
Therefore, from spring 1944 the AK had formed military units from their 
original partisan platoons that were of a considerable organisational 
size.  The warmer weather, foliage on the trees, and the nearing of the 
front meant that local partisan units were rapidly increasing in size 
making the creation of these larger formations possible.  In fact in 
Lubelszczyzna the size of the AK’s partisan units was almost to double 
between May and July 1944. 22 
   
As a reflection of this increased capacity and confidence of the 
organisation, the AK launched Operation “Jula” in April 1944.  “Jula'” 
was a co-ordinated attack by the AK on German lines of communication 
within the area of the General-Government.  The AK attacked isolated 
German patrols and outposts, blew up railway lines and cut 
communication wires.  Ordered by the increasingly confident Special 
Operations Directorate, “Jula” was carried out throughout occupied 
Poland from 6th to 9th April.  So successful were some attacks that it 
took a full week before the German authorities could start using certain 
routes once more.  In Lublin province, the most effective “Jula” attack 
was on the railway-bridge in the small town of Tryncza, in the north of 
the province. 23 This attack effectively disabled the main line for German 
reinforcements to the eastern front.  The operation, therefore, marked a 
significant step-up in AK activities in the region and was a signpost for 
things to come. 
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Operation “Tempest” and the approaching Red Army 
 
“Fly” had resulted in the creation of an advanced network that stretched 
throughout the General Government and the occupied eastern 
territories.  Stage two was to be “Burza”, or more famously known in 
English as Operation “Tempest”.  The parameters of the operation had 
been set out by Komorowski's order of November 1943, and the specifics 
of the plan in Lubelszczyzna were to be established in the first few 
months of 1944.  “Tempest” was to be characterised by a major 
sabotage campaign that would be mounted in connection with Allied 
offensives.  The “Tempest” plan was in fact to be a series of consecutive 
uprisings at the moment of German collapse. It was, therefore, to be 
initiated by the AK at a local level when the German administration in 
that area was at the point of withdrawing. By 1944 it was no longer 
intended to be a synchronised operation that began across the country 
all at the same time - as the Red Army entered the operating area of a 
particular AK region, then operation “Tempest” would be put into effect.  
By July 1944 “Tempest” had already been initiated in roughly a quarter 
of Poland, whilst in Lubelszczyzna the command was still waiting to 
enact their plan.  The Volhynia AK enacted “Tempest” in January, the 
Tarnopol AK in March, the Brześć- Polesie in June and July, and Lvov 
in July; ultimately it was to be enacted in Lubelszczyzna at the end of 
July 1944.  24   
 
In many respects there was no other feasible method of the AK 
launching their plan.  Had “Tempest” been intended to be a 
synchronised operation, many AK units would have risen up in areas of 
often huge troop and artillery concentrations.  It would have meant that 
several thousand partisans armed with often nothing more than a 
hand-gun would have risen up against the full might of the Wehrmacht.  
Given the very nature of the war that the AK was attempting to fight, 
therefore, “Tempest” had to be mounted according to a local timetable 
and local circumstances.  This pragmatism was perhaps also the key 
flaw in the plan.  It meant that if the Soviet Union continued its 
aggressive stance, local AK units, usually isolated and lacking even in 
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small arms, would reveal themselves and be picked off one by one.  The 
intention was that once these operations were complete the AK, along 
with civilian members of the Delegatura, would attempt to restore Polish 
administration throughout liberated areas.   
 
Yet the “Tempest” plan should not be seen as being monolithic; as 
Soviet policies became clearer the instructions and manner of “Tempest” 
were to change. Throughout 1943, the idea of launching a general 
uprising at the moment of liberation had led to heated discussions 
between the civilian and military branches of the Government-in-Exile 
in London as well as in occupied Poland itself.  25 The key issue was the 
question of the Soviets and how the homeland forces should react to 
them both during and immediately after the period of liberation.   Such 
questions, as preparations for an uprising in the homeland began, only 
complicated further the existing tensions between the new Prime 
Minister Mikołajczyk and the Commander-in-Chief Sosnkowski.  
Ultimately, the start of “Tempest” simply served to highlight these 
problems, as it exposed differences in approach both within the 
Government-in-Exile and between London and the AK in Warsaw and 
Lublin. 26 
 
Therefore, Soviet actions during the early months of 1944 and the 
enaction of “Tempest” in areas to the east of Lublin were to have a large 
impact on the manner in which the operation was attempted to the west 
of the Bug River. On the night of 3rd-4th January 1944 the Red Army 
had crossed Poland’s pre-1939 frontier for the first time since the 
launching of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. On 26 th March 1944 the 
commander of the AK in Volhynia, after revealing himself and his unit 
to Soviet forces, entered into discussions with General Sergeev and 
Colonel Kharitonov, the commanders of the Soviet army that was 
heading in the direction of Kovel.  The Volhynian and Vilna Divisions 
represented the two largest AK units in the disputed eastern provinces 
and would be of considerable help to the Soviets in their advance 
through difficult wooded and marshy terrain.  In fact at this time, in the 
areas of Poland which lay to the east of the Curzon Line, the three main 
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AK units were the Volhynian Division with 6,000 soldiers, the Vilna 
brigade with 12,000 men under the command of Colonel “Wolf” and the 
5th Infantry under Colonel “Yanka” with 11,000 men.  27 The resultant 
agreement between the 27th Volhynian Division and General Sergeev of 
the Red Army was sent back to London and the details presented by 
Count Raczyński, the Polish Foreign Minister, to the British Foreign 
office on 7th April 1944.  The report stated that the Soviet-Polish talks 
had come to the following agreements on continuing the fight together: 
 
1) Total subordination in the operative sense of the Polish forces 
to the Soviet command locally and also beyond the River Bug. 
2) The recognition of the Polish forces as a Polish division under 
the Polish authorities in Warsaw and London 
3) Absolute liberty for the Division to maintain contact with these 
authorities. 
4) The creation out of existing Polish partisan detachments of a 
regular Polish Division. 
5) Prohibition of partisan activity of any kind in the rear of the 
Soviet forces. 
6) Full field equipment and armament for the Polish Division to 
be supplied by the Soviet authorities. 28 
 
At a cursory glance this agreement looked like a series of wonderful 
concessions by the Red Army to the AK.  It promised to recognise their 
command structure, to equip them and to guarantee them 
communication access to the underground authorities.  It seemed as if 
a workable agreement had been signed.  Perhaps the Soviets did not 
have any designs on Poland.  However, the point of crucial importance 
was point five.  It was made clear that there was to be no partisan 
activity behind Soviet lines.  But how were 'partisans' to be defined, and 
who would define them?  The AK were quickly to find out that, as soon 
as the front had passed their region, they ceased to be allies and 
became bandits.  Equally, an appreciation of the Soviet-Polish border 
dispute was key to understanding the overtones of this agreement – 
these AK forces were operating on soil that as far as the Soviet Union 
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was concerned was Soviet.  To the AK this territory was part of the 
Polish Republic and it had been stolen from them by the Soviets in 
1939.  Clearly, therefore, it was always implicit that AK forces in these 
areas, forces that supported the re-establishment of Polish government 
east of the Bug, would be ultimately classed as bandits and destroyed.   
 
The pattern that would emerge over the course of the next two years 
was radically different to the one that the AK had envisaged.  If the AK 
unit were large enough, the Soviets would use it for a while, if not, the 
unit was liquidated immediately.  The NKVD would separate the AK 
officers from their men.  The officers were shot, tortured or imprisoned.  
Their men were disarmed or forced into Berling's Army.  As one AK 
officer put it: 'Katyn was being perpetrated on various scales all over 
again.' 29 This was of course happening a matter of miles away on the 
eastern bank of the Bug, and the presence of the Red Army here meant 
that the number of regular and irregular Soviet units in Lublin was 
rapidly on the increase.  From 1943 onwards the Soviet Union had been 
parachuting partisan detachments into Poland in order to undertake 
diversionary activities, which were primarily designed to tie down as 
much of the German administration as possible.  Although starting 
slowly Soviet troops steadily grew in number and the size of their 
activities increased accordingly.  By the last years of the war the Soviet 
Partisan Command had thousands of troops operating in Poland behind 
the lines, blowing up German supply depots, railway lines and 
command posts.  Their contribution to the defeat of the Third Reich is 
one of the great and often over looked elements of the Second World 
War.  In the Lubelszczyzna region the Soviet partisan forces were, like 
the rest of the armed resistance to the Nazis, primarily operating in the 
forests and marshes of the region.   
 
These partisan groups were linked to Red Army command and were 
often well trained and equipped to discharge the sabotage activities 
assigned to them.  From 1943 all large-scale Red Army operations had 
been co-ordinated with the Partisan Command and partisan 
commanders were given the rank of Generals in order to tie them 
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personally to the leadership.  Despite the considerable hurdles placed in 
the way of partisan camps, in the form of repeated liquidations, they 
were still able to play a significant role in the Soviet war effort.  From 
1941 onwards the Central and Republic Partisan Schools alone trained 
22,000 troops, 75% of which were demolition experts. 30 A.A. Maslov 
estimates that during the war Moscow partisans blew up 12,000 
bridges, destroyed 65,000 motor vehicles and destroyed 1100 airplanes.  
Perhaps most importantly however, Maslov estimates that as much as 
10% of the Wehrmacht's regular forces were forced to fight against the 
partisans. 31 
 
Indeed, the partisan bands that were dispatched to Poland formed quite 
a considerable contingent.  Their remit was to conduct diversionary, 
reconnaissance and sabotage activities.  These units, such as P.P. 
Vershigora's 1st Ukrainian Partisan Division, which served in the 
Puszcza Solska, also had the mission of establishing contact with 
communist underground forces and helping to strengthen the nuclei of 
a future pro-Soviet government.  By May 1944 in many of the woods of 
the region, the local communist force, the Armia Ludowa, People’s Army 
(AL), were operating with large Soviet partisan groupings. 32 
 
It was not until February-March 1944 that Soviet partisan units began 
to operate in Lublin in strength.  Initially Soviet units had crossed the 
Bug and operated on its western bank in an uneven capacity, crossing 
back and forth as events allowed.  For example the Aleksander Nevski 
partisan unit reached the Bug in March and crossed the river on the 
night of 4th-5th April, coming into contact with an AK unit commanded 
by Stanisław Witamborski in the process.  Whilst building a temporary 
bridge across the river, the unit was attacked by members of the SS 
Galizien, scattering the Soviets and forcing one battalion to remain on 
the eastern bank.33 Once inside the Lublin region, Soviet forces began 
busying themselves fulfilling their raison d’etre by launching 
diversionary attacks that would tie up as much of the German military 
as possible.  In this both the AK and Soviets had a common enemy and 
initially relations between the two forces seem to have been positive.  
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According to Zbigniew Czernicki, “Kaktus”, from February onwards 
Soviet partisan units led by General Kovpak were operating in Bi łgoraj 
and the local AK commanders, “Podkowa”, “Wacław” and “Sławian” 
took part in talks with Piotr Verszyhora the local commander of these 
Soviet partisans.  As a result, local AK units and Soviet partisan units 
launched a series of joint raids on German positions in the area.  In 
particular, a joint Polish–Soviet attack on a local railway viaduct was 
undertaken in which it was successfully blown. 34 
 
Another example of AK-Soviet co-operation was reported by Alfred Thor, 
“Zych”, in the Hrubieszów area.  According to his recollections, large 
Soviet partisan forces passed though his area in February 1944.  
Contact was made, and it was established that they were on their way 
to the forests in Biłgoraj.  Much later on 25th April an AK post on a track 
near the Huczwa River was visited by an exhausted and starving Soviet 
horse patrol.  The tired group had amongst their number Soviet officers 
and a few Poles.  Talks were conducted between “Zych” and the 
commander of the patrol, Leutenant Rudanowski, in which the latter 
asked for food and lodgings for his exhausted men.  The Soviets were, 
according to “Zych”, given food and together with AK members began to 
march west, but such was the level of fatigue amongst the Soviet unit 
that many of them collapsed soon after the start of the march.  After 
meeting up with his wireless detachment in the forest near Tyszowiec, 
“Zych” radioed command and was told to retain contacts with the Soviet 
unit.  After resting in the wood, talks were renewed during the course of 
which it was discovered that Rudanowski was the descendent of a 
Polish rebel who had been exiled to Siberia after 1863.  He said that his 
orders were to meet up with other Soviet partisan forces in Biłgoraj. 35 
 
It is quite clear that Soviet partisans operating in the south of the 
Lublin region had been given orders to concentrate in the large woods of 
the Puszcza Solska and Janów Forest.  As a part of this process in April 
1944 the following Soviet partisan units crossed the Bug River and 
entered the Janów forest via Zamość and Hrubieszów: the Nadielin, 
Sankov, Vasilenko, Fiedorov units and an AL unit commanded by 
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Edward Gronczewski. Individually each of the units numbered only a 
few companies but together their size was significant.   As these new 
partisan forces were subjected to the command of the existing Soviet 
forces in the area they also took part in joint operations with the local 
AK.  In particular the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry AK was to take 
part in many such actions with Soviet forces during April and May.  
Such was the success of these actions that during this period the 
General Government lost control of a large area of the districts of 
Biłgoraj, Tomaszów, Zamość and the northern part of Hrubieszów.  
Reports and recollections show how complex the situation was.  Clearly 
groups were operating together in the province in order to face a 
common threat, the Germans, but as the front came closer the 
relationship between the AK and the communists became more 
problematic.  In most of the reports mutual antagonisms stemming 
from anti-Polish and anti-Russian feelings were greatly antagonised as 
Soviet partisans attempted to assert their hegemony over local AK units 
via weapons and intelligence reports.  As April wore into May, Soviet 
commanders were increasingly unlikely to share intelligence reports and 
equipment with the AK.  The fact that AL units were often attached to 
Soviet partisan units did not help relations, and it was often clear that 
AK and AL would not work together. 36 
    
A major example of how this initially cordial phase of AK-Soviet 
relations was changing took place in the province bordering Lublin.  By 
May, the AK’s 27th Volhynian Division which had been fighting 
alongside the Soviets since the March agreement found itself trapped by 
the German army on its portion of the front.  Surrounded since late 
April, with the German Army tightening its noose around the Szack 
forest in which it was based, the 27th decided to break out through to 
the Soviet-German lines to the north-east, where they would be given 
new equipment as previously agreed with the Soviet authorities.  The 
Division was split into three groups for the breakout, Major "Kowel's" 
column, Captain "Garda's" column and Major "Zegota's" column.  The 
breakout was attempted on 21st-22nd May.   The "Garda" column 
suffered heavy casualties from both German and Soviet troops during 
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the breakout, and in effect found itself under fire from all sides.  
"Garda" himself 'disappeared' during the breakout and it was later 
found out that he had run into a NKVD unit; "Garda" was arrested by 
the Soviets and then later on was deported to the east.   The troops of 
the "Garda" and "Zegota" columns that did break through were faced 
with the ultimatum of join Berling or be arrested.  The Column of Major 
"Kowal" managed to escape into Lublin province.  The column crossed 
the Bug River and set up a new base of operations in the Parczew 
Forest.  The survivors from the breakout initially numbered only 2600, 
although stragglers quickly swelled this number to 3200. 37 Of course, it 
could be said that this change in Soviet attitude took place in the areas 
to the east of the Bug because they were claimed by the Soviet Union, 
but this would have cut very little ice with Poles living on either bank at 
the time - to them the lands to the east of the river were as Polish as 
Łódź or Kielce. 
 
Therefore Soviet policy towards the AK even from this early stage can be 
said to be duplicitous at best.  On the one hand they were actively 
prepared to fight alongside AK units, but ultimately the AK was being 
used only if their help aided the Soviet advance through the region.  In 
adopting this policy the Soviets were not recognising the AK as the 
rightful heirs to the Polish Government; they were merely using Poles to 
speed their own advance.    It can be clearly said that this was no 
alliance, rather from the Soviet point of view they would enter into a 
marriage of convenience with the AK if and when it suited them.   
 
Yet to the AK command, Soviet actions in spring 1944 seemed uneven 
and contradictory.  The Soviets had signed an agreement with the AK to 
the east yet reports were reaching Bór-Komorowski that other units 
were being disbanded.  What was Soviet Policy?  Surely the Soviets 
could not annex Polish territory or indeed Poland itself against the 
wishes of Poland's Anglo-Saxon sponsors?  Faith in the Government-in-
Exile and the British and the Americans remained strong, and it was a 
major factor in how the AK interpreted these early Soviet actions.  
However, the undermining of the AK by the Soviets was increasingly 
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happening; slowly but surely the territories under Soviet control were 
being reigned in.  This is clearly shown that within one month of the 
March agreement, the NKVD had been installed in all Soviet controlled 
district level towns east of the Bug.   
 
 
  “Marcin” and the command’s planning for the front in 
Lubelszczyzna 
 
The sense that the AK in the region was feeling increasingly uneasy at 
the prospect of liberation by the Red Army is shown in their planning 
for the moment of liberation.    As the level of organisation grew, along 
with the number of recruits, the specifics of the liberation of 
Lubelszczyzna became clearer.   In response to this the regional 
command in Lublin began readying their troops for the moment that the 
front would arrive and a German withdrawal seemed inevitable.  The 
precise plan that the Lubelszczyzna command would follow for 
“Tempest” was drawn up by Bureau III of the regional command, and in 
particular by the regional Commander-in-Chief, “Marcin”, by his 
Second-in-Command, Franciszek Żak, “Wir”, and the chief of Bureau III, 
Jan Kucharczak, “Kazimierz”.  Inspectors, and partisan group 
commanders were familiarised with the details of the plan from 
February until June 1944.  In addition to briefings each commander 
was sent envelopes containing the precise details and plans of attack 
that their units were to follow.  At the moment that the central 
command issued the ‘go’ order then these plans were to be put into 
practice across the province. 38 
 
The key to this planning for the arrival of the Soviets is that “Marcin” 
ordered his deputy Żak, to prepare a reserve command during June and 
July that would be able to function if and when he was arrested by the 
Soviets.  Lublin was not the only AK region to order the establishment 
of a reserve command but it was one of only a handful that did.  This 
order is fascinating as it clearly shows that at least in the minds of 
“Marcin” and the AK command in Lubelszczyzna the possibility of Bór-
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Komorowski’s exposure order backfiring was a real one.  The command 
could well have been the result of a secret order, sent from central 
command but it is more likely that the establishment of a reserve 
command reflected the regional AK commander’s increasing fear of 
impending Soviet liberation.  With the existing splits within the 
Government-in-Exile being worsened over the issue of how to approach 
the Soviets, it is not inconceivable that some lower down the chain of 
command were starting to make their own contingency plans.   In 
particular, this response in Lublin is not surprising given the fact that 
many amongst the AK upper command in the area had prior experience 
of Russian/Soviet invasion and or occupation.  Once again the 
geographical position of the area is an important factor in explaining 
this foresight.  The fact that Lublin province was to the east of the 
nation meant that in the great struggles for independence after World 
War One, just twenty years before, Lublin had been very much in the 
front line.  Equally significant is the fact that the region had been 
invaded by both German and Soviet troops in 1939.  This meant that 
many in the regional command had personal experience of the Soviets.  
 
For example Żak, who was to become the regional commander under 
the plan if “Marcin” was arrested, had served in the 4 th Infantry Legion 
alongside Zygmunt Berling at the end of the First World War and had 
then fought in the Soviet-Polish war in 1920. 39 Equally, Ludwik Bittner, 
“Halka”, who was to become commander of the 9 th Infantry Division in 
Lubelszczyzna, had fought the Soviet-Polish War as commander of the 
34th Infantry Regiment.  “Marcin” himself, one of the main architects of 
the “Tempest” plan in the region, had been born in 1897, had served in 
the Polish Legions in 1915 and in the September War in 1939.  Initially 
he had been based in Krakow but during the German occupation he 
moved to Lublin to head the regional command.   Equally Stanisław 
Prus, “Adam”, a commander in the 9th, had also served in the KOP.  
Even Stefan Drewnowski, “Roman”, had been arrested by the Tsarist 
authorities in Minsk during 1917 for agitating against the occupying 
power. 40 This level of familiarity with the realities of the Soviet system 
must have been an important factor in the stance that the command 
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took when the Red Army entered the region in July.  Yet this perhaps 
provided only the background for suspicions of the Soviet Union.  
“Marcin” had already identified that opposing the activities of the PPR 
was amongst the most important roles that his force was involved in, 
equally he must have been aware that the NKVD was arresting Poles in 
the eastern provinces. 41 Another factor, the power of which cannot be 
underestimated, was the impact of the Katyn massacre.  This meant 
that whilst the regional command were to obey Bór-Komorowski’s order 
on openness towards the Red Army, they were clearly worried enough 
about it to put a contingency plan in place.  
 
 
German anti-partisan operations and their impact 
 
The build up to “Tempest” in the region was interrupted by the moves of 
the German authorities.  In the days and weeks before the end of the 
German occupation of Lubelszczyzna, the occupying authorities were to 
launch several punitive campaigns throughout the length and breadth 
of the region.  These operations were to have a significant impact on 
both the population at large and the various partisan groups operating 
in the area, which at this point in time constituted the territory to the 
immediate rear of the Wehrmacht on their eastern front.  The German 
authorities launched a series of operations designed to requisition extra 
food for the front, and to clear partisan forces from the areas to the 
immediate rear of their forces.  The operations launched in the Janów 
Forest and the Puszcza Solska were known as Sturmwind I and 
Sturmwind II.  Operation Sauhatz was launched in the Kozłowiecki 
Forest, and operation Cyklon was launched in the area of the Parczew 
Forest.  A matter of weeks before the arrival of the front, the AK was, 
therefore, involved in several critical actions. 42 
 
By the end of May 1944 the number of partisan groups operating in the 
woods to the south of Zamość was huge.  In fact Zygmunt Klukowski 
recorded in his diary that by this time local village women had started 
to build up a lucrative trade with many of the partisans in the woods of 
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the area.  Many of them had taken to walking into the woods with 
baskets laden with cigarettes, matches, beer, lemonade and sandwiches 
– all of which were sold at inflated prices.  Over the previous few weeks 
many different units had entered the woods, amongst them deserters 
from the German Army in the area.  According to “Marcin’s” report to 
central command in Warsaw dated 13 th July 1944, in the area to the 
north-east of Janów Lubelski there were now around 3-4,000 Soviet 
partisans operating with a NKVD diversionary unit as a part of this 
number. 43 Add to this the fact that many young men from the area 
were now moving into the woods to join the partisans, and the picture 
in the woods at this time becomes very confusing.  What is more, from 
the middle of May the Volksdeutsch that had been so recently settled in 
the area started to move out, leaving once rich Polish villages such as 
Brody Duże deserted.   
 
In particular the woods of the south-west were targeted by the German 
authorities since in effect, they had lost control of these areas at the end 
of April.  Punitive actions against the population at large involved food 
requisitions for the front, population round ups, burning settlements 
and launching anti-partisan raids.  No corner of Lubelszczyzna was 
spared in the last weeks of the German occupation.  For example in the 
Kranystaw district the Germans started actions on 9th June against the 
villages in that area, requisitioning livestock from the inhabitants who 
were probably lucky to flee with their lives.  But it was in the south of 
the province, in the Zamość inspectorate, that the Germans launched a 
major campaign to displace the local population.  From 9 th to 29th June 
the German authorities launched operations “Wicher I” and “Wicher II” 
in the area in and around the Puszcza Solska; this included the 
concentration of eight villages, amongst which were the populations of 
Józefów, Aleksandrów, Pardysowka, Bondyrz, Tereszpol and Bukownica.  
Dr Klukowski visited the village of Zwierzyniec on 23 rd June, where 
some of the captives were being held behind barbed wire.  He estimated 
that in total there were around 200 children and 700 adults, mostly 
women that were being held there.  These people were subsequently 
moved to Lublin’s Krochmalna Street Arbeitsamt on 25th June.  
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According to research by Zygmunt Mańkowski, Jerzy Markiewicz and 
Jan Naumiuk, during these operations in total 509 civilians were killed, 
whilst from the Biłgoraj and Tarnopol regions in total the Germans 
moved around 12,000 people into such temporary holding camps. 44 
 
The German anti-partisan initiative had at least one consequence that 
the Germans would have welcomed: the AK’s internal alliances were put 
under strain.  The local AK command held a meeting at the village of 
Bondryrz on 19th June, which was then moved to the area of Krzywe to 
avoid a large German detachment that was entering the area.  Within 
days, from 21st June, a large number of the AK’s local force, the 9 th 
Infantry Regiment, were involved in a major battle in the woods to the 
south of Józefów, around 15 miles to the south of Klukowski’s hospital. 
45 This meant that many of the towns felt they were without adequate 
protection when the German authorities started the deportations.  
During operation “Wicher II” alone, 5,000 civilians were captured, with 
an additional 3,000 being captured in another part of the Bi łgoraj 
district. 46 Klukowski records the immediate reaction in the area to 
these facts: 
 
June 25th 
 
…There have been no new transports, but the memories of the 
last few days are still very strong.  Villagers are disappointed that 
their leaders deserted them, moving into secure places.  In 
particular people from the peasant battalions are disturbed.  
They are extremely upset about the warehouse full of uniforms, 
shoes, and arms in Bondyrz and Trzpieciny that were taken by 
the Germans.  As far as I know the AK refused to distribute these 
goods to the peasant battalions. 47 
 
Dr Klukowski goes on to describe how on Friday 23 rd June, near the 
village of Krzywe, members of peasant units killed Wal, “Msciwy”, and 
shot at Stefan Pozdzik, “Wrzos” both of whom were AK members.  
Klukowski finished his diary entry for 25 th June 1944 with this: ‘The 
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upset peasants swear to kill the leaders of the Home Army’. 48 Such 
tensions were apparent, both at the grass roots level and at the level of 
the regional command.  In fact the BCh command in Lubelszczyzna had 
already sent a letter to the central commands of both the AK and BCh 
on 6th June explaining that due to problems existing between the two 
forces further integration between them was now impossible. 49  This is 
something that was clearly an issue in Lubelszczyzna at this point.  
Integration meant that the regional AK commander was ultimately 
responsible for the distribution of arms, and AK policy on the 
distribution of these weapons was highly contentious.   During June, in 
addition to the aforementioned letter the head of the BCh in 
Lubelszczyzna had a series of correspondences with “Marcin”.  In these 
it is clear that the issue of AK weapon stashes was a highly contentious 
one and it was an issue that was driving a wedge between the two 
biggest underground forces in the area.  “Marcin” sent his opposite 
number in the BCh the following letter on 14th June 1944 in response to 
allegations of weapons being withheld: 
 
Whilst not entering into the merit of specific demands of 
operations of integrated soldiers – as this is incompatible with 
the spirit of the military.  Allowance of arms is necessary for 
commanders responsible for operations – There is no difference 
(in the treatment) between soldiers and units…They are (claims 
of weapons being withheld) imaginary pretensions.   One military 
commander is responsible for the whole of operations, and 
political factors are an entirely different problem…. Weapons and 
magazines are to be given only to (partisan units) on operations.  
At the present time weapons are only given to units on special 
tasks or relative to training.  50 
 
If after liberation the Government-in-Exile had been able to return to 
Poland such problems could be dismissed as the type of internal conflict 
that any organisation would be witness to given the extreme nature of 
the occupation.  Yet this was not to happen, and stress between the AK 
and BCh was to remain in Lubelszczyzna until the turn of the year.  
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This was perhaps the unique problem that the AK faced as the valid 
claimant for the title of the official Polish armed forces – they would 
have to fight the occupiers of their country and at the same time provide 
an adequate defence of their population.  As the events in the 
Zwierzyniec area show this was a difficult balancing act that the AK 
weren’t always able to manage.   
     
To the south, in the forests of the Puszcza Solska the AK’s 9th Infantry 
took part in a large partisan battle against German forces in the second 
half of June.  On 18th June, as a part of their anti-partisan operation 
“Sturmwind II” 30,000 soldiers from 154 th, 174th and a part of the 213 th 
Wehrmacht Divisions, along with an SS battalion and other forces were 
cast in a net encircling the Puszcza Solska.  The German forces were 
cast along the line of Zwierzyniec-Biłgoraj-Tarnogrod-Lubliniec-Ruda 
Różaniecka-Susiec-Krasnobród-Zwierzyniec.  What followed, the Battle 
of Osuchy, was to be one of the largest partisan battles in occupied 
Poland.  On 21st June an AK unit commanded by “Woyna”, “Kalina” and 
his deputy “Miecz”, were surrounded in the Józefów Forest by German 
forces.  By 27th June reinforcements had been sent to help the AK forces 
in the woods, with the units commanded by “Podkowa” and “Dolina” 
going to help.  In addition to this, AK units from as far away as 
Hrubieszów took part in the fighting.  According to the research of Jan 
Turowski, the following units were trapped within the German circle: 
the “Corda” unit numbering around 120 men, the “Grom” unit under 
the command of Jan Kryk “Topol” numbering around 100 men, a staff 
company of the Zamość Inspectorate numbering around 100 men under 
the command of “Weyna”, part of the “Podkowa” unit under the 
command of “Korczak” numbering around 20 people, a unit of around 
100 under the command of Konrad Bartoszewski “Wir”, a woodland 
Hospital unit from Biłgoraj under the command of Lucjan Kopic 
“Radwan” numbering around 16, a unit under the command of 
Stanisław Kowalski “Huk”, and finally a section of the Zamość 
Inspectorate BiP under the command of “Kalif”.  In total, Turowski 
calculated, this force numbered around 560 men.  In addition to this, 
caught in the German ring were a sizeable Soviet partisan force, AL 
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units and BCh units.  Overall the Polish independence forces in the 
forests were under the command of the BCh Zamość Inspector, Major 
Edward Markiewicz “Kalina”.  The BCh units caught in the ring were 
under the commands of Antoni Warchał “Szczerb”, Jan Kędra 
“Blyskawic” and Antoni Wróbla “Burza”. 51 
 
Jan Turowski- “Norbert”      Tadeusz Kuncewicz- “Podkowa”   Adam Piotrowski- “Dolina” 
(I.Caban and Z. Mańkowski, Związek Walki Zbrojnej i Armia Krajowa w 
Okręgu Lubelskim 1939- 1944, Lublin 1971) 
 
Reports of the fighting that filtered back to Szczebrzeszyn were sketchy 
yet telling.  By the 29th, according to AK troops emerging from the 
woods, the command was experiencing problems leading a force as large 
as the 9th Infantry.  This was perhaps an inevitable result of the rapid 
expansion of the force over the previous weeks and months, and of the 
nature of the terrain in which it was fighting.  What was clear, however, 
was that during the course of the fighting “Cezary”, “Adam’s” Second-
in-Command had lost contact with his commander and that the 
9thInfantry’s chain of command had temporarily broken down and 
disorganisation reigned.  Members of the command who turned up at 
the hospital in Szczebrzeszyn asking for medics to be sent into the 
woods were testimony to the fact that casualties in the fighting at 
Osuchy were high.  According to Dr Klukowski, the officers involved 
seemed reluctant to talk about casualties but it was clear that the battle 
at Osuchy ended in defeat but not destruction for the AK’s 9th Infantry 
and the other forces that took part.  According to the local AK, around 
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1,000 members of the AK and BCh, 3,000 ‘Russians’, and 1,000 PPR 
took part in the defeat. 52 In fact the AL units involved were mainly from 
the forces that had been under the command of “Wick” that had moved 
to the area in May.  This force had subjugated themselves to Soviet 
command and made their attempt to break the German net near the 
village of Tereszpol.  The 500-600 soldiers were heavily outnumbered 
and were destroyed during the fight.  This meant that the largest AL 
forces in the south of Lublin province had been removed in a battle that 
lasted only a few hours. 53 “Marcin’s” report to the AK central command 
in Warsaw dated 13th July backs this up.  He estimated that the AL 
units that had been operating in the south of the region had been 
‘wrecked’ by these German anti-partisan initiatives.  As a result, the 
report claims the remaining AL forces in the south were forced to move 
into the districts of Puławy and Lublin. 54 
 
In other areas of Lublin, the German authorities were also attempting to 
reassert their control of remote areas.  In the centre-north of the 
province, on 12th July, the Germans launched one of their last major 
attempts to crush the partisans in Lublin province, and in particular 
those hiding out in the Parczew forest.  As with other remote regions of 
Lubelszczyzna, the Parczew was now home to a wide mix of partisan 
units.  Along with the newly arrived 27th Volhynian Division, operating 
in the forest were both sizeable Soviet and AL Divisions.  According to 
the AK command’s estimation, operating in the Włodawa district and 
the Parczew Forest were around 2,000 Soviet partisans and the “Mietka” 
grouping from the regular Red Army along with a few other smaller 
units. 55 The aggressive German anti-partisan actions brought these 
groupings together, however temporarily.  In the forest the 27th came to 
an agreement with the local Soviet commander, General Baranovsky, 
that for the period of the fighting they would subordinate themselves to 
his command and fight alongside his troops.  In the event, the AL 
partisan commander Lieutenant-Colonel Grzegorz Korczyński refused to 
give the extra arms that the 27th Volhynian Division needed to take 
part effectively in the fight against the Germans. 56 This was repeating a 
pattern that had become apparent in Zamość during the previous 
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month.  Therefore the 27th Volhynian Division took the decision to 
break out again to a more defensible position, away from the Parczew 
Forest and the Germans anti-partisan measures. 57 Most of the 27th 
Volhynian Division was therefore based around 15 miles due north of 
Lublin city in the Lubartów Forest during the final weeks of its 
existence.   
 
In these operations of June and July, both regionally and nationally the 
AK had lost many soldiers in operations against the Germans, before 
the start of “Tempest” and the Warsaw Uprising.  Even at this stage, 
there were clear strains on the internal fabric of the Government-in-
Exile and the AK.  What the German anti-partisan campaigns during 
the last weeks of the occupation did was to effectively rob the 
Lubelszczyzna AK of its maximum strength in the days immediately 
preceding “Tempest”.  In total at this time it is estimated that the AK 
nationally lost around 62,000 men before they had even enacted what 
was to be their key operation, the one at the moment of liberation.  This 
number represented about 18% of the total national force, and in 
Lubelszczyzna the attrition rate was higher than the national average.  
Mańkowski and Caban estimate that from the above statistics and given 
the higher loss rate in the province due to actions such as the ones 
mentioned above, the AK in Lubelszczyzna had probably lost around 
11,000 men before the start of “Tempest”. 58 
 
AK: Tactics and strength in July 1944 
 
Yet it was the events in the east that caused AK command in Warsaw to 
adapt once again its disclosure orders on dealings with Soviet forces.  
This was to be a constant feature of AK-Soviet policy throughout 1944 
and 1945.  As the Soviets pushed further into Poland’s pre-war 
territory, and the AK’s worst fears began to be realised so official 
approaches to the Soviets were to be changed.  This new directive was of 
particular importance to the AK in Lubelszczyzna as it was to form the 
blueprint for their enaction of “Tempest”.  The order issued to the 
district commands on 12th July 1944 read: 
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On the one hand, the Soviets are our mighty comrades in arms in 
the fight against the Germans, and on the other hand, dangerous 
conquerors threatening our cardinal principle, independence… We 
must co-operate with the Soviets only in the fight against the 
Germans.  We must offer political resistance to the Soviets, 
consisting of constant and stubborn demonstrations of the 
autonomy of all forms of Polish organised life…Commanders of 
Home Army units must carry out military operations against the 
Germans absolutely independently, without rashly seeking to 
establish contact with Soviet troops.  They establish this contact on 
their own initiative, only in the event of imperious tactical need 
which may arise in the battlefield… Should the Soviets try to enrol 
the Polish units in the Soviet army or Berling units, it is appropriate: 
a) to protest, b) to try to withdraw and to avoid disarmament by 
force, or enrolment, c) in the last extremity to put all arms in a 
safe place and disband the unit.  59 
 
This order is markedly more aggressive in tone towards the Soviets, and 
reflects how reports from regional commands sent to Warsaw had made a 
strong impression on Bór-Komorowski.  The experience of the AK to the 
east had meant that “Marcin” now put resistance to the communists in his 
region as the first priority and had ordered the creation of a reserve 
command; clearly redefining his forces stance to the Soviets based on 
experiences on the ground.  In Warsaw a similar change was also clearly 
taking place.   
 
According to Zygmunt Mańkowski and Ireneusz Caban in total AK forces in 
Lubelszczyzna totalled around 60,000 in the days leading up to the 
enaction of “Tempest” in the province, at the end of July and the beginning 
of August 1944.  Of this number, around 80% of the force were to be used 
in the front line, the remaining 20% were to be used, in accordance with 
the strategy outlined by the regional command for “Tempest”, as police 
units that would enable the AK and the civilian Delegatura to maintain law 
and order from the very moment that the province had been cleared of the 
84 
 
Germans.  60 Yet, out of this force of 60,000, only the estimated 12,000 
soldiers in partisan units were actually to enact “Tempest” in 
Lubelszczyzna.  By July 1944 these partisan units were armed, formed and 
ready for the go signal.  
 
In total partisan forces in Lubelszczyzna had launched around 2,150 
actions during the period from the region’s occupation until the end of July 
1944.  These actions had been of varying size and success but the range of 
the actions undertaken show clearly how the AK as the military wing of the 
Polish Government-in-Exile had attempted to act as protector of its people, 
as a police force, and perhaps most importantly as a unifying umbrella for 
the fight of most of the underground forces.  Just as importantly the type of 
operation undertaken was in effect dictated by the conditions that were 
peculiar to the different areas of the command.  For example, certain 
inspectorates or districts were home to large Ukrainian populations, other 
to Volksdeutsch  - such facts were to have a large effect on the type of 
actions undertaken in these areas.  The following table helps to show the 
scope of partisan raids undertaken in the Lublin area prior to Operation 
“Tempest”:  
 
A table of partisan operations carried out before Operation 
“Tempest” in the province of Lubelszczyzna 
 
*Specific lettered actions are given as a percentage of the overall number of 
actions undertaken 
Key to the table: 
Column A – Attacks on trains, transport and train stations 
Column B- Attacks against members of the occupying military forces 
Column C- Liquidation of collaborators and informers 
Column D- Attacks on communications facilities 
Column E- On prisons and release of those arrested 
Column F- On members of the occupying civilian administration 
Column G- Requisitions and economic actions 
Column H- Accidental engagements with the enemy, fighting during German pacification and 
anti- partisan campaigns 
Column I- Actions against banditry and robberies 
Column J- Actions against Volksdeutsch Villages and their colonists 
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Column K- Fighting against the UPA, Ukrainian Selbstschutzem units, Ukrainian Police and 
operations against nationalist groupings 
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The table shows that the AK in Lubelszczyzna by the time of Operation 
Tempest had become adept at launching a myriad of different types of 
operation against the occupiers of their land.  Even if all of the above 
operations had been a failure they would have pointed to the fact that the 
AK had the ability to launch operations across the region, and further, that 
the underground army now possessed at least a core of men who were well 
practiced in military operations.  At the point of launching Operation 
“Tempest”, therefore, the Lubelszczyzna AK was by no means a ‘green’ force 
that had spent the German occupation merely avoiding capture.  It had 
been increasingly attempting to fulfil its role as a government force, 
launching anti-banditry operations, operations against the UPA and 
attacks on the German occupiers.  What is interesting about this table is 
that it clearly shows that a relatively low percentage of operations 
undertaken were directly against the military forces of the occupier.  Indeed 
in Zamość inspectorate, the area of the greatest activity, only 16 percent of 
the operations undertaken were against German military units, whilst only 
around 25 percent of operations were against any part of the German 
occupying apparatus.  This meant that three quarters of the AK’s 
operational time in this area was occupied by fighting Ukrainian groups, 
bandits, and on things such as food requisitions.  This clearly shows how 
the AK, as a government force had taken on a huge raft of responsibilities 
in addition to the fight against the occupier. 
Area Number of 
actions (approx) 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
Whole 
Region 
2150 8,2 22,
4 
14,6 1,4 2,7 5,8 20,8 7,2 3,1 4,6 5,8 
Insp of 
Lublin 
320 7,5 25,
9 
6,6 1,5 2,1 6,2 38,2 5,6 2,6 - - 
Insp of 
Chełm 
280 5,7 32,
8 
15,1 2,5 2,1 7,1 22,9 4,6 1 - 4,6 
Insp of 
Puławy 
440 13,
1 
24 12,8 1,4 2,7 5 24,2 3,4 7,4 - - 
Insp of 
Biała P. 
260 15 24,
6 
11,3 2,3 3,8 6,1 20 6,9 2,3 - 1,5 
Insp of 
Zamość 
850 4,7 16,
2 
18,9 0,9 2,8 5,6 11,8 10,4 2 11,7 12,9 
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Equally, the AK, the only force recognised by the Government-In-Exile, had 
only brought together the many groups in the Lublin region under the one 
banner in the months immediately preceding July 1944.  It was only during 
the last months of the occupation that the conditions existed in which the 
AK had started to form larger more uniform units.  In this process NOW, 
BCh, and the NSZ had been brought into the fold but to limited effect, and 
many amongst those groups were to remain operating outside of the Lublin 
AK even by the time of Operation “Tempest”.  These groups were primarily 
united by the fact that they were all fighting for an independent Polish 
state, and ultimately they were brought together at the moment of what 
they hoped would be its realisation – in this lies the importance of the 
outcome of Operation “Tempest” both for the future of Lublin and Poland in 
general.   When the Polish communist underground or Soviet partisans 
fought alongside AK forces this can be seen to have been, in the light of 
subsequent events, forced out of necessity.  This was perhaps the key, the 
AL, the AK, the NSZ and the BCh in June and July had a common enemy, 
the Germans.  Once this common enemy left, what was it to be replaced 
by?  Clearly those within the AK fold believed that this meant the return of 
the Government-in-Exile, but ultimately what form would this new Poland 
take?  
 
Finally it should be pointed out that when the Red Army entered the Lublin 
region in July 1944, it was not the only force that was entering the region.  
The 27th Volhynian Division, other AK and underground units and the UPA, 
were being pushed onto the soil of Lublin.  However, the advance of the 
front should not be seen as one huge tidal wave of humanity heading 
towards the region.  The Red Army, operating across a huge front, fought in 
areas of concentration and other areas of relative weakness.  Therefore, 
when this force entered the region its effects were to be varied at first.  The 
arrival of the front should not be thought of as one clean continuous wave 
in which the whole of Volhynia was secured before Lublin was entered.  
Rather, the Red Army were continuously punching holes in the 
Wehrmacht’s lines, not allowing them to regroup, and attempting to keep 
the front in a perpetual state of motion.  This meant that even as the Red 
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Army was approaching the city of Lublin, the fighting in Lvov had still not 
finished.  In fact the fighting in Lublin city was to finish on 26 th July, 
whereas in Lvov, 120 miles to the south-east, the fighting was not to finish 
until the 27th. 
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Chapter 2 
 
July 1944-August 1944 
 
Operation “Tempest” 
 
 
Recollections of the liberation of the Lublin region from the Nazis differ 
violently.  For a significant period, both during the war and the post-war 
communist period, the story of liberation centred around the idea that it 
was achieved by the communists alone.  It was a victory of Polish and 
Soviet communism over the forces of fascism.  The AK, for its part, was 
either parachuted into the region by Churchill or simply did not fight and 
certainly did not fight alongside the Soviet forces entering the region.  
However, more recently this view has slowly crumbled under the weight of 
overwhelming evidence.  The AK in Lublin did take part in the fight for the 
province, they had been planning for this moment for years, and they often 
fought along side Soviet units and shared military information with them.  
What becomes clear from the moment of liberation in Lublin is that 
relations between individual AK and Red Army units or commanders were 
often initially cordial.  The Red Army stance was often to seem 
contradictory to the AK in Lublin, but the stance of the NKVD was not.  
During the first two days of the liberation period the NKVD was given 
orders to arrest or disarm local underground units and to create holding 
camps to deal with those arrested.    
 
Once the Germans had been removed, the Delegatura put their plans into 
effect in the region’s towns, villages and parishes to reassert the control of 
their government.  This process was initially successful, with city councils 
being created in Lublin, Zamość and countless other smaller urban areas.  
Yet within days of crossing the Bug, a new communist puppet government 
the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), had been put in place 
in the eastern town of Chełm.  The Lublin region thus had two 
governments, the Delegatura based in Lublin and the PKWN only sixty 
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miles to the east in Chełm.  With the PKWN’s Soviet supporters behind 
them, the Delegatura’s government was destroyed in Lublin and the PKWN 
moved in once the regional capital was secured.  This pattern was repeated 
throughout the region.  In effect three governments functioned in Lublin 
during July 1944: the Nazi General-Government, the Delegatura and the 
PKWN. 
 
One of the most important aspects of Operation “Tempest” in Lublin lay in 
the decision of “Marcin” to hand in his force’s weapons and to disperse his 
troops.  This decision which was a result of both his own personal 
experiences and an order from central command meant that much of the 
AK in Lublin was to avoid the initial wave of NKVD arrests.  Behind his 
decision lay a clear strategy; by dispersing his forces the core of the AK in 
Lublin could be preserved, it could weather the initial storm.  In July 1944 
it seemed perfectly feasible that the Red Army would continue its advance 
through Poland and that the current situation would not last for long.  In 
the great ‘Krakow’ tradition of resistance, the AK would preserve its 
manpower and simply wait, boycotting the Berling Army forcing the new 
administration into crisis. 
 
 By most standards Operation “Tempest” in Lublin was a fiasco.  
Thousands of AK soldiers and Delegatura men would offer themselves into 
the clutches of the NKVD whilst assisting the advance of the Red Army.   
But, by the end of Operation “Tempest” in Lublin when the NKVD had 
arrested thousands of AK men, the core of the force, led by officers and 
NCOs who had avoided capture were able to return to their homes.  In fact, 
only a fraction of the weapons that the AK had taken from the Germans 
were handed to the Soviets.  After Operation “Tempest” the regional reserve 
command still commanded an organised and equipped force. 
 
At the beginning of July there was still perhaps some doubt as to the true 
intentions of the Soviet Union.  Up until this point, the Soviet Union had 
been arresting AK men on territory that the Soviet Union had annexed in 
1939, in Lublin they had no such claim; this was the importance of 
Operation “Tempest” in Lubelszczyzna.  The events in Lublin during the 
period between July and September 1944, helped to confirm to Bór-
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Komorowski and the AK command that something must be attempted now 
if free Poland was to be saved.  By the beginning of August, Lublin was in 
the grip of a new Soviet-directed administration and the AK was being 
systematically destroyed.  In the face of what was increasingly looking like 
a fait accompli from the Soviets, the central command in Warsaw took what 
was in effect a last desperate throw of the dice.    
 
Chuikov's troops enter the Lublin region 
 
In mid July General Vassili Chuikov's 2nd Guards Tank Army had reached 
the Western Bug River.  At 12.00pm on 20th July the 2nd Corps had 
crossed the river and by the next day the entire army had crossed.  Driving 
forward, units from the 2nd Guards Tank Army and the 28th Rifle Corps 
surrounded the city of Lublin from the north and east by the end of the 
22nd.  The War correspondent, Vassili Grossman was with General Ryzhov 
as he entered the city on the night of Sunday-Monday 23rd-24th July.  He 
recounted how he sped up Lubartowska Street to witness Ryzhov's men 
fight their way into the city finally disabling the German machine gunners 
that had been positioned in the main Ryniek of the city’s old town.  Perhaps 
the most interesting aspect of his account is in his recording of the 
attitudes of the liberated Poles: 
 
The most amazing thing about the fighting in the streets of Lublin 
was the hundreds of people - men, women and children - who came 
out into the street from basements and archways, careless of 
danger, contemptuous of shells and grenades...We saw many a 
touching scene that morning, heard many a word of heartfelt 
gratitude to our men from the people of Lublin. 1 
 
This seems to be an accurate account of the reactions of most Poles in the 
area at the moment of liberation.  After five long years of repression, hatred 
and fear, the moment of liberation, by whoever it was, was bound to 
engender such a response.  However whilst Grossman is strong on Polish 
gratitude, as are other Soviet accounts, their silence on AK activity 
throughout the period and region is almost deafening.  In fact the reality 
was that the AK troops who had been patrolling the captured city were 
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ultimately to be disarmed or interned whilst the city was handed over to 
the PKWN whose leaders were being flown in from Moscow.  The 
commander of the 1st Byelorussian Front, a Pole, Konstantine 
Rokossovskii, hardly mentions the AK at this time, Chuikov does, albeit in 
a customarily brusque manner.  According to Chuikov's account, his army 
first came into contact with the AK in the forests to the south and west of 
the town of Lubartów. He estimates that in this region the AK had a 
strength of around 20,000.  His comments on his first encountering the AK 
are telling: 
 
They simply did not fight the Germans at all, and the later in turn 
did not touch them.  The British Prime Minister, Churchill, had 
taken care to have them formed, equipped and dropped into Poland 
not to revenge their country and fight those who occupied it, but just 
for the sake of appearance. 2 
 
In fact, the AK was to be far from inactive when the liberating Red Army 
reached Lublin, for the regional command had been planning for this 
moment of co-ordinated resistance since the beginning of the German 
occupation.  According to the AK’s logic, now was the time to fight. 
 
 
“Tempest” comes to Lublin 
 
By summer 1944, the AK’s Lublin district had become one of its strongest.  
3 Mańkowski and Caban estimate that the total strength of the 
Lubelszczyzna AK at the beginning of “Tempest” was around the 60,000 
mark, however of this number only around 12,000 were in partisan units.  
4 At some point between 16th-20th July the central command in Lublin 
began appointing commanders to each of its newly formed regional units. 
“Marcin” therefore had the following forces at his command: The 3rd 
Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division and the 27th Volhynian Division.  
In addition to this the two main infantry divisions were divided within these 
Inspectorates.  Within the 3rd Infantry Division fell the following Regiments: 
7th, 8th, 9th and 15th.  In the Lublin inspectorate, Colonel Stefan Jasilski 
commanded the 8th Infantry Regiment.  In the Zamość inspectorate the 9th 
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Infantry Regiment, was commanded by Major Edward Markiewicz.  In the 
east in the Chełm inspectorate, the 7th Infantry Regiment was commanded 
by Major Władysław Zalewski.   To the west, Major Stanisław Kowalski 
commanded the 15th Infantry Regiment in the Puławy inspectorate, along 
with units under the command of Captain Tadeusz Wingert. 5 The 9th 
Infantry Division was composed of the following: the 34 th and 35th.    
Colonel Stefan Drewnowski commanded the force in the Radzyń district, 
along with units under the command of Konstanty Muller. This force, the 
35th Infantry Regiment was based in both the Radzyń Podlaska and Biała 
Podlaska districts.   The 34 th Infantry Regiment was based in the Biała 
Podlaska area.  Finally the 27 th Volhynian Infantry Division was under the 
command of Colonel Jan Kotowicz.  6 The 27th Volhynian Division were 
based in the woods between Lubartów and Włodawa in the upper centre of 
the province.  Close by, at the beginning of operations the 9 th Infantry 
Division were operating in the area just further to the north in the Biała 
Podlaska area.  To the south of Zamość, the lumpy hills and isolated 
villages amongst the woods of the Puszcza Solska provided the base of 
operations for much of the 3rd Infantry Division.  7 This meant that as the 
Red Army entered the province, moving from east to west through it, the 
first AK forces in the province to encounter the Red Army were those of the 
3rd Infantry Division.   
 
The 3rd Infantry Division during “Tempest” 
 
 The 3rd Infantry Division that was based in the centre and south of the 
province was composed of the 7 th, 8th, 9th, and 15th Infantry Regiments at 
the beginning of Operation “Tempest”.  It is worth here showing the 
breakdown of this force’s command structure, as it was the biggest force in 
the region: 
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When Operation “Tempest” was initiated throughout the whole of the 
province, the heaviest fighting involving AK units took place between 20 th-
26th, but for the operations of the 3rd Infantry Division, the fighting to clear 
the area of Germans was mainly to last until the 24th.  The Red Army’s 
thrust through the centre of the province was along the line of Chełm-
Lublin-Puławy. 
 
The 7th Infantry Regiment – Chełm 
 
(Courtesy of IPN Lublin) 
 
 
The 7th Infantry Regiment was the weakest force amongst the ranks of the 
3rd Infantry Division in Lubelszczyzna at the start of Operation “Tempest”. 
The 3rd Infantry Division 
Commander Adam Switalski 
7th Infantry Regiment AK – Chełm 
Commander Major Władysław       
Zalewski 
 
8th Infantry Regiment AK – Lublin 
Commander Colonel Stefan Jasilski 
 
9th Infantry Regiment AK- Zamość 
Commander Major Edward Markiewicz 
 
15th Infantry Regiment AK- Puławy 
Commander Tadeusz Wingert 
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This was mainly due to the strength of the NSZ and BCh in the area, but 
perhaps more importantly as part of the anti-partisan initiatives launched 
by the German authorities, from the 17th-21st July a large part of the 
Chełm inspectorate was witness to a large pacification campaign.  In 
addition to this, in Włodawa district, there is very little surviving archival 
evidence about the AK’s movements.  These factors combined mean that 
following the AK’s actions in this inspectorate is very difficult.  What is 
known is that according to a report by the regional command dated 29 th 
July, the AK units in Chełm concentrated their forces in the area of 
Surchów and Żółkiewka.  After this in the Chełm region AK units took part 
in skirmishes around the crossing point on the river Bug at Dorohusk 
where the bridge was blown up.  AK units then helped the Soviet Army to 
liberate the city of Chełm on the 22nd. 8 
 
This story of AK resistance is in stark contrast to the official Soviet line of 
events, as summed up by Marshall Rokossovskii.  In his memoirs he states: 
 
Only the AK- the Armia Krajowa- kept aloof.  Our first meeting with 
representatives of this organisation left an unpleasant impression.  
On receiving information that a Polish formation calling itself the 7th 
AK division had occupied the forests north of Lublin, we decided to 
send out several staff liaison officers to contact them.  At the 
meeting the AK officers, wearing Polish uniform, held aloof and 
rejected our proposals for combined operations against the Nazis... 9 
 
As Rokossovskii had set up his forward command base on the western 
bank of the Bug River in the town of Włodawa, the force to which he was 
referring was the Chełm inspectorate AK.  According to this account, the 
Soviets, from the very moment that they crossed the Bug River found that 
the AK in Lublin refused to fight in joint operations, yet it also depends on 
Rokossovskii’s definition of joint operations.  It is perfectly likely that to the 
Soviets ‘combined operations against the Nazis’ meant Soviet-Berling Army 
10 combined operations.  
 
 Whilst the lack of information on the actions of the 7th Infantry Regiment 
in Chełm means that refuting Rokossovskii’s claim is difficult, if true, it 
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would have been an anomaly within the region as a whole.  Thus the 
actions of other forces operating in the forests to the north of Lublin 
provide a sharp contrast to this account.  According to research 
undertaken by Roman Jezior and Czesław Gregorowicz on the AK in 
Lubartów at this time, the commander of the AK in Lubartów, “Okon”, had 
established contact with the Soviet forces entering the area at the start of 
Operation “Tempest”.  After establishing contact, “Okon” acquainted the 
Soviets with the situation in the area and returned to them nine Red Army 
soldiers who had escaped from captivity a month earlier and had been 
given shelter.  According to a report by the former commander of post II, 
Jan Majerski, “Anastaza”, the attitude of the forces entering the Lubartów 
area, amongst them AL units under the command of Grzegorz Korczyński, 
only changed after the clearance of the Germans.  11 
 
The 8th Infantry Regiment and 27th Volhynian Division in Lublin 
 
 
(Courtesy of IPN Lublin) 
 
The 27th Volhynian Division had been operating in a large area in and 
around the Parczew, Włodawa and Lubartów forests for about a month 
prior to the enaction of Operation “Tempest”.  At this time, the division was 
composed of around 3,500 men.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
operating in the same area were other partisan groups, independent 
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communists and communist groupings directly subordinate to the army 
and security forces of the Soviet Union.  Amongst them were several 
thousand partisans of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade Soviet group, under the 
command of General Baranowski and Captain Bielowa.  In total, this force 
numbered about 4,000 men.  In addition to this the military group of Leon 
Kasman commanded a unit of around sixty NKVD functionaries. 12 The 27th 
Volhynian Division, in conjunction with these other, often stronger, units 
had been operating in this area of the province during July helping to 
disorganise the German lines of defence in the face of the approaching Red 
Army.  The German response was to launch operation “Wirbelsturm”, but 
this operation was not a great success as it only really succeeded in 
scattering the local AL force, whilst the 27th Volhynian Division was able to 
break through the German ring on 21st July to the south and the Lubartów 
forest.   
 
During Operation “Tempest”, the attack plan of the 27th Volhynian Division 
was to strike in three directions towards the towns of Kock, Lubartów and 
the village of Firlej on the road to Lublin.  This attack was duly launched 
on 21st July. The first units into the town of Lubartów were from the 27th 
Volhynian Division, it marched into the town along Ulica Ulotka to the 
cheers of local women who threw flowers at the troops.   The 50 th Infantry 
Regiment , 27th Volhynian Division, under the command of Major 
Szatowski, “Kowala” took the barracks, disarmed the German guards, 
secured the weapons left behind by the enemy and managed to take the 
station, which was on the line to Lublin. There they seized a German 
supply train and took around 100 weapons and a lot of ammunition. 13 
Once the town had been taken on the sunny evening of Saturday 22nd July 
1944, the central staff headquarters of the district commander, Roman 
Jezior “Okon”, was established in Lubartów middle school with a platoon 
guarding the building.  Throughout that evening and the next morning 
elements of the 8th Infantry Regiment kept arriving in the town, whilst the 
Delegatura began setting up its administration in the centre.  14 Lubartów 
is and was a small place, with the middle school on the north western 
corner of the central cross roads and the new Delegatura headquarters 
being opposite on the south eastern corner on the road to Lublin.  
Elements of the 27th Volhynian Division then moved out of Lubartów to 
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take the ancestral home of the Zamojski family, the manor house at 
Kozłówka less than eight miles outside of Lubartów. 
 
As part of the same three-pronged attack, a battalion from the 27 th 
Volhynian Division, which was commanded by Captain Filipowicz, was 
operating in the area around the mouth of the Wieprz River.  This area, 
around the Wieprz River mouth and the River Tyśmience, was an area of 
swampland and marsh.  This terrain provided good cover for the unit’s 
attack on the town of Kock, which they took successfully along with 
weapons, vehicles and enemy prisoners. 15 Finally, in the third part of this 
operation, a battalion commanded by Major Pukacki “Gzymsa” seized the 
village of Firlej to the south.  By the end of 22nd July the 27th Volyhnian 
Division had successfully taken three areas of key local significance.  On 
the same day, the command sent a message back to central command 
informing them that the above towns had been taken and that they were 
awaiting further orders. 16 By capturing the village of Firlej, the 27 th 
Volhynian Division helped to cut off the main road to the north out of 
Lublin.  The capturing of the town of Lubartów, meant that the Germans 
lost control of one of the largest towns in the area and a key section of 
railway line.  Finally the capture of Kock meant that the AK had taken the 
key crossroads town in the north of the area.17  However in the overall 
scope of the liberation of the Lublin region, the actions of the 27 th 
Volhynian Division were strictly limited in scope, and took place in a largely 
wooded and thinly populated area of the province.   
 
In the final days of its existence as a fighting force, the 27 th Volhynian 
Division was based in and around the town of Lubartów.  It was to be in 
this area, near the village of Skrobów, that the force entered into talks with 
the nearest commander of the Red Army, D. Bakanova of the 74 th Soviet 
Guards Infantry Division, and it was the 27th Volhynian Division that was 
amongst the first AK units in Lubelszczyzna to be faced with the ultimatum 
of disarm, enlist in Berling or be arrested. 18  The Red Army started 
entering Lubartów at around 9am on 23rd July.  It was followed by 
Korczyński’s 1st Lubelski AL Brigade at around midday. During that 
afternoon, in the centre of this small provincial town, three rounds of talks 
were held between the Soviets, the AK and the AL.  The first and second 
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rounds descended into a slanging match between the AK and AL 
commanders.  Despite the fact that there are reports of many joint 
AK/AL/Red Army actions against the Germans in the Lubartów district 
during 22nd and 23rd July, the tone of these meetings can be summed up 
by the AL commander, G. Korczyński’s declaration: ‘Gentleman officers- 
you are bandits!  You tried to break my soldiers.  You denounced my men 
to the Gestapo.’  On the evening of July 23rd, the governmental activity of 
the Delegatura in Lubartów was stopped by the AL and Red Army. 19 On 
25th July, the 27th Volhynian Division cabled back to London to inform the 
command of what was happening.  The 27th Volhynian Division had only 
just escaped Soviet disarmament in its home province a matter of weeks 
before, but the key fact about this report is that the Soviets were now 
disarming AK units in territory that they recognised as Polish and not 
Soviet.  The ramifications of this short report were massive therefore: ‘The 
Soviets are disarming us- I repeat- The Soviets are disarming us – 27th I.D.’ 
20 
    
 
Elsewhere in the Lublin inspectorate Operation “Tempest” continued.  21 A 
matter of forty minutes drive to the south of Lubartów, on 21st July the AK 
Lublin city district concentrated its forces for Operation “Tempest”.  Here in 
the city of Lublin itself Operation “Tempest” began for the 8th Infantry on 
the evening of Saturday 22nd July.  In the city the AK forces had been 
divided into five regions, numbering around 1,200 people.  The fourth 
platoon 8th Infantry Regiment concentrated in the area of Czechowa, 
Marysina and Wola Sławińska near to the Dąbrowa Forest.    22 The AK in 
the city was able to take command of several streets in the provincial 
capital and successfully break off communications between the Germans 
defending the city centre and their forces outside the city.  Post I started its 
attack in the Środmieście area of Lublin.  This area, as its name suggests 
was very close to the city centre and to the nerve centre of the German 
occupation on the city’s main street, Krakowskie Przedmieście.  Platoons of 
post I attacked and took the German administrative buildings on that 
street.  Post III was able to seize the Religious Seminary, which had been 
used by the Germans as a hospital.  Troops from posts IV and V 
successfully took the SD building and the waterworks.  However, by far the 
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greatest success was achieved by platoons of post II.  Moving out from the 
city’s southern suburbs of Piaski and Diesiąta, these units were able to 
attack and take the sugar factory, the gas plant, the electricity plant and 
the main railway station.23 Most of these attacks took place at the same 
time that the Red Army began its attack on the city on Sunday 23rd and 
Monday 24th.  24 The Soviet attack of that night began with an armoured 
bombardment.  On the morning of the 23rd, the Red Army attacked the 
German forces defending the city from the south, from Ulica Piłsudski this 
attack was held up by the Germans on Ulica Narutowicza.  Another attack, 
this time from the north of the city, along Ulica Lubartowska, met with 
more success.  The Red Army was able to clear the old town and the rest of 
the city centre of its German occupiers.   It was at this point that Vassily 
Grossman found himself riding up the city’s main streets.  From his 
account he was within yards of the platoons of post II yet no mention was 
made of their existence.  In fact, it was in the city on the 23rd that the first 
local AK force, the “Kmicic” unit, was disarmed by the Soviets. 
 
The Red Army Parades down Krakowskie Przedmieście after entering Lublin, 
July 1944 
(A.G. Kister, Studium Zniewalania; Walka aparatu bezpieczeństwa z 
polskim zbrojnym podziemiem niepodleg łościowym na Lubelszczyźnie 
1944-1947, Krakow 2005) 
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The above photograph shows the commanders of the AK 8th Infantry 
Regiment meeting with officers of the Soviet Army, somewhere in the Lublin 
inspectorate.  July 1944 
(Z. Mańkowski and I. Caban, Związek Walki Zbrojnej i Armia Krajowa w 
Okręgu Lubelskim 1939- 44, Lublin 1971) 
 
 
The 15th Infantry Regiment - Puławy 
 
 
(Courtesy of IPN Lublin) 
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The operations in the Puławy inspectorate undertaken by the 15th Infantry 
Regiment were typified by their large geographical range and by the co-
operation between the AK and other forces.  Firstly due to the breakdown of 
inspectorates in Lubelszczyzna, the Pulawy inspectorate’s forces had to 
operate over the largest distances - this meant that co-ordinated operations 
in the inspectorate were more difficult than in other areas.  The 
Inspectorate’s boundaries meant that it roughly formed a long boomerang 
that ran two thirds of the length of Lubelszczyzna along the Vistula.  In 
addition to the 15th Infantry Regiment, the inspectorate was also the base 
for the 8th Infantry Regiment’s 3rd Battalion which was operating in the area 
of Janów Lubelski to the very south.  In Puławy district the AK 
concentrated for Tempest in the village of Wronów in the parish of 
Końskowola. 25 In the Kraśnik district, Commander Taduesz Wingert 
“Warta” concentrated around 200 men near the Vistula River for the start 
of operations.  26 Operations began in the Puławy district on 21st July when 
sections from the “Debicz” platoon fired on a German column in Kazimierz 
Dolny.  On the next day, the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 
under the command of “Turnus”, along with soldiers of the BCh and AL 
ambushed a SS staff car on the road between Puławy and Wąwolnica.  Next 
they ambushed and captured a German unit in the same area.  Later on in 
the same day, two German armoured cars near the village of Kurów 
attacked the group.  As a result of the skirmish, the group captured one of 
the armoured cars.  It was at this point that the commander of the force 
made contact with members of a Red Army tank column.  Elsewhere, on 
the 24th a platoon from the 3rd Battalion under the command of “Melchior” 
ambushed the German troops guarding the bridge at Bobrownika and then 
went on to ambush another German group in the area. On 23rd July, a 
twenty-strong unit led by the commander of the Nałęczów area, “Weneda”, 
had entered the spa town in order to secure the weapons left behind by the 
enemy and to take the town’s railway station a couple of miles to the north.  
On the same day a seven-man patrol under the command of “Mazowiecki” 
stopped and seized three cars, capturing two police officers.  On 25 th July a 
unit from post I of the Dęblin sub-district fought with a German unit near 
the Vistula River killing three Germans.  On the same day, in reaction to 
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SS units attempting to burn the village of Zastaw, a unit under the 
command of “Debicza” together with BCh soldiers fought against the 
Germans for an hour and a half, forcing them to withdraw from the village.  
Again on the 25th, the units “Przepiórka”- “Zagończyk” along with local 
units of the AL and BCh fought against a 150 strong German unit which 
was in the process of setting fire to the village of Końskowola on the road to 
Puławy.  During this fighting, units of the Red Army entered the village and 
cleared the area.  Finally from 26 th-30th July, units from the Puławy district 
helped to reconnoitre and take the town of Puławy along with units of the 
Soviet Army.  In addition they also helped to take the towns of Wąwolnica 
and Poniatowa during this period.27  
 
 
 
9th Infantry Regiment - Zamość 
 
 
(Courtesy of IPN Lublin) 
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The second main thrust of the Red Army into the Lublin region was along 
the line of Hrubieszów-Zamość-Kraśnik.  The line of attack that the 9th 
Infantry Regiment followed however was in the direction of Zamość-
Hrubieszów-Szczebrzeszyn.  28 On 21st July in Zamość inspectorate, the 
town of Bełżec was taken and held until the arrival of the Soviets.  In the 
eastern town of Hrubieszów, after taking the town the units commanded by 
Marian Gołębiewski, “Korab”, were disarmed by the Soviets.  This appears 
to be the first case of disarming in this region and was almost certainly 
carried out by units of the NKVD. 29  Elsewhere, the AK and Red Army were 
fighting shoulder to shoulder.  Moving into the south-centre of the 
province, the Red Army began a bombardment of the city of Zamość on 23rd 
July.  Most of the bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the city’s zoo, 
meaning that the beautiful city was able to avoid significant damage to its 
old town.  By the 24th, Red Army and AK units had cut off the roads out of 
the Szczebrzeszyn area forcing the last of the German units in the area to 
attempt to escape via the road to Frampol.  On 25 th July the village of 
Zwierzyniec was taken by Soviet units.   After the taking of Zwierzyniec and 
Szczebrzeszyn, “Adam” received news from “Sas” that units in the 
Hrubieszów district had been disarmed by the Soviets.  On the 25 th Wacław 
Wnukowski, “Kabel”, and his men arrived in the old town of Zamość at 
14.00 - around two hours before Soviet forces entered the city.  After the 
liberation of the city, the head of the Delegatura in the City Antoni Wiącek, 
“Sandomierski”, announced the re-establishment of independent Polish 
government in Zamość.  30 
 
Zygmunt Klukowski, the local AK information service officer in 
Szczebrzeszyn, recorded a typical scene during the liberation of his town on 
26th July: 
 
Around 7:30 am, from the direction of the bridge, a small group of 
Soviet soldiers came walking towards the town. 
At 8 am a Russian Officer arrived at the hospital.  While talking with 
him I heard the cry, "our boys are coming!"  I left everything and ran 
to see for myself.  From the direction of Blonie a group of 
approximately twenty young men approached; all were armed, in 
(AK) uniform, with red scarves around their necks and red and white 
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arm-bands on their sleeves.  The people went wild.  They were 
crying, shouting, and throwing flowers... 
"Podkowa" (the local AK commander) received information that the 
Russian colonel to whom (he) was to report had arrived.  When we 
went outside we found the Colonel standing by his car.  After a short 
introduction he began a speech.  He talked about the Germans, 
brothers and the independence of Poland.  He assured us that the 
Russians are our friends and the Russian military will give the Poles 
complete freedom to organise our own administration, but it must be 
democratic.  He was a very good speaker. 31 
 
 
In fact, the AK soldiers that Klukowski describes were actually from units 
of the 9th Infantry Regiment along with a company of the 24th Infantry 
Regiment from the 27th Volhynian Division. The key part of the Soviet 
officer’s speech, as recorded by Klukowski is in his mention that the new 
Polish government ‘must be democratic’.  This is key, as the use of the 
word ‘democratic’ was to have a huge significance for the future of Poland.  
Unknown to Klukowski and his countrymen at the time ‘democratic’ would 
ultimately mean communist.  To the audience, ‘democratic’ doubtlessly 
meant a return of the exiled government, but as it was to emerge, the 
communists were to constantly link that body to the undemocratic 
Constitution of 1935.  Ultimately therefore the Government-in-Exile was 
not, to the incoming Soviets, democratic and would not be allowed to 
return as a whole.  However this would not have been discernable to the 
people at the time, the speech of this Soviet officer must have had a very 
comforting effect on the ears of its audience. 
 106
 
Entrance of the “Kabel” unit into Zamość old town square 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 
2007) 
 
 
 
AK troops receive flowers after the liberation of Zamość.  This picture was 
taken in front of the City hall on 25 th July 1944 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 
2007) 
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The head of the Delegatura in Zamość, Antoni Wiącek, “Sandomierski”, in the 
city a few days after taking control, 29th July 1944 
(J. Jóźwiakowski, Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, Norbertinum Lublin 
2007) 
 
 
 
Operations of the 9th Infantry Division 
 
 
(Courtesy of IPN Lublin) 
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The 9th Infantry Division which was based to the north of the province in 
the Radzyń inspectorate, was composed of the 34 th and 35th Infantry 
Regiments, along with the 9th Artillery Regiment.  In July 1944 the area 
had around 8000 soldiers at its disposal but only 1600 of this number were 
in the 9th Infantry Division.  On the morning of 21st July Ludwik Bittner, 
“Halka”, the inspectorate commander and one of the most experienced 
commanders in the region, ordered the concentration of his forces.  In Biała 
Podlaska district the 34 th Infantry Regiment was concentrated near the 
village of Leszczanka, in the districts of Łuków and Radzyń Podlaski, the 
35th Infantry Regiment was concentrated in the region of the Kakolewnica 
Forest.  32 The attack route of the Division was along the line of Łuków-
Międzyrzec-Biała Podlaska, which meant that its operational route skirted 
the northernmost area of the region.  Their operations began on the night 
of the 21st and 22nd July when the “Zenon” unit attacked a German column 
on the road from Biała Podlaska–Łomaszy. 33 Next, on the 23rd, the 34th 
Infantry Regiment led by "Zenon" surprised a German unit on the Biała 
Podlaska-Parczew road, scattering the enemy and destroying an armoured 
car.  34  The 9th Infantry Division provides perhaps the best example of 
regular Red Army-AK co-operation during the period of Operation 
“Tempest”.  The Division’s attack along the north of the region was made in 
conjunction with Soviet armoured cavalry and infantry units.    On 23rd 
July, units of the Division were able to take the town of Łuków in 
conjunction with Soviet forces.  On the same day, a unit of the 35 th Infantry 
Regiment, numbering around 170 men, attacked and took the railway 
station along with its rolling stock at Bedlno.  On the 24 th the “Zenon” unit 
attacked a retreating German column near the village of Leszczanka to the 
south of Biała Podlaska. 35 The next two biggest objectives in the Division’s 
attack route, the towns of Biała Podlaska and Międzyrzec, were both taken 
on 26th July, and were once again taken along with Red Army units. 36 
Biała Podlaska itself was taken by the 34 th Infantry Regiment under the 
command of “Zenon”, which took the town along with the Red Army’s 278th 
Infantry under the command of Colonel Pawlowski.   Skeletal platoons from 
the Division, commanded by Piotr Makarczuk “Gruda”, Jan Giewartowski 
“Janka”, along with a platoon under Zygmunt Lukaszuka “Wrzos” and a 
mounted reconnaissance patrol under Zygmunt Raczynski “Nałęcz”, 
attacked the town from the south, protecting the town’s power station.  
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After three days the 34th Infantry Regiment removed itself back to the 
nearby village of Leszczanka, where the command was able to send 
messages back to command in London from their R-31 radio transmitter.  
From 29th July until 3-4th August the commander of the 9th Infantry 
Division, Ludwik Bittner “Halka”, engaged in talks with the Soviet 
command that was now based in Biała Podlaska. 37 During the initial 
stages the 9th Infantry Division was re-armed by the Red Army and an 
agreement was reached with the local commander that would have allowed 
the Division to march to Warsaw fully armed.  Joint struggle meant that in 
this region relations were cordial, at least for a few days. 
 
Yet ultimately Red Army AK relations were not to be the key.  The Red 
Army was followed into the province by the NKVD -and it is worth quoting 
an NKVD order given during this time as regards NKVD policy towards the 
AK: 
 
(1) Permit representatives of the Berling Army to enter the collecting 
centres for AK prisoners with a view to recruiting suitable NCOs and 
privates. 
(2) NCOs and privates who earlier expressed a willingness to serve in 
the Berling Army should be drafted... for use in auxiliary units of the 
Soviet Army. 
(3) AK staff officers with operational significance should be 
transferred to the relevant organs either of the NKVD- NKGB or of 
Smersh counter-intelligence. 
(4) Remaining AK officers should be sent to NKVD camps since 
otherwise they would occupy themselves by forming Polish 
underground operations. 38 
 
This order was given on 20th July to NKVD units in Lublin province, on the 
very day that the local AK began to enact Operation “Tempest”.  There is 
nothing ambiguous about these orders, once the Germans in a local area 
had been destroyed this blueprint for the destruction of the AK was to be 
put into effect, irrespective of what help they had given.  Indeed such a 
mind set enabled the Soviets to set aside the aid that the 27th Volhynian 
Division had given them when on 25th July they forcibly disarmed the unit.  
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Equally, the 35th Battalion, a unit that formed part of the 8th Infantry 
Regiment was forced to freeze its operations during Operation “Tempest” 
the day after the disarming of the Volhynian Division.  On 26 th July the 
Lublin regional command sent a cipher to London informing central 
command that the 35th Battalion under threat of force from the Soviets had 
been forced to sign a declaration and join the Berling Army 39 
 
Conflict over the new civilian administration of Lublin  
 
A day after the Germans had been cleared from the city of Lublin, 
Waldemar Lotnik, who had recently escaped from Majdanek, started the 
walk into the city after spending the night in a barn near the death camp.  
He recalled: 
 
Two days later I approached Lublin along the Warsaw Road, which 
had once been a magnificent avenue lined on either side with plane 
trees and parkland, dotted with imposing public buildings and the 
houses of the wealthy… On the way I passed three charred Soviet 
tanks with their turrets blown away.  The stench of rotting flesh in 
the July heat was intense.  They were from the Ukrainian front 
under Rokossovsky and had been knocked out by artillery from the 
Byelorussian front under Koniev… Some houses had been peppered 
with bullets and here and there I could see evidence of mortar 
shells… the city was still in turmoil and the survivors had no desire 
to celebrate their liberation, however great their relief that the 
Germans had gone.  40 
 
On the same day that the Soviets were disarming the 27th Volhynian 
Division some 15 miles away, in the city of Lublin the AK/Delegatura were 
busy attempting to re-establish the independent apparatus of government.  
On 25th July Władysław Cholewa, “Paśnik”, the Delegate of the 
Government-in-Exile, read out a proclamation in the city centre 
announcing that the legal Polish authorities were now in power in Lublin.  
The new headquarters of the local government, the Miejska Rada Jedności 
Narodowej (MRJN), was on the city’s main street, at number 51 Krakowskie 
Przedmieście.  It was a central and symbolic choice of location, at the heart 
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of the city, within a stone’s throw of the old town.  It was a clear declaration 
to the people of Lublin and to the Soviet forces in the city that the exiled 
government was exiled no longer.  It also signified how the modified plans 
for Operation “Tempest” were being enacted successfully in the province – 
as ordered, the AK-Delegatura were making a resounding declaration to 
their Soviet liberators that this was Polish territory and that they were the 
Polish government.  Along with the declaration, the news was posted on 
walls, doors and notice boards throughout the city.  In addition to this 
announcement, the serious work of attempting to create government was 
begun.  Units of the State Security Corps, Panstwowy Korpus 
Bezpieczeństwa (PKB), became the city’s new police force, patrolling the 
city and being identified by the PKB initials on the Polish flag on their arm 
sleeves.  One of the new government’s key roles were to station PKB men 
outside key public buildings and ensure that basic services could continue 
running.  As a part of this the new police force was placed outside the gas, 
electricity and railway stations, along with the city’s abandoned shops to 
prevent looting.   On the same day the commander of the PKB in Lublin, 
“Adam” announced the formation of his police force, along with the order 
that PKB units were to take immediate control of policing in 60% of the 
region, and perhaps provocatively, that the new police force would disarm 
any Poles that were not part of a force subordinated to the AK or PKB. 41 
 
 Equally the AK forces in the city, which had been led by “Konrad” during 
the fighting in the absence of Stefan Dębicki “Kmicic”, formally revealed 
themselves.  “Kmicic” set up a new headquarters for the city command at 4 
Ulica Górna, which was about a five-minute walk from the new MRJN base.  
Throughout the 26th and the 27th the process of installing an 
administration continued with the appointment of an official town 
president and the appointment of local ministers for public institutions and 
industry.  As a part of this process the pre appointed president of the 
Delegatura, Roman Sląski, who was not in the city at this point, saw a 
temporary replacement, Marian Chojnowski, appointed as provisional vice- 
president until his arrival - Sląski was to arrive in the city later.  As the 
Delegatura was now attempting to fulfil its long held aim to return as the 
government, so the local AK was beginning to return to the role of a 
conventional armed force.  At least this process can be seen to have begun 
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in the announcement by the new administration of the re-establishment of 
the army and its calls for a regional mobilisation.  This was the first stage 
of the so-called Reconstitution of the Armed Forces plan that had been 
drawn up during the German occupation. According to the AK its plan, met 
with a strong initial response, for it was perhaps no surprise that many 
local men were very keen to respond to this call to arms in ‘their’ army.  Yet 
by doing this, by calling up the men of the province into their Police force 
and their military, the AK/Delegatura were effectively presenting a 
challenge to Soviet plans for recruitment into the Berling Army - the Soviets 
had also set up a recruitment centre in the centre of the city for the Berling 
Army.  42 
 
The next day, 27th July, can be seen to be one of the most crucial days in 
modern Polish history.  At the beginning of the day the central command in 
Lublin, both civilian and military were still operating freely, openly 
expanding their activities, and recruiting new men to their cause.  By 
nightfall, however, the picture would look very different.  The key to this 
change was the swing in the weight of numbers between communist and 
non-communist forces in the city which took place during the day.  
Equally, the open activity of the preceding two days had meant that 
virtually all of the key players in the Polish underground had revealed 
themselves and their whereabouts to the Soviets.  
 
On the morning of the 27th, the AL started to concentrate its units around 
Lublin and entered the city in a conspicuous show of force.  On the same 
day units of the Berling Army started to enter the city.  The arrival of these 
large Polish communist forces inspired local communist groups within the 
city.   Having previously remained quiet, they now started to set up People’s 
national Unions.  After this Lublin was a very different place.  The regional 
delegate of the PKB, Józef Dolina “Zych”, was invited to Berling’s 
headquarters for a meeting.  In this meeting it was demanded that the PKB 
forces in the city submit to the local AL commander.  Dolina replied that he 
could only follow the orders of the legal authorities, and Berling said that 
that being the case he would meet with Cholewa himself at 13.00.  This 
promise was never kept.  Instead, on the night of the 27 th-28th July the 
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Delegatura’s new government building on Krakowskie Przedmieście was 
stormed and captured by Berling’s forces. 43 
 
27th July, the first AL partisan units, led by Grzegorz Korczyński, enter 
Lublin. 
(A.G. Kister, Studium Zniewalania; Walka aparatu bezpieczeństwa z 
polskim zbrojnym podziemiem niepodleg łościowym na Lubelszczyźnie 
1944-1947, Krakow 2005) 
 
In Zamość “Dąbrowa” and “Adam” had engaged in talks with Berling Army 
representatives the day before.  After these talks “Dąbrowa”, on the 
morning of the 27th, left to go to Lublin for discussions with “Marcin”. 44 On 
the same day “Marcin” had been invited to a conference with the 
commander of the Soviet 69th Army, General Kolpaczka, in which he was 
faced with the option of joining his forces to the Berling army or be 
disarmed.  “Marcin” chose the later of the two options and decided to 
disperse his troops.  However, both he and his officers were placed under 
Soviet arrest and then kept under guard until 29th July.  In taking this 
option, “Marcin” was following the orders given to him on 12th July by 
central command.  In these orders, he had been told to resist recruitment 
into the Berling Army and that only ‘in the last extremity’ was he to 
disband units and stash arms.  It is not known precisely what was said at 
his meeting with the Soviets but it must have given “Marcin” the feeling 
that his forces were facing the last extremity.  In a cipher sent back by him 
on 30th July, “Marcin” stated that during the meeting, General Kolpaczka 
asked him when he was given the order to fight the Germans.  45 Co-
operating, “Marcin” responded that the order, Order Number 43, had been 
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received by him during 1943.  Further, Kolpaczka asked him when he was 
given the order to attack Soviet units – the first such attempt perhaps to 
link the AK to the fascist forces in Lublin province.  Naturally, as no such 
order had been given, “Marcin” denied this claim. 46 Such a line of 
questioning must have confirmed for the regional commander that he was 
in an incredibly difficult position – disarming and dispersal would at least 
save the bulk of his forces from being targeted by the NKVD. 
 
So the order to disarm was given, and around 1000 soldiers of the Lublin 
AK handed in their weapons to the Soviets on the 28th July.  Equally at this 
time “Marcin”, whilst presumably still being kept guard by Soviet troops 
issued a briefing to the members of the AK regional command then present 
in the city, in which he ordered them to demobilise and disarm their forces.  
On the next day, 29th July at 12 noon the AK troops in the city were 
officially dismissed. 47  The units in the rest of the province would follow, 
but some not until August.  “Marcin’s” report back to London on 31st July 
is very telling as to why he took the second option presented by the Soviets.   
 
Alarm – Marcin. 
Although the Soviet attitude towards the AK is bad I feel that it is 
crucial to reveal our units in other areas.  It proves that our posture 
is correct.  It will open Soviet eyes to the fact that we are the true 
rulers of the area.  There is no result of recruitment to the Berling 
Army.  This is a brilliant social attitude.  The KRN (The PPR 
sponsored National Homeland Council) can be seen to be a complete 
fiasco. 48 
 
“Marcin” seems to have believed, therefore, that in the face of the Soviet 
stance his forces would adopt a position of passive resistance, refuse to 
mobilise into a Soviet controlled army and ignore communist sponsored 
political initiatives.  Clearly, trust in the intervention of the exiled 
government and, above all, their Anglo-Saxon allies is the most important 
factor here. “Marcin” was continuing to commit both himself and his entire 
command to Bór-Komorowski’s disclosure policy because not even the 
Soviets would attempt to impose communist rule in an area, which was 
governed by an allied force.  This sense of waiting for the immediate 
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repression to pass and for the Anglo-Saxons to assert themselves, is 
equally clear in another message that the Lublin command sent to the 
Government-in-Exile on the evening of 29th July.  In this cipher the 
command talks about being squeezed by the two million Soviet troops that 
were coming into the province and how the Soviet aim was to ‘freeze out’ 
the Anglo-Saxons in a policy of AK destruction that was about ‘interference 
in the name of power.’ 49 To “Marcin”, the AK had to remain open and the 
Soviets would eventually change their stance.  Disbandment meant that 
most of his forces would stand a chance of surviving what was probably 
hoped to be a short-lived period.  
 
However whilst “Marcin” had been under Soviet guard, the Delegatura’s 
governmental apparatus was being dismantled.  On 28 th July the local PKB 
delegate was summoned to the Soviets and in front of two witnesses the 
demand that he submit to the AL was repeated.  It is interesting that on the 
27th the communist line had been to invite the civilian branch to meet with 
the ‘Polish’ Berling Army, whilst the AK leadership had been invited to meet 
directly with the Soviet military commander in the area.  Clearly the 
decision had already been made that civilian matters in Poland were now in 
the hands of Polish communists acting at Moscow’s behest whilst military 
matters were to be in the direct hands of the Soviets.  Yet on the 28th this 
had been changed, now both the AK and Delegatura were being dealt with 
directly by the Soviets.  Perhaps the Soviets were discovering that the 
Polish communists commanded very little respect or influence on their 
countrymen.  The Soviets would have to do everything themselves. 
 
At the meeting with the Soviets on the 28th “Zych” too decided to disarm 
and disband the PKB; from now on the Delegatura had no effective police 
force, no way of enforcing its law on the city it was attempting to govern.  
The Soviets now had both the numbers and the will to enforce their own 
law on the city of Lublin irrespective of whether the local population 
supported them or not.  Whilst the storming of the Delegatura’s 
headquarters the night before had not signalled the end of their 
administration, the disarming of the PKB marked the symbolic end.  In 
response to the closure of their offices on Krakowskie Przedmieście, the 
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Delegatura had moved to number 7 Ulica Chopina, but by the evening of 
the 28th this building had been captured as well. 50 
 
The Lublin Committee 
 
The taking of Lublin was extremely important for the future of post war 
Poland, as it was the first sizeable Polish City taken in territory recognised 
by the Soviet Union as being 'Polish'.  The opportunity to exploit this fact 
was duly taken by the Soviets.  On 22nd July 1944 the Stalinist puppet of 
the Polish Committee of National Liberation, Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia 
Narodowego, (PKWN) or Lublin Committee was established.  For the first 
few days of its existence, however, the ‘Lublin’ Committee sat in the city of 
Chełm in the east of Lubelszczyzna around 60 miles to the east of Lublin.  
In a typical piece of Soviet factual manipulation the establishment of the 
committee in Chełm had been announced on Moscow radio on 21 st July, 
whereas in reality Chełm itself was not seized by the Red Army until the 
22nd and members of the PKWN did not reach the city until the 27th.  
Therefore, whilst the AK-Delegatura was being hounded and dismantled in 
Lublin city the Soviets were setting up their puppet government to the east 
in readiness for the moment when the provincial capital could be ‘secured’.    
The establishment of the PKWN marked a major turning point in Polish-
Soviet relations.  Prior to this point there had seemed no viable alternative 
to restoring the Polish Government-in-Exile.  Through the PKWN the 
Soviets had created a bridgehead for future communist rule.  It would 
administer over the newly liberated Polish territories in conjunction with its 
Soviet masters until the state of political flux had passed, and would then 
become the centre-piece of a new communist Polish administration.  The 
Government-in-Exile, with Churchill's backing could not be ignored 
completely, but with the PKWN in place Stalin had taken a huge step 
towards creating a 'friendly' Polish post war state. Now there was a 
communist alternative that Stalin could pay lip service to, a 'government' 
that was in Poland, a government that was 'fighting' for a free Poland with 
the people of Poland.  
 
Whilst this was very much the image that Stalin wished to portray to the 
world and thus undermine the prestige and support of the AK, this was in 
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reality far from being the truth.  The committee was an entirely Soviet 
construct from its very inception. It was created in Moscow and its 
manifesto stamped out by Soviet not Polish communists.  Moscow's new 
puppet was composed of the Moscow based Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) 
and Central Bureau of Polish Communists (CBKP) and the Polish-based 
PPR.  Whilst the Polska Partia Robotnica, the party that formed the 
backbone of the new committee, had been created on 28th December 1941 
their party membership had always remained small and isolated.  The PPR 
had attempted guerrilla campaigns against the occupying German 
authorities from 1941 to 1944 and most if not all had ended in failure.  Its 
military wing, the AL, had been relatively powerful in the Lublin region but 
had been largely undermined by the German actions of less than a month 
before.  Therefore, Stalin chose the PKWN’s new leaders, as they were 
reliable men with a history of strict adherence to Moscow.  Men such as the 
Committee's new chairman, Edward Osóbka-Morawski, or the Security 
Minister Stanisław Radkiewicz.  These Soviet backed men were placed in 
key positions in the new Committee to prevent it from becoming too 
independently minded.   
 
On 30th July Cholewa, the Head of the Delegatura in Lublin was invited to 
the Soviet commander in Lublin, where he was told that he must work with 
the Polish communists.  Cholewa refused this and on the next day he was 
taken to Chełm to meet with General Zukow and Osóbka-Morawski and 
Andrzej Witos of the PKWN.  At the meeting he repeated that he was the 
representative of the legal Polish authorities and that he would not work 
with the PKWN.  He then met the head of security, Radkiewicz, who advised 
him to stop all governmental activity with immediate effect.51 He returned 
to Lublin, from where he sent his report to the U.K.  On 1st August the AK-
Delegatura held a large meeting to discuss their response to the Soviet and 
PKWN demands.  Yet, they were not given time to act on their deliberations.  
On 3rd August Cholewa was arrested and “Marcin’s” arrest followed on the 
same day.  The PKWN would now be the only government in Lubelszczyzna.    
 
From the very inception of Operation “Tempest” the NKVD, if not the Red 
Army had a clear policy of neutralising the AK via the systematic arrests of 
its officers and the impressment of its men.  Bór-Komorowski's attempt to 
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work with the Soviets, via his policy of non-concealment of forces was 
back-firing.  Throughout July the AK had effectively offered themselves into 
the clutches of the NKVD.  Yet, clearly the AK had helped in the liberation 
of the province, making a mockery of assertions such as those of Chuikov 
that the AK had simply watched.  In fact if anything, it is highly probable 
that by fighting, by aiding the Soviet advance and by setting up their own 
administrations, the AK/Delegatura had probably reinforced the NKVD’s 
determination to disarm and neutralise them.   
 
The net result of implementing Operation “Tempest” in Lublin was that the 
AK had assisted the Soviets in their attempts to advance in towns and 
villages throughout the province.  In total underground partisan forces had 
launched around 150 raids during Operation “Tempest”.  This had yielded, 
in military terms, 1,000 German dead, 1,200 German soldiers captured, 
seven enemy tanks destroyed, 31 enemy armoured cars captured or 
destroyed, and 24 guns and mortars captured or destroyed. The scope and 
range of the raids had varied considerably from inspectorate to inspectorate 
and was clearly impressive, yet ultimately the net results were 
questionable.  Firstly the Soviets had managed to arrest virtually all of the 
underground’s top military leaders by mid August.  After the arrest of 
“Marcin”, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division Adam Switalski, was 
arrested on 13th August, and the commander of the 9th Infantry Division 
Ludwik Bittner, was arrested on 14th August.  In addition to this many 
soldiers had been disarmed and forced to enlist into the Berling Army.  Yet, 
as I. Caban points out in his study of the underground in this region, the 
majority of those NCOs and other ranks who had served in Operation 
“Tempest” had been able to return to their homes or quarters at the end of 
the operation, in the main still armed.  The Soviets were clearly targeting 
the head but the body still remained very much alive at this point in time. 
52 This was in a large part due to “Marcin’s” decision to disperse his forces 
before his arrest.  In addition to this, as shown in chapter two, “Marcin” 
and the regional command had to an extent anticipated that the Soviets 
would take such an approach and had put a shadow command structure 
in place before the arrival of their ‘liberators’.  This meant that the AK in 
Lubelszczyzna was able to remain very much an operational force after this 
point.  Although the shadow command limited the impact of the arrests, 
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many experienced members of the underground in the region had been 
lost; “Marcin” had been in a position of command in Lublin for two years.  
To some the policy of disclosure in effect had meant that Operation 
“Tempest” was nothing less than a catastrophe. 
 
After Operation “Tempest”, whilst the new, at first unofficial, regional 
commander Colonel Fraciszek Żak managed to preserve the core of the AK 
in the region, the AK and the Delegatura as an open force in the towns of 
Lublin province was to be effectively destroyed by September 1944.  
However, the underground and resistance as an idea had not been 
destroyed, the Poles were once again beginning to do what they had done 
under the German occupation.  In August 1944 Żak was still the head of a 
sizeable, organised force.  Until his suspension of activity in November of 
that year, Żak controlled the following inspectorates: Lublin, commanded 
by Edward Jasinski until his arrest on October 16 th who was then 
succeeded by Stanisław Piotrowski; the Puławy inspectorate, commanded 
by Stanisław Kowalski; Radzyń, commanded by Stefan Drewnowski until 
his arrest and then Wilhelm Szczepaniewicz; the Chełm inspectorate 
commanded by Władysław Zalewski; and finally Zamość inspectorate, 
which was commanded by Stanisław Prusem.  From September Żak was 
hiding in a flat in Lublin - within two months the AK in Lublin had become 
an underground conspiracy once again. 53 
 
The communists had managed to send the AK back underground and they 
appeared to be leaving nothing to chance.  Indeed, W ładysław Gomułka 
claims in his autobiography that nothing was left to chance when it came 
to the matter of who would ultimately be able to step into the power 
vacuum in Poland.  He talks about how special operational groups formed 
from the PPR followed the advance of the Red Army into the newly liberated 
territories of Poland.  He described their role thus: ' (To) build and extend 
the party organisational network, prepare the land reform and propagate 
the programme of the provisional Government'. 54 Therefore, behind every 
Red Army unit there was the NKVD to arrest and impress members of the 
AK, allied to this the PPR was following behind in turn to plug the gap in 
administration.  In effect the Soviets can be seen to have been removing 
two layers of government in the towns of Lublin in the summer of 1944.  
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The Red Army in conjunction with the AK had removed the Nazi 
administration from Lublin and now, within weeks often days, the 
AK/Delegatura administration was being removed in favour of the incoming 
PPR. However in the official post-war Soviet histories on this period, the 
very existence of the first phase was simply wiped from the record books.  A 
section of Marshall Zhukov's memoirs in which he talks about the local 
authorities is very revealing in this respect: 'We had established normal 
relations with local authorities and public organisations, and had their co-
operation where-ever it was possible.' 55 Technically Zhukov is correct in 
making this statement, as the local authorities of which he speaks are 
almost certainly the communist PKWN authorities.  The Period in which the 
Delegatura had attempted to run the towns and work with the incoming 
Soviets had simply never, happened.   
 
The key factor that the AK still had on its side as August 1944 began lay in 
the fact that the Government-in-Exile was still perceived to be the 
legitimate government of Poland by the vast majority of Poles and was 
recognised as such in London and Washington.  In Lublin, the arrests and 
round ups had removed the AK's original top command in the towns of the 
region, and to some extent damaged its standing in society, but it could 
still enjoy the support of a population which still saw them as 'our boys'.  
This meant that in the rural areas of the province, where the PKWN and the 
NKVD had a small and infrequent presence local Delegatura men were still 
settling matters of government.  Communist authority in much of the 
province, despite the huge numbers of Soviet troops in the area, was very 
much only skin deep.  The PKWN had declared that it was the government 
yet in real terms it was an isolated committee with a few thousand 
followers in the PPR and its military wing, the AL.  The PKWN had authority 
in an area directly occupied by Soviet troops; the danger was that when the 
troops left so would the PKWN's authority in Poland.   
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Chapter 3 
 
August 1944-October 1944 
 
 
Lubelszczyzna during the Warsaw 
Uprising 
 
 
At the beginning of August the new communist PKWN was weak and its 
supporters were divided as to the way forward.  They had been put into 
place in Lublin only days after the removal of the Delegatura and the arrest 
of the AK’s regional commander.  The AK’s policy of disclosure had clearly 
not worked, neither in Lublin nor in the east.  It had meant that the 
intelligence which the Soviets had gained on the AK from the AL and their 
own partisans was massively expanded - disclosure had revealed to the 
NKVD thousands of AK partisans in the region.  Yet in the first few days of 
August, communist administration had only been established in the cities 
of Lublin and Chełm.  At first members of the Delegatura and AK were 
running administrations in many rural areas and in some cases this was to 
be the case for the first couple of weeks.  Whilst disclosure had failed, 
“Marcin’s” decision to hand in weapons and disperse his forces meant that 
a significant number of his troops were able to avoid the first wave of 
arrests.  Equally the decision to create a shadow command meant that the 
impact of “Marcin’s” arrest was minimised.  Thus the arrival of the Soviets 
did not herald the end of an organised underground in the province.  
Rather, in the first few days after Operation “Tempest”, the NKVD was 
occupied with the soldiers that had been captured, in clearing the rear of 
the front and reconnoitring the region.    
 
It was against this backdrop that the uprising in Warsaw was launched.  
This event was to have a significantly disruptive impact on the Lublin 
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region.  The effects were immediate with the removal of the remaining AK 
Delegatura figures from the towns of the province.  Equally, the uprising in 
Warsaw made huge demands on the men that had avoided the first wave of 
arrests.  Across the region, area commands and individual units held 
discussions on whether to help their comrades in the capital.  In the event 
many of them did go and merely walked into Soviet forces.  The Uprising in 
the capital was to have a huge impact on the AK in Lubelszczyzna – for it 
was to provoke new waves of arrests by the NKVD.  This, allied with the 
fact that the Warsaw Uprising meant that the eastern front was to 
unexpectedly halt to the west of the province for nearly six months, 
produced a situation in which “Marcin’s” idea of weathering the storm was 
severely tested.  This process of weakening the ties of the underground was 
compounded by the Government-in-Exile’s decision not to send clear and 
consistent orders to the province. 
 
Even so, the underground that remained, much weakened though it was, 
was able to retain its structure and to redirect some of its activities.  Due to 
the early weakness and division of the PKWN, AK forces were able to 
penetrate many of the new structures of the fledgling administration, 
including even the security services.  The PKWN’s early attempts to reach 
out to elements of the underground did not have the immediate effects that 
they hoped for.  Rather, as the Uprising in Warsaw continued without 
serious Soviet help the people of the province became increasingly 
polarised.   Equally, it took the NKVD in the province time to establish their 
base, to extend their intelligence networks and to familiarise themselves 
with the whole of the region.  As a result, during the first few months of the 
Soviet presence in the region the NKVD were not able to cut off AK radio 
communications, nor destroy its command networks in Lublin.  By the end 
of the period of the Warsaw Uprising, the AK in Lublin was still operating.  
Ultimately the period of the Warsaw Uprising was to be a crucial one in the 
history of the AK, not just for the fighters in Warsaw, but for their 
compatriots in Lublin - with out guidance from London the regional AK had 
to attempt to survive NKVD arrests in a weakened state whilst also go to 
Warsaw’s aid.  
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The Warsaw Uprising 
 
In the city of Lublin the heads of the AK and Delegatura had been arrested, 
but a large number of men linked to both groups remained at liberty and 
continued to implement their government’s plans for the re-establishment 
of an independent Poland.  The Soviet Union had created the PKWN, their 
own puppet administration, and had now moved it to Lublin, but it had few 
supporters and little or no reach outside of its new headquarters.   
 
Within the Communist movement there were clear divisions of opinion on 
how to overcome the hostility of the majority of the population.  The main 
differences were between the Polish based communists in the PPR, and the 
Soviet-based ZPP communists who preferred to fall back on Red Army 
repression to assure a communist future for Poland.  Differences between 
the two groups was not a new phenomenon, throughout a significant 
period of the war the PPR had developed without radio contact with 
Moscow.  It had developed organically, and in many respects independently 
of Moscow.  It had spent most of the war attempting to fight the Nazis and 
the NSZ, seeking to increase its support away from its traditional heart-
lands such as Łódź yet it still had only around 20,000 members by mid-
1944. The PPR felt that they knew the temper of the Polish people; after all 
they had been trying and largely failing to gain popular support for some 
time.   Their ZPP counterparts, who had been flown in from the Soviet 
Union, had had very little in put about the direction of the communist 
movement either through influence in Moscow or through influence of the 
PPR's military wing, the AL.  At this stage there was no unified Polish 
communist strategy. 1 
 
Aside from the communist factions within the PKWN, the PPS, was 
ultimately to be the committee’s the most numerous and influential 
member.  Drawing the majority of their support from their traditional 
strongholds in the industrial cities of Lublin, Zamość and Krosno, the 
socialists were the only other faction within the new Committee aside from 
the communists, who were to control its upper echelons, and therefore 
have a degree of influence in its policy making.  2 Many members of the 
PPR believed that this small base had to be broadened if the committee was 
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to become the post war government of Poland. Yet it was made quite clear 
in the committee's manifesto of 25th July that the AK and the Government-
in-Exile were now the enemy and would not be tolerated: 
 
The National Council of the Homeland, called forth by the fighting 
nation, is the sole legal source of authority in Poland.  The émigré 
Government in London and its agency in Poland is an illegal and 
self-styled authority, based on the illegal Fascist constitution of April 
1935. 3 
 
This statement is typical of the approach that the PKWN took in order to 
undermine support for the Government-in-Exile.  The reference to 'the 
fighting nation' was a constant line that the communists, both Polish and 
Soviet, took towards London.  These ‘fascists’ were safely tucked away in 
Western Europe, whilst the real war was being waged in Poland by true 
Poles, by the Poles of the Communist Party.  Equally, the reference to the 
'Fascist constitution' was another line that the PKWN consistently took 
towards London.  The constitution referred to was the 1935 Sanacja regime 
which was unpopular, distinctly authoritarian and undemocratic in nature.  
Even though the members of the Government-in-Exile had had nothing to 
do with this constitution, they had been members of the politically 
repressed opposition, the PKWN constantly attempted to link them with it.  
It was a desperate attempt to link London with the failures of the inter-war 
government, with the abject defeat of 1939 that had lead to the terrible 
Nazi occupation.   
 
Yet it is important to point out that in the initial stages of the Soviet 
occupation, the propaganda of the PKWN was markedly ‘softer’ in its tone 
than it would become.  This can be seen to be part of the attempt to draw 
in more of the region’s left leaning people, persuading them to support or at 
least to accept, the PKWN.  As Rafał Wnuk points out in his study on the 
province’s underground, PKWN documents from the period of the Warsaw 
Uprising are full of adjectives such as ‘patriotic’, ‘democratic’, ‘people’s’ and 
‘national’.  These were used and emphasised instead of the type of rhetoric 
more readily associated with Stalinist propaganda such as ‘communist’, or 
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‘Marxist’.  By using this type of language the PKWN were clearly attempting 
to appeal to the people’s sense of Polishness and not their class loyalties. 4 
 
With the PKWN apparently hesitating and the liberation of Warsaw 
seemingly imminent, it must have seemed as if everything was still to play 
for.  The perception both amongst the AK, the Polish people and many in 
the PKWN was that the future hung on the fate of the uprising in Warsaw 
and the support of the western allies.  Nothing seemed to have been 
decided in the international sphere; success in Warsaw and pressure from 
the western allies would surely persuade the Soviets to back-down.  Such 
broad political reflections were reinforced by the results of Operation 
“Tempest” in the east.  These had a great influence on the thinking of the 
AK command in the capital.  Disclosure clearly was not working; 
throughout July the AK had in effect lost some of its largest units in the 
east of the country.   It had tried co-operating, it had tried disclosure, what 
then was the AK to do next?  To Bór-Komorowski and the high command it 
looked more likely every day that the Soviet Union was intent on presenting 
the AK with a fait accompli. 5 
 
For this reason Bór-Komorowski at the suggestion of his subordinate, 
Leopold Okulicki, had ordered a modification of Operation “Tempest”.  
From now on the AK was to focus its attention on enacting Operation 
“Tempest” only in the major towns.  In urban centres, in front of witnesses, 
the AK would concentrate its forces, set up an administration and 
'welcome' its Soviet guests.  The capital was to be the centre of this 
operation.6  Bór-Komorowski had to act now, Soviet guns were heard 
beyond the Warsaw suburb of Praga; the same force that was destroying 
the AK in the east seemed now to be on the doorstep of the capital, at the 
centre of the resistance.  In a message to the Delegatura on 26th June the 
Government-in-Exile had effectively handed over control of the uprising 
start date to the AK in Poland.  This meant that even though key people in 
London, such as the Commander-in-Chief Sosnkowski,7 were against 
action at this time, the decision was in the hands of Warsaw.  To the people 
on the ground, the situation must have seemed increasingly desperate.  In 
addition to the reports from regional commands, on 27th July Radio 
Moscow had announced that the previous day a ten-point agreement had 
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been made between the Soviet Union and the PKWN.  The most important 
points were these: 
 
Point Two: The PKWN is to establish a Polish administration in 
accordance with the Polish constitution, create the machinery for 
recruiting men for the Polish armed forces and ensure active co 
operation with the Soviet Commander-in-Chief 
Point Six: As soon as an area of liberated Poland ceases to be a zone 
of direct military operations, the PKWN will assume full 
responsibility in matters of civil government. 8 
 
Therefore, only days after the setting up of the PKWN in Lublin, Moscow 
was announcing to the world that the Polish future would be in effect a 
communist one.  This 'agreement' appeared to set in stone Moscow's policy 
on Poland.  The clear inference of point six was that the PKWN was to be 
the government after liberation, not the Delegatura authorities.  For the AK 
command this meant that if their men on the spot continued to welcome 
the Soviets, continued the policy of disclosure, they would continue to be 
relieved of their posts.  The AK would not be allowed to set up an 
alternative administration.  If the announcement of the establishment of 
the PKWN had sent shock waves through the AK, the Ten Point agreement 
confirmed their worst fears.  
  
The uprising that began in Warsaw at 5p.m. on 1st August 1944 was, 
therefore, in many senses a supreme act of defiance, perhaps an act of 
desperation by an organisation that was running out of options.  Okulicki 
had persuaded Bor-Komorowski that if the AK could hold Warsaw until the 
Soviets arrived, the international community could not allow the NKVD to 
crush the Poles there as they had in the provinces.   The Warsaw Uprising 
was indeed an act of desperation, as it relied on too many variables to 
guarantee its own success.  In order for the uprising to succeed, the AK 
needed the Wehrmacht to continue its withdrawal from the city leaving the 
German garrison exposed.  This did not happen.  The uprising needed 
British, American and, most vitally, Soviet support to succeed.  For the 
British and Americans the operating distances to Warsaw were very great 
and would require a series of dangerous flights over Germany itself 
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meaning that significant help was never very likely.  Even if Stalin had 
allowed US planes to refuel in the Soviet Union, the distances and dangers 
involved were always going to be prohibitive, despite an attempt by the RAF 
to overcome these problems in September.  Given their recent record 
during Operation “Tempest”, the Soviets were never likely to offer 
significant support.  Anita Prażmowska in her recent work Civil War in 
Poland, 1942- 1948 , estimates that the AK had a total force of 50,000 in 
Warsaw at the beginning of the uprising, but only around 22,000 men 
actually participated in the fighting; even this force only had enough 
ammunition to cover 10-12 percent of its needs. 9 The uprising would not 
be successful without outside help: it was one of the great ironies of the 
situation in mid 1944 that the Poles were dependent for their freedom on 
the very people who would ultimately deny them it.  On 29th July, Major 
General Radzievsky's Second Tank Army had got to within twenty 
kilometres of Warsaw, the same day the AK reported hearing the Soviet 
shelling of the northern suburb of Praga.  However, Radzievsky ran into a 
wave of panzer counter-attacks from German Army Group Centre.  The 
strength of these attacks had exposed the temporary insecurity of the 
army’s left flank and the charge to Warsaw had been stalled, but for how 
long?  Certainly very few people within the Polish capital believed that it 
would take more than a couple of days.  Marshall Zhukov in his memoirs 
claims that in a meeting with Stalin, the decision not to go for Warsaw was 
made first and foremost on tactical grounds: 
 
From the operational viewpoint we do not particularly need the area 
north-west of Warsaw.  The City must be taken by skirting it on the 
south-west and simultaneously dealing a powerful blow in the 
direction of Łódź-Poznan. 10 
 
After this meeting in late September 1944, Zhukov claims that Stalin 
decided to adopt a defensive posture along the 1st Byelorussian Front.  The 
official line was that the Soviets had attempted a breakthrough in August 
and had been knocked back, now they were to attack elsewhere.  Yet it is 
highly possible that the difficulties of entering Warsaw whilst it was in the 
hands of the AK were more to the forefront of Stalin's mind in his decision 
to adopt a defensive posture.  Stalin’s mind was on the Balkans in August 
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and September and the Soviet push southwards into that peninsula - the 
Soviets could afford to wait outside Warsaw and watch events unfold.  Yet 
this halt was to have a massive impact on the AK forces both in front of 
and behind the Red Army.  The pause for six months outside Warsaw 
enabled the Soviet security forces to the rear crucial time and extra troops 
with which to smother their enemies. 
 
Zhukov's tactical argument has a ring of truth about it.  The 1st 
Byelorussian Army was commanded by the heroes of Stalingrad, who knew 
well the horrors of street fighting against a seemingly invisible enemy and 
in the first half of 1944 it was becoming increasingly clear that the German 
Army was planning to make a stand in Warsaw. Zhukov also states that 
the initial attack on the Praga suburb of Warsaw was merely a faint, part of 
a greater deception to persuade the German Army Group Centre to mass 
their forces around the Polish capital, enabling the combined Byelorussian 
and Ukrainian Fronts to outflank them.  However, as Norman Davies 
argues in Rising 44: The Battle for Warsaw, this excuse was only valid until 
the middle of August; after this with every day that passed the pointed 
nature of the Soviet halt became more apparent. 11 
 
The view from Lublin 
 
In Lublin, on 1st August, on the very day that the Warsaw Uprising was 
launched, the experience of the Delegatura and AK was decidedly mixed.  In 
the central strip of the province, where the direction of the Red Army’s 
thrust had deposited the greatest number of Red Army and NKVD men, it 
was beginning to look as if a new occupation was being established.  Yet in 
contrast to this, the far south-east of the province had been left virtually 
untouched by the incoming communist forces, and the AK was fighting the 
UPA whilst setting up its own administrations in ‘Polish’ areas.  In the 
cities and large towns of the province the experience was equally mixed.  In 
the city of Zamość, in the south of the province, representatives of the 
Government-in-Exile were openly holding a meeting to discuss the 
problems of how to restore law and order to the area.  The Delegatura 
representative presiding over the meeting was Antoni Wiącek, a local 
Zamość banker. On the walls of the city council chambers, where the 
 131
meeting was being held were hung a Polish eagle that was surrounded by 
the flags of Poland and the USSR on one side and Britain and the United 
States on the other. 12 
 
At the local level, the agents of the Government-in-Exile were attempting to 
establish their administration, yet against this lay the background of 
reports of arrests elsewhere.  Locally most of the AK involved in Operation 
“Tempest” had been disarmed at the end of July but in the Zamość area, 
the quantity of weapons handed into the Soviets represented but a small 
portion of the weapons that the AK had managed to seize from the 
retreating Germans.  Although in many of the towns of the province the AK 
was still in the open, by the beginning of August the atmosphere was 
distinctly nervous. The feeling at this time must have been one of 
uncertainty.  The Germans had gone, the Soviets were arresting people to 
the north and east, and as yet there was no direction from the 
Government-in-Exile.  During the first few days of August, in many of the 
towns of the province, much of the AK had been temporarily disbanded in 
accordance with “Marcin’s” order, while the Delegatura attempted to 
govern.  This state of affairs was watched over by an increasingly numerous 
NKVD. 13 According to the work of Jacek Wołoszyn, during the first days of 
the occupation the NKVD were primarily occupied with two aims: to disarm 
the independence underground, and to force AK other ranks into the 
Berling Army.  Operation “Tempest” had enabled the NKVD to seemingly 
achieve these aims very quickly; within days of the Germans leaving, the 
top commanders of the region had been arrested and after “Marcin’s” 
dispersal order, the other AK units in the region had returned to their 
hiding places.  In many senses it was primarily due to “Marcin’s” order to 
disperse that the AK was able to continue in organised strength at all after 
Operation “Tempest”.   
 
The reasoning behind the NKVD’s policies in the region was that the force 
under the command of Ivan Serov was there to clear the areas to the rear of 
the Soviet advance.  The fact that Serov was sent to Lublin after leading the 
arrests in Soviet-claimed Vilna is indicative of the continuity of the NKVD’s 
policy towards the AK. 14 There was no tangible difference in the treatment 
received by the AK in Vilna or Lublin, they were behind Soviet lines and 
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therefore had to be neutralised, it did not matter that they were part of a 
force that was allied to the ally of the Soviet Union.  The military imperative 
to defeat Nazi Germany overrode all other considerations.  The disclosure 
policy had dramatic consequences: before Operation “Tempest” the only 
information that the NKVD had on the AK in Lubelszczyzna had been 
limited and gathered by AL and Soviet partisan units operating behind the 
front during the last two months of the German occupation.  After the 
fighting to clear the Germans from the province, many AK units and the 
cryptonyms of their leaders became known to the NKVD.  Thus in the first 
few days of the communist administration the Soviet security forces were 
able to compile lists of AK officers, information that would ultimately prove 
to be vital.  15 
 
In the initial stage of operations, the NKVD in Lubelszczyzna was primarily 
interested in removing the biggest potential obstacles from the rear of the 
Red Army.  At this stage it lacked the local know-how to truly bring the 
whole of the region under control.  Therefore, it concerned itself in the first 
few days and weeks with dealing with those AK soldiers who, by fighting 
alongside the Soviets in Operation “Tempest”, had given away their 
positions.  In the main, AK forces, such as the 9th Infantry Division in the 
north, had withdrawn after Operation “Tempest” to small villages in their 
operating areas.  This meant that, aside from Lublin, for the first two weeks 
of the communist administration, the majority of the NKVD forces in the 
area were dealing with the AK units that had been surrounded in mostly 
remote areas.  During this time General Ivan Serov based NKVD operations 
in the city of Lublin and began to organise his forces into the following 
groupings: agents, investigators, reconnaissance investigators, and army-
operations.  These groups were to work with NKVD regiments in the region 
in order to clear the rear of the front.  Although the NKVD was adept at 
such operations, things such as the reconnaissance of a war-torn region 
would take time. 16 Therefore it is important to state that during this 
period, and until the failure of the Warsaw Uprising, the first few months of 
‘People’s’ authority brought about a relatively wide margin of freedom for 
the majority of the population.  
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Weathering the NKVD storm 
 
The arrests of “Marcin” and “Paśnik” had been destabilising but it was the 
sheer number of Soviet and NKVD forces moving in and through 
Lubelszczyzna at this time that made coherent large-scale AK activity 
virtually impossible.    As Rafał Wnuk points out, given the fact that the 
NKVD were still relatively ignorant about the terrain in which they were 
working and that the Polish communist security forces existed in only 
name, it was the fact that the front had halted in the Lublin region that 
was the major factor in hampering the AK’s activities in these crucial first 
weeks. 17 “Marcin’s” order to disperse should not be seen as an example of 
someone grossly misreading the situation that his forces were in.  Rather, it 
must have seemed perfectly conceivable given the speed of advance by the 
Red Army in the four months prior to August 1944 that this force could 
have been in Berlin by Christmas.  This would have meant that the 
crushing weight of the front would have moved beyond Lublin, and 
therefore the period of communist military saturation would have been 
brief.  Despite his arrest and the arrests of many of his colleagues, “Marcin” 
had arranged that a reserve command be put in place and many of the 
rank and file had returned home after Operation “Tempest”.  The Warsaw 
Uprising and the halting of the front for five months was to destroy the idea 
of weathering the storm.   In many senses the contrast between what could 
be described as the “Marcin” line and the decision to launch the uprising in 
Warsaw was indicative of a greater schism in approaches to ‘fighting’ 
occupation in Poland.  Since the nineteenth century Polish resistance had 
been divided into two broad camps.  In many senses the Warsaw Uprising, 
was the last great manifestation of the ‘heroic’ approach to resistance.  
Equally “Marcin’s” attempts to preserve the body of his force whilst the 
NKVD rolled over the province is resonant of the so-called ‘Kraków’ school 
of resistance.  In 1944 one was to ensure the failure of the other. 
   
The stalling of the front for such a prolonged period had two huge benefits 
for the communists in Poland.  Firstly the key fight in Warsaw was watched 
but not helped, and secondly it gave the Soviet security forces time and 
men to make sufficient progress in undermining the AK/Delegatura to its 
rear.  If the front had continued forward in August 1944, it is highly 
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unlikely that the Soviet Union would have been able to make any form of 
communist administration work in the land that they had set aside for the 
new Polish state.  The local AK in Lublin was therefore smothered under 
the weight of Soviet not Polish communist numbers.    Given this weight of 
numbers, the level of ‘filtering’ of non-communist groupings was achievable 
on a huge scale, and was always likely to have destroyed any attempts by 
the local population to determine their own fate.  
 
As touched on in the previous chapter, the NKVD had been given specific 
orders to effectively destroy AK forces in Lubelszczyzna from the very 
moment that they had stepped into the region.  The day after this order, on 
21st July NKVD units operating in the Lublin area had received another 
order that assigned sections of this force to creating and controlling holding 
centres, or prison camps, for local AK units.  Virtually all of those AK forces 
that had held talks with the NKVD or Red Army in July were to be ‘filtered’ 
through camps in this manner.  For example, the 27th Volhynian Division 
and elements of the 8th Infantry Regiment had met with Soviet forces in the 
village of Skrobów outside of Lubartów after Operation “Tempest”.  Once 
the ultimatum to disarm or join the Berling Army was given to this AK 
force, the NKVD had to create a holding centre for thousands of soldiers.  
According to AK sources, in the first weeks of August around 6,000 men 
were held at this temporary camp near Lubartów.  The camp commander, 
Major Alexander Kavaznikov, was in control of men most of whom were 
now classified as being a part of the Polish People’s Army.  Until the 
entrance of the Soviets they had been members of AK, NOW and BCh units, 
which were mostly from the Lubartów area.  These people had ‘decided to 
join’ the Berling Army, after the NKVD ultimatum, yet they were to still find 
themselves in what was essentially a prison camp for weeks after their 
decision.  Once camps such as Skrobów were liquidated, the former 
inmates were either deported to the USSR or sent to Lublin with NKVD 
minders to begin their service in the forces of People’s Poland. 18   Initially 
the NKVD was operating out of their new base on Ulica Chopina in the city 
of Lublin.  Once the cells at this location proved to be insufficient due to 
the sheer volume of arrests, a further two locations in Lublin city centre, at 
number 10 Ulica Świętoduski, and number 10 Ulica Skłodowski were 
created.  In addition to this the former German prisons/ camps at 
 135
Majdanek and Lublin Castle were reopened to deal with the increased 
numbers.  The speed of the NKVD’s work in the province can be seen by 
the fact that within two weeks of arriving in the region, on August 11th, 
they sent out their first bunch of deportees from Świdnik to Kiev.  Amongst 
the first people deported from Lubelszczyzna were around 40 members of 
the local AK/Delegatura and 8 officers of the AL. 19 It is unknown when the 
NKVD began using the recently vacated German concentration camp at 
Majdanek to house captured AK soldiers but it is certain that the camp 
began its new use at some point during the first two weeks of August.  
Janina Kiełboń estimates that it was probably on August 8th that the camp 
received its first batch of AK inmates – ten officers from the 3rd Infantry 
Division.  From this time onwards, new prisoners were to arrive virtually 
every day into the camp.  Very quickly another two branch camps were set 
up at Poniatowa and Krzesimów to deal with these numbers.  This first 
phase of repression lasted until mid-August and saw the leaders of the 
AK/Delegatura in Lublin, Tumidajski and Cholewa arrested and ultimately 
be sent to Gulag camps in the interior of the USSR - a fate that most of the 
inmates of Majdanek in the summer of 1944 would share. 20 
 
The attempted destruction of the AK in progress, Majdanek, summer 1944.  
In the foreground are officers of the Berling Army conscripting AK other ranks 
into their force.  In the background are the blocks of Pole III, field III, of the 
former Nazi death camp.  These were now being used as barracks and 
holding blocks for AK men.  Whilst the men were conscripted their officers 
were being interrogated and deported. 
(A.G. Kister, Studium Zniewalania; Walka aparatu bezpieczeństwa z 
polskim zbrojnym podziemiem niepodleg łościowym na Lubelszczyźnie 
1944-1947, Krakow 2005) 
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Over 200 AK officers alone were sent to the camp at Majdanek during the 
first weeks of August, where they were held in field III, Pole III, this number 
would eventually be much higher.  The interned AK men were next to the 
German POW’s in Pole IV that they had perhaps helped to capture less than 
a month before.  The efficiency at which large numbers of people were 
arrested and deported was truly impressive, indeed on 23 rd August around 
250 officers and cadet–officers of the AK were taken from Pole III of 
Majdanek and under armed guard were forced onto 40 freight wagons.  
Some of these men were able to throw letters that were addressed to their 
families out of the train, some amongst them must have guessed their fate 
– they were being deported into the heart of the Soviet Union.  This was the 
largest single deportation out of Lubelszczyzna in the first two months of 
the Soviet occupation. 21 At a stroke the NKVD had removed many of the 
AK’s most experienced and respected officers from Lubelszczyzna.  In total 
8 transports deported around 400 AK/Delegatura officers from Majdanek 
during August and September 1944 into the Soviet Union.22 
 
 
A view of Lublin castle from the city’s old town.  This former Tsarist prison 
was used from August 1944 onwards as a NKVD prison and interrogation 
centre. 
(Author’s own collection) 
 
These initial detentions were not focused on the whole of Polish society nor 
were they focused against the AK as a whole, the NKVD was mechanically 
removing the non-communist armed groups, whose presence they were 
aware of, from the rear of the Red Army. 
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The outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising sent shock waves through the ranks 
of the PKWN in Lublin and prompted the NKVD to intensify its activity.  If 
the uprising were to succeed then Stalin, the Red Army and the PKWN 
would themselves be presented with a fait accompli - an AK and anti-
communist coalition in Warsaw would destroy any communist attempt to 
take power in Poland before it had even begun.  The response to this was to 
begin arresting more members of the underground.  In Zamość on 4th 
August the Delegatura leader in the city, “Wiącek” was forced to leave his 
post in favour of a member of the Polish Worker’s Party, Dubiel. 23 The 
destabilising effects of the removal of the heads of the local Delegatura 
representatives was felt immediately: 
 
Because of “Sandomierski’s” (Wiącek’s) removal, the general 
situation in our region is very unsafe.  This morning a proclamation 
signed by General Żymirski, a communist, was posted throughout 
the town.  General Żymirski is calling on all “former” members of the 
Home Army, or other underground units to join the Berling Army.  24 
 
Whilst the NKVD was beginning its arrests of the local leadership, a decree, 
was posted throughout the Soviet held towns of the province on 12th 
August..  Stating that all former military personnel were to register for the 
Berling Army by 18th August at the latest.  The local AK command reported 
back to London in a message dated 14 th August that a commission headed 
by General Bogdanov was investigating anti-communist activities in the 
Lublin area.  The commission was treating both the AK and NSZ as 
agencies that were engaged in such activities.  As a consequence, all AK 
men who had revealed themselves were being interned. 25 Thus a two-
pronged attack was made on the AK.  The leadership was being arrested 
and removed whilst the grass roots support for the Government-in-Exile 
was to be forced into the communist Berling Army under direct Soviet 
control.   
 
Yet it must be stressed that the NKVD’s ability to install PKWN men at this 
stage was still very much limited to the larger towns and cities of the 
south-east.  Elsewhere, as “Marcin” had suggested it seemed possible to 
 138
weather the storm.  On the day that the Lublin city Delegatura was being 
destroyed, in other, remoter areas of the province, the administration was 
to remain in the hands of ‘Mikołajczyk supporters’.   The command noted 
on 4th August that the NKVD were already beginning ‘their work’ in the 
region’s cities and yet the same report states that at this time the ‘Soviets’ 
were operating in only some of the region’s outlying areas.  It took the 
NKVD in some cases until October to penetrate the region’s largest forests.  
This is something that is often repeated in the messages sent back to 
London during the first half of August 1944.  In the first weeks of the Soviet 
occupation the NKVD, a foreign force with little knowledge of the area, had 
entered the region primarily along the main transport routes into Lublin.  
Without a sizeable Polish security force to liase with, the NKVD was in 
effect running blind in much of Lubelszczyzna at first.  As the NKVD began 
to move out from their original base in the city of Lublin, and reconnoitre 
the outlying terrain, their ability to restrict and stop the governmental 
working and military activities of the AK/Delegatura massively increased.   
 
For example, on 4th August the commander of the AK and the head of the 
Delegatura had already been arrested, the AK had been disarmed and the 
NKVD were operating in the city of Lublin at number 18 Ulica Chopina, yet 
to the north of the province things were very different.  In the Biała 
Podlaska area, elements of the 30 th Infantry Regiment would still be in a 
position to attempt a march to Warsaw fully armed on 12 th August.  
Equally, whilst the Red Army and NKVD were in the town of Biała Podlaska 
itself, “Marcin’s” order to disperse had not yet been enacted.   According to 
the commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment “Roman”, “Marcin’s” order 
was to be enacted on the morning of 12th August.  As a part of it, the 34th 
and 35th Infantry Regiment were to return to their original place of 
concentration, stash their arms and appoint officers to liase with the local 
Soviet command.  To fulfil this, the 34th Infantry Regiment marched to 
Biała Podlaska and the 35 th Infantry Regiment marched to Łuków.  Due to 
the fact that at this point the AK in this region still had a large degree of 
operational independence vis-à-vis the incoming Soviets, they were able to 
successfully stash most of their arms. 26 This discrepancy between the 
experiences of the region’s AK forces was not to last.  The reach of the 
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NKVD was spreading across the terrain of Lubelszczyzna during the first 
half of August 1944 as reports to London show: 
 
Sent to London on 4th August: 
In the towns the work of the NKVD is starting, and in some villages 
the Soviets are operating 27 
Sent to London on 13th August: 
In Łuck and Włodzimierz mobilization of Poles to Berling, Ukrainians 
to Soviet Army 28 
Sent to London on 17th August: 
On 12th August the Government delegate in Tomaszów Lubelski was 
arrested along with 235 personnel 29 
Sent to London on 19th August: 
Registration of officers and cadet officers in the counties of Zamość, 
Krasnystaw, Tomaszów, Biłgoraj 30 
Sent to London on 19th August by the AK regional commander Żak: 
Mass arrests are taking place throughout the whole region by the 
NKVD 31 
 
In most of these reports it was stated that as communist ‘government’ was 
expanding its area of operation, it did so at the point of a NKVD rifle.  If on 
4th August the NKVD was beginning its work, by the 19th the regional 
commander could report that ‘its work’ was being repeated throughout the 
area of his command.  In practice this meant that towns throughout the 
region were receiving the same treatment as Lublin, for example in Zamość 
the NKVD had now set up a prison in the city, arrested Poles were put in a 
cold house, next to the butchers on Ulica Radziecki. 32 But as these reports 
show, the local AK constantly described how mobilisation and arrests were 
being carried out by the Soviet NKVD and not by the PKWN. The new 
communist government was completely impotent at this early stage, which 
helps to explain why most AK men felt that the repressions and arrests 
could not go on.  It just did not seem feasible that the communists could 
stay in power once the front moved forward.  Zygmunt Klukowski records 
in his diary how the communist administration was slowly spreading out 
from its base in Lublin to the rest of the province’s main towns: 
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20th August, 1944 - Sunday 
 
The Soviets are slowly widening their influence.  A Russian colonel 
travelling with the chief of the county National Liberation 
Committee, Dubiel, inspected the communes.  He stopped in 
Szczebrzeszyn.  We have here now a Soviet city commandant who is 
not only in charge of all military activities but also heads the city 
administration. 
An NKVD officer took over three rooms of the Zamoyski Estate and 
also seems very much interested in the cellars, probably as a future 
prison.  The inhabitants of Zwierzyniec are obviously extremely 
disturbed about this. 33 
 
On 23rd August the Soviet High Command had sent Soviet war 
commanders to be appointed over every village, town and large town in 
Lublin.  Their orders were precise and clear; they were only to work with 
the PKWN, their representatives and officials, and no other group.  It was 
against this backdrop that the AK’s shadow command in Lublin started re-
orientating its activities in order to combat the moves of the communists.  
From the beginning of August, Bureau II of the AK command in the region 
reoriented its work towards the activities of the Red Army, PKWN, Berling 
Army and NKVD.  By the autumn, the framework of a counter-intelligence 
operation had been established by Bureau II.  Captain Antoni Wieczorek, 
“Scibor”, later known as “Kaktus”, headed the counter intelligence unit 
during August.  This unit was able to penetrate the workings of the 
fledgling communist administration.  During the period of the Warsaw 
Uprising, Bureau II was able to receive information from workers in the 
Department of Public Security, Resort Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (RBP), a 
part of the PKWN.  These contacts, along with men working around the 
area of the RBP building, also enabled Bureau II to gain information on the 
activities of the NKVD, which were undertaken at18 Ulica Chopina, and 
afterwards at Lublin castle.  In addition to this appointments to the RBP 
and the Communist Armed Forces were monitored along with the 
movements of troops through the area and the attitude of the population 
towards these events. 34 
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On 10th August an AK officer meeting took place in a flat in the city of 
Lublin, after which “Nurt”, the Lublin inspectorate commander ordered all 
members in his area to remain in organised underground units and to 
resist the call up to the communist controlled Polish Army, Wojsko Polskie 
(WP). 35 Starting from 2nd August, Żak also sent a series of commands to 
his subordinates that talked about the need to maintain operations.  In 
each of these orders, constant reference was made to the ‘legal government 
in London’, and to the support of the Anglo-Saxon allies.  For example on 
21st August, in a command that was sent to all Lublin region AK and BCh 
commanders he ordered that the PKWN should be boycotted and that it 
was the AK’s duty to resist call up to the WP.  In most of these orders he 
finished with the words: ‘Soldiers!  We must follow the commands of the 
rightful government.  Long live Poland!’ 36 From these reports it is clear that 
the regional command increasingly believed that conflict between east and 
west, between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon allies, was becoming 
inevitable and that the Lublin AK should prepare for this. From September 
onwards Bureau II and the BiP in Lublin were ordered to begin to infiltrate 
and to launch counter propaganda aimed at the communist forces in the 
region.  Below the regional level, the Lublin city BiP created a special 
section whose remit it was to infiltrate the workings of the PKWN.  This 
unit was led by Zbigniew Flisowski, “Mochort” until October 1944 and was 
able to successfully infiltrate the PKWN and the WP in the region.   The city 
AK also created diversionary groups that were ordered to disrupt the 
installation of the communist administration.  By the end of September 
1944, in Lublin city there were three platoons of 24 people in such units. 37 
 
The longer the Warsaw Uprising went without Soviet aid, the stronger in 
tone Żak’s orders become, and the more the AK in Lublin re-orientated its 
activities towards the communists.  
  
The fact that the underground was able to successfully penetrate the 
fledgling communist administration eloquently highlights the problems 
faced by any occupying power which wishes to enforce a satellite 
government on a foreign people.  In the first few months of the Soviet 
occupation, the PKWN had to invent a government virtually from scratch.  
Although through the PPR and AL, the Soviet-led communists were to have 
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a source of vital local intelligence and manpower, such was the small size 
of these organisations, that they were not large enough to form a viable 
basis of government in the short term.  In the first few months of the 
PKWN’s existence therefore, given the size and organisation of the non-
communist underground, any attempts to enlarge either the PKWN’s 
civilian or military governmental apparatus in Lubelszczyzna meant the 
potential employment of AK men into their new communist forces.  The 
potential for infiltrating communist forces, such as the Citizen’s Militia, 
Milicja Obywatelska (MO) – the new communist police force, was huge 
therefore for the AK.  Despite the steady expansion of the NKVD, there were 
signs that the AK was weathering the storm. 
 
Several issues highlight the uncertain foundations of the new People’s 
Poland.  It is important to point out that from August 1944 onwards; in 
effect three distinct legal systems were operating in Lubelszczyzna.  Firstly 
the law courts of the AK/Delegatura were still functioning in a reduced 
underground capacity and enforcing the laws of the inter war republic on 
its members.  Then there were two distinct Communist legal systems, the 
Soviet and the Polish.  In practice it was Soviet law that was to rule in the 
province throughout 1944, with the Delegatura being sidelined in August 
and the Polish communist system often deferring to their Soviet masters.  
Nothing reflects the puppet-master relationship of the PKWN and the USSR 
more clearly than the fact that Soviet law held precedence over Polish 
territory in all matters, and in particular to those relating to the destruction 
of ‘opposition’.  Whilst the Soviets had transferred the lands to the west of 
the Bug River over to the PKWN, in practice Soviet law was applied in both 
Soviet and Polish territory, to wherever the Soviet terror apparatus and 
judiciary happened to operate.  From this point onwards those unfortunate 
enough to fall into the category of ‘political offenders’ were to be charged 
under the infamous Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code.  This meant in 
practice that, under Article 58, an AK soldier who was an ethnic Pole, who 
was born in pre-war Poland, and had been a life long Polish citizen could be 
sentenced as a “traitor to the Soviet Motherland”, or a “counter-
revolutionary” or more simply as a “fascist”.  However whilst always 
deferring to Soviet law the new PKWN administration introduced its own 
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legal regulations by amending the existing pre-war laws with a barrage of 
new decrees. 38 
 
From the inception of the PKWN, the RBP had been formed as an integral 
part of the new government.  Within this new department, a section was 
devoted to the fight against the ‘public enemy’; it was this branch that was 
to be trained and expanded by NKVD minders, and it was this force whose 
work was aimed against the forces of the underground in Lubelszczyzna 
from 1st August 1944.  The new security apparatus comprised the RBP as 
well as provincial and district security offices.  In practice this meant that 
during the first months of PKWN rule the MO provided the backbone to the 
administration.  These forces were sometimes supplemented by units of the 
WP which played an auxiliary role in operations against ‘enemies’ of the 
new administration.  The new regional MO during the first half of August 
was based on Ulica Ewangelicki in Lublin city, a street that runs parallel to 
the cities main street.    The new police force’s core was composed of 
members of the local AL - this was to prove to be a vital factor in the 
ultimate paralysing of anti-communist partisan activity in the area.  In 
particular, the first command posts of the regional MO were dominated by 
members of the 1st Lubelski AL Brigade.  The commander of the 1st, 
Grzegorz Korczyński, therefore became the first commander of the region’s 
MO.  Korczyński was subsequently transferred to command of the Otwock 
area with another ex-AL man, Ignacy Borkowski, “Wicek”, becoming Lublin 
region MO commander.  In the city of Lublin itself, the city’s new police 
force was formed from members of the local AL unit that was led by Pawel 
Niewinn “Bartosz”, whereas in Zamość, the MO was created from the AL 
unit under the command of Józef Małysz “Marek”.   According to Anna 
Kister, during the first months of the MO’s existence around 50% of the 
force was composed of ex-AL partisans.  39 Many of the men who were now 
in the core of the MO had therefore been fighting in the same areas of the 
province as AK units during the German occupation.  Some had even 
fought in actions alongside AK units during the liberation of the area.  
These men often knew woods such as the Parczew very well, and could 
often identify members of AK units.  In addition, the Polish Independent 
Special Battalion, Polski Samodzielny Batalion Specjalny, was formed at 
this time.  It was a unit numbering 200 people that was formed from ex-AL 
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units along with Soviet officers and soldiers who could speak Polish.  This 
force was ultimately to form the core of the PKWN’s Internal Army, the 
Wojska Wewnętrzne (WW).   
 
Yet during the first weeks of the PKWN’s existence, its security forces were 
not in a position to challenge the underground on their own - such was 
their weakness in terms of numbers. By the end of August there were only 
1,053 men in the Special Battalion and by November this had only grown 
to 2,195.  According to Coutouvidis and Reynolds, this force was so weak 
that its numbers had to be bulked up by ill-trained and ill-equipped 
Ukrainian and White Russian peasants.  40 Until well into 1945, the 
suppression of the AK and other underground groups was in the hands of 
the NKVD, therefore.  41 This Polish communist weakness is shown by the 
fact that, as early as 15th September the PKWN approved measures to 
strengthen communist party cells within the MO, such was the level of 
infiltration of the new police force by members of the independence 
underground.  This was quickly followed by a decision to sack over 50% of 
the MO’s personnel due to their unreliability. 42 
 
The precarious nature of the PKWN’s hold on power, despite the actions of 
the Soviet NKVD, was all too clear to people such as W ładysław Gomułka.  
On his return from Moscow late in August, Gomułka helped to dampen the 
wave of repression through his personal influence and the stressing of a 
broad national line. This national line approach was ultimately 
unsuccessful but it did have an effect. Gomułka’s early attempts to create 
this broader political front of support for communist government was 
aimed at splitting the AK from within, and it had some success. The key 
was that the PKWN targeted the peasantry in Lublin; this was the group 
that needed to be won over.  In territory governed by the PKWN, even once 
full industrial production was achieved again by the end of the year, only 
85,000 people were in the industrial workforce out of an estimated 
population of 5.5 million.  The PKWN could not come to power on the backs 
of the urban proletariat alone. 43 Gomułka, though a communist, was also 
a patriot.  He understood the precarious nature of the PKWN's position in 
Poland in 1944.  Unless the PKWN attempted to court favour with a broad 
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cross section of the Polish people, it was doomed to failure, and perpetual 
reliance on the presence of the Red Army.   
 
Whilst the majority of the peasantry would remain loyal to the Government-
in-Exile some, in particular amongst BCh units, had answered the call to 
join the PKWN’s new forces. For example in the Kraśnik district after 
Operation “Tempest” the “Warta” group had been given the disarm or 
disperse ultimatum and handed in its weapons.  Part of this group went 
into the WP, including a unit under the command of Stanisław Łokuciewski 
“Mały”.  The AK-NSZ partisan groups that stayed active were those of 
Wacław Piotrowski “Cichy”, Leon Cybulski “Znicz” and Hieronim 
Dekutowski “Zapora”, the rest of the underground went home. 44 Yet the 
precedent of working with the communist authorities had been set and in 
the first months of PKWN rule in Kraśnik and Biłgoraj, an estimated 80% of 
the lower level council posts were taken up by local peasants.  Yet this 
pragmatic approach on the behalf of the PKWN worked both ways - low 
level functionaries were continuing their government functions, as many 
had during the Nazi occupation, but in practice this meant that the 
government structure was ideologically woodworm; On 1st September 1944 
Communist party membership in the whole of ‘People’s Poland’ was only 
still 4,633. 45 The main difficulty for Gomułka lay in the fact that the PKWN 
was obviously a usurper government, put in place by a foreign power which 
was arresting people’s cousins, brothers, teachers, or wives.  Therefore the 
PKWN's intention of in effect absorbing former AK officers and men into the 
newly expanding Polish state forces flew in the face of the NKVD policy of 
arresting all unreliable elements.  Ultimately in any conflict of 
interpretation, the view of the NKVD was always likely to prevail.   
 
It is clear from the archival evidence that the AK’s contacts between 
regional-inspectorate and district command were able to continue despite 
the best efforts of the NKVD.  In addition, many of the region’s radio 
transmitters were still operational during the period of the Warsaw 
Uprising, meaning that a game of cat and mouse between the NKVD and 
the regional AK’s wireless groups was taking place across the province.  On 
the night of 30th July the NKVD had managed to capture one of the city’s 
transmitters and arrest its two operators, Antoni Kudela “Mis”, and Piotr 
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Potasinski “Cygan”.    On 20th August Leon Rembarz “Dołęga”, a member of 
the local AK’s Bureau V established a radio communications unit that was 
composed of the best men available in the city of Lublin.  Initially the unit 
broadcast from the home of Konstanty Machniuk “Rysia”, at number 25 
Ulica Bychawski, near to the city’s main train station.  However in order to 
evade the NKVD, the unit had to quickly relocate to the village of Wilczopole 
a few miles to the south east of the city.  The unit managed to keep contact 
with London from this location for four days.  From his position in the 
village, Konstanty Machniuk, helped by Marian Gutka “Urej”, sent back 
regular reports and the two men were able to hide the transmitter and 
evade capture when the NKVD arrived after four days.  On returning to 
Lublin, the NKVD again located the position of the unit, but once again the 
two operators evaded capture and saved the transmitter.  Other transmitter 
units were not so lucky.  In the village of Babin a transmitter unit was able 
to function for three weeks before the Soviets discovered their presence, yet 
in the Chełm inspectorate that region’s transmitter operator “Marzec” was 
discovered, arrested and eventually deported to the USSR.  Equally in the 
Puławy inspectorate, Wacław Herman “Fadina” was discovered by the 
Soviets and shared the same fate as “Marzec”. 46 
 
As a result of these set backs, it was decided by the regional command that 
it would be safer for the Lublin regional AK to move its central broadcasting 
unit to the Zamość inspectorate.  This switch took place half way through 
September and was part of several moves within Bureau V of the Lublin 
regional AK.  At the same time, Leon Rembarz, the unit’s deputy 
commander moved from 43 Ulica 1 Maja to his sister-in-law’s at 19 Ulica 
Bernardynska.  Rembarz took with him the files of Bureau V and hid them 
underneath a stack of coal.  From this point onwards the commander of 
Bureau V, Major Mieczysław Komarski “Wojtek”, reoriented the command’s 
contacts with London to just two transmitters:  transmitter 31, which 
operated out of the Radzyń inspectorate, and transmitter 77 which 
operated out of the Zamość inspectorate. 47 These events clearly point to 
the fact that from the beginning of the Soviet occupation the NKVD was 
attempting to cut off the AK’s links to the outside world.  This policy was 
intensified during the Warsaw Uprising, when a systematic attempt was 
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made to destroy all possible links to the central command and to the Allies 
in London and Washington.  
 
However, the NKVD were not able to silence the broadcasts out of the 
region, and the surviving AK ciphers are today one of the most valuable 
sources for historians of this period. For example, the local command 
reported back to London several times between 14 th-18th August, 
commenting on the fact that a new Soviet commission had been set up in 
the city of Lublin.  Relying on information that had been gained by an 
unnamed member of the underground who had recently been released by 
the commission, the AK in the city reported that this new Soviet 
commission was officially maintaining that its actions were to regulate 
Polish war relations.  However, according to the increasingly frantic 
sounding reports arriving in London, the commission was led by Soviet 
General Bogdanov and General Zukov, who was now acting as the liaison 
officer between the new commission and the PKWN in the city.  The 
commission was openly investigating the activities of ‘anti-Soviet forces’ in 
the region.  Overall this committee seemed to be directing the activities of 
the Soviet forces in the area, using the Berling Army as a pretext to impress 
men.  The reports also mentioned that those impressed, most probably 
officers, were taken in isolation and subjected to prolonged discussions ‘of 
a political nature’. 48 
 
Incomprehensively, during the second half of August when the 
Government-in-Exile was being sent regular reports that must have been 
increasingly alarming to them, it is clear from the messages sent that 
during this crucial period in the history of the AK in the Lublin province, 
guidance from London was lacking.  As the population were refusing on 
mass to cooperate with the attempts of the Soviets to install their puppet 
administration, the terror of the Soviet forces seemed to be increasing.  Yet 
London was clearly not issuing instructions to the Lublin command.  It 
meant in practice that Żak was repeatedly feeding central command 
information about the arrests of his men, about the expansion of the 
Berling Army call up age, and about the weakening morale of the 
population and yet he was receiving no adequate response.  The following 
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examples show the dilemma and were sent to the UK during the second 
half of August 1944: 
 
Sent on August 19th at 00.57 from Zamość Insp: 
We request an immediate response to this radio station, what are we 
to do?  49 
Sent on August 19th from Żak: 
Silence from London is worrying for us.  We haven’t received any 
directives for three weeks.  The community demands guidance from 
London 50 
Sent on August 21st at 14.50: 
Resistance is weak, they are waiting on the results of talks involving 
Mikołajczyk – how to proceed… again send us guidance 51 
Sent on August 21st at 17.20 from Żak: 
Arrests of AK soldiers are still going on.  Resistance is weak.  Please 
give us guidance.  52 
Received on August 31st at 15.00 from Żak: 
Please General send us orders and directives 53 
 
During the German occupation the regional command had received 
constant instruction from their superiors in London.  This had helped to 
maintain contact and to retain the relevance of the exiled government for 
those people on the ground.  However, in a sense clear orders were made 
possible by the fact that the Germans were the enemy of the Poles, the 
Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon powers.  Once the Germans had gone 
from Lubelszczyzna, defining the enemy of the Allies was much more 
complicated. Whilst those people leading the AK in Lublin were fast coming 
to the conclusion that the Soviets were the enemy, in the corridors of power 
in London it must have seemed far more complicated.  What Żak and his 
fellow commanders needed to know was whether they were still bound by 
the order not to attack the Soviets. 
 
According to the work of Rafał Wnuk on this period, this lack of response 
can be explained by the fact that the Government-in-Exile were waiting for 
the results of the upcoming talks in Moscow with Stalin.  This meant that 
during a crucial stage in the creation of the communist state in Poland, the 
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central command in London was not issuing sufficient guidance to the AK 
in the provinces, rather it hesitated until October waiting on the outcome of 
the Moscow talks and the uprising in the capital.  This virtual radio silence 
from London was doubly damaging to the AK in Lubelszczyzna and the 
other areas that were already behind the Soviet advance.  The net effect of 
this was to be the fact that during the Warsaw Uprising, the Lublin AK was 
in effect operating in a de facto independent state.  This relative 
independence of the AK command was compounded by a growing sense of 
disillusionment with the central authorities in London.  For example the 
commander of the Hrubieszów area, Marian Gołębiewski, “Ster”, described 
the silence from London as being the most hurtful factor in Lublin during 
the first months of the communist administration.  According to Rafał 
Wnuk the silence from London had a large and depressing impact amongst 
many of the commanders in the Lublin region. 54 This was an abrogation of 
responsibility that London could ill afford in an area where the PKWN were 
actively courting the largest component parts of the AK. 
 
 
Coming to Warsaw's aid? 
 
The one order that the AK in Lublin did receive from central command was 
the order to aid the uprising in the capital.  This was controversial.   Most 
of the region’s partisan units had been dispersed after the end of Operation 
“Tempest” in accordance with “Marcin’s” order.  As a consequence, many of 
the area’s partisan units had been able to avoid the attentions of the Soviet 
authorities up until this point in time.  Whilst AK soldiers had been 
arrested after the withdraw of the Germans and some taken from their 
homes by the NKVD, the initial arrests had not destroyed the AK’s internal 
structure and many from the partisan units remained undiscovered after 
dispersing, and had successfully stashed their weapons.  This meant that 
during the months of the uprising in the capital there were many units in 
Lubelszczyzna that did attempt to go to Warsaw's aid despite the distance 
to the capital.  For units in the north of the Lublin region, in the Biała 
Podlaska and Łuków areas the march to Warsaw would mean a march of 
less than three days, whilst units in the Hrubieszów or Tomaszów Lubelski 
areas would have to be on the road for almost twice as long. 
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Once the Warsaw Uprising had begun, Bór-Komorowski issued the 
following order to the provincial commands:  
 
The battle for Warsaw becomes more intense.  We are fighting 
against vastly superior forces.  The situation calls for immediate 
reinforcements from outside.  I therefore order all available units to 
march on the capital as speedily as possible, attack the enemy on 
the outskirts and break through into the city 
 
Bor 
C in C Home Army 55 
 
If the provinces were to respond to this order and come to the aid of 
Warsaw, they would need a good slice of luck, for they would need the 
Soviets to allow them to march to the capital.  This was not something the 
Soviets would allow to happen.  The problem in essence was this: during 
August 1944 the Red Army had around two million men in the 
Lubelszczyzna region.  After “Marcin’s” meeting with the Soviets and the 
arrests of the local command, only an Adjutant Antoni Wieczorek had 
returned.  The NKVD had released him requesting that he return with the 
region’s deputy commander, Francisek Żak.  Wieczorek informed the 
command about the meeting but stated he was not sure what had 
happened to “Marcin”.  There followed a period of inaction by the local 
command that was probably due to their attempt to reach an 
understanding of what was happening in Lubelszczyzna and how best to 
combat this.  At least part of the shadow command was composed of new 
officers and was based in Tartak, near Lubartów, around twenty miles 
north of Lublin city.  Those officers that remained from before changed 
their pseudonyms.  However, the command did hold a series of discussions 
on the possibility of responding to Bór-Komorowski’s order to help the 
capital.  The decision was made to send the PKB commandant Jan Flisiak 
on a scouting mission to see if helping Warsaw was feasible.  Flisiak 
returned with the news that every road to Warsaw out of the area was 
blocked by Soviet troops, indeed the Soviet advance had swung north from 
Lublin along the banks of the Vistula towards Warsaw.  This meant that 
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the bulk of this massive Soviet force was situated directly between Lublin 
and the capital city. Clearly helping Warsaw was not an option for the 
central command in Lublin. 56 
 
Yet, due to the nature of the fight in Warsaw and its significance for the 
future of the AK and Poland, many units did attempt to go to Warsaw’s aid.  
Given the size of Soviet forces in the area, the effects on such units of 
attempting to force a way through to Warsaw were often devastating.  
According to I. Caban, many units in the Lublin region started to re-group 
from the middle of August onwards.  On 20 th August the “Wilkow” unit 
attempted to march to Warsaw but was stopped by the NKVD.  On the next 
day the famous “Zapora” group from the city of Lublin re-grouped in order 
to assist the capital but couldn’t cross the Vistula and terminated their 
attempt.  In the second half of the month soldiers from the units “Uskok” 
and “Lekarz”, along with other local AK units concentrated and began the 
march to Warsaw but they too were unable to cross the river. 57 Outside of 
Lublin an AK force of around 700 men heading towards Warsaw was 
intercepted by the NKVD and arrested.  Likewise units of the Home Army 
marching from Krakow along with elements of the 9th Infantry Division 
were intercepted to the east of Lublin province and forcibly disbanded 
before they could come to Warsaw's aid.58 
 
The largest unit from the Lublin inspectorate to attempt the march to 
Warsaw was the unit of Tadeusz Pospiech “Brzechwa”, which numbered 
around 120 soldiers.  This unit was based in the area around Firlej to the 
north of Lubartów.   The force reached the Vistula, but was unable to cross 
and was disarmed by Soviet forces.  A second grouping from Lublin 
inspectorate along with other smaller detachments made it to the Vistula 
near the town of Dęblin.  They found that Soviet detachments were based 
along this stretch of the river, and once they had encountered them they 
were disarmed.  Other units however didn’t even make it this far.  For 
example, the BCh regional commander of Lubelski, Jan Pasiak “Jawor”, 
along with the commander of sub-region IV B in Zamość, Edward 
Michonski “Lis”, engaged in talks with the Soviets in their area with a view 
to marching to Warsaw.  The result of these talks was that their request 
was refused and that they and their men were ordered to join the WP. 59 To 
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the north, after an agreement with the Soviets, units of the 34th Infantry 
Regiment were supposed to march to Biała Podlaska before their march to 
Warsaw.  On 9th August, as a part of this agreement only the 3rd Battalion 
under the command of Józef Strzeciwilk “Dunina”, actually went to Biała 
Podlaska where his men were forcibly integrated into the Berling Army and 
the officers interned.  The other units of the 34th Infantry Regiment, 
suspicious of Soviet intentions never started the march. 60 
 
An excellent example of the fate that met the units attempting to help 
Warsaw can be found in Hrubieszów district.  On 16 th August a group of 
around 1,600 people, including AK soldiers and a few dozen nurses and 
women from the Women’s Military Service, Wojskowa Służba Kobiet (WSK), 
set off to aid their countrymen fighting in the capital.  However, the force 
came into contact with the Red Army near the village of Ornatowic around 
twenty miles north of Hrubieszów.  At negotiations between the two groups, 
the Red Army commanders refused to believe the AK commander’s story 
that the unit was heading north to aid Warsaw, and their further progress 
was halted.  In reaction to this, the unit decided to march from Ornatowic 
to Hrubieszów.  Around six miles outside of Hrubieszów as the column was 
crossing a cornfield, a plane was spotted circling above.  This was then 
followed shortly afterwards by the appearance of two WP officers in a jeep, 
who ordered the column to march to Bohorodyca.  In response to this, the 
commanding officers declared that they needed a briefing with the 
Hrubieszów magistrate before they could determine their next move.  As the 
force remained outside of the town, a woman who had successfully broken 
though the Soviet cordon around Hrubieszów was able to update the AK 
unit as to the latest situation there.  They were informed that the Red Army 
had formed a cordon surrounding the town and that a military post had 
been created to process and disarm any persons or units leaving or 
entering.  In reaction to this, most of the unit withdrew to the cover of the 
local woods, whilst the “Wygi” company chose to hide in the ruined 
buildings in the area.  Their attempt to aid Warsaw was effectively at an 
end. 61 
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On the march to aid their countrymen in the capital, the NKVD disarmed this 
force shortly after this picture was taken.  Hrubieszów district, August 1944. 
(I. Caban, Oddziały Partyzanckie i Samoobrony Obwodu AK Tomaszów 
Lubelski, Warsaw 2000) 
 
 The experience of the unit from Hrubieszów is telling of the AK’s greater 
problem in August and September 1944.  Whilst “Marcin’s” dispersal 
strategy meant there were still many units that had not been arrested or 
disarmed by the Soviets, their ability to act had now been seriously 
curtailed.  As this story illustrates, the countryside was crawling with 
Soviet troops.  Within a short space of time, they had encountered regular 
Red Army, Red Air Force and WP, there was never any chance that such 
forces could help Warsaw.  At some stage, usually an early one, they would 
come across Soviet forces that would prevent their progress.  “Marcin”, like 
the cause of which he was a part, had been a victim of events out of his 
control, but his response had been the most pragmatic one available to 
him, to preserve most of the manpower of the underground.  The march to 
Warsaw, allied with the halting of the front was to seriously undermine 
even this response.  It did not destroy the underground but it added 
considerably to the cumulative effects of the summer of 1944.   
 
 The second wave of large-scale arrests, and the undermining of the AK’s 
operational strength in the Lubelszczyzna region came primarily as a result 
of the attempts to go to Warsaw’s aid.  Clearly it was at this point that 
“Marcin’s” strategy was, in effect, destroyed.  Many battle-hardened units 
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with experienced officers left the homes or hiding places where they had 
been since “Marcin’s” dispersal order, reformed and marched straight into 
Soviet forces.  The importance of the loss of such officers on the march to 
Warsaw is impossible to estimate but there are one or two clues to look at 
in the experiences of the Lubartów district.  Of the district’s three main 
partisan units, comparing the fate of two is instructive. “Uskok” was not 
disarmed and arrested on the march to Warsaw; in fact, the “Uskok” unit 
was so adept at avoiding the communist administration that it was able to 
remain in operation for several years. Once the front moved away from the 
province in January 1945, the logic of “Marcin’s” weather the storm 
approach was proved when forces such as “Uskok”, which had laid low 
during the autumn and winter expanded to over 500 men and was able to 
aid in paralysing the communist administration in its area.  By contrast, 
the “Brzechwa” unit, a unit with a similar level of experience in partisan 
warfare, of a similar size, and with a similar number and type of weaponry 
to “Uskok” went to aid Warsaw, and was effectively wiped off the scene.  62 
 
The internal fabric of the regional underground was significantly weakened 
by the events of August, and this is shown clearly in two reports from Żak 
at the end of the month.  In the first report Żak mentions how anger was 
building amongst his troops towards the Soviets in the province.  Crucially, 
he stated that if his men broke orders not to attack Soviet forces then he 
would not be able to prevent this.  He reiterated this threat in another 
report sent on August 26th: 
 
Society is disorientated by the silence of London and the 
unpunished conduct of the NKVD which threatens us with 
destruction.  Its resistance weakens, but among AK soldiers it grows 
stronger.  A spontaneous armed uprising against the Soviets, which 
I cannot stop, threatens to occur and would have terrible 
consequences.  In the case of spontaneous action I will be forced to 
lead it.  I request instructions.  Spontaneous acts will cause 
unpredictable acts of retaliation from the soviets. 63 
 
If Żak’s report is accurate then many AK in the region were sticking to an 
order from London that was hugely unpopular whilst the NKVD was 
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arresting their comrades, Warsaw was burning and the Lubelszczyzna 
command was receiving no guidance from the centre.  This was certainly a 
recipe for weakening the bonds between the exiled government and Lublin.         
 
And yet, despite the impact of actions aimed at helping Warsaw, the AK 
Command survived.  From this time on, most of the command that had 
managed to evade the first wave of AK arrests in August was forced to 
change their pseudonyms and go into hiding.  Żak, the new area 
commander of the Lubelszczyzna region, spent the rest of 1944 hiding in 
many different safe houses throughout the city.  Żak used the flat of his 
adjutant commander, Witold Engelking, throughout September and 
October.  Just as the AK command had done during the German 
occupation, it used a large network of safe houses to rotate and hide their 
commanders, helping it to survive the first wave of NKVD repression.  One 
such place of safety was a church situated in the same district of Lublin as 
Engelking’s flat, the 10th District. 64 The church was probably a centre of 
underground activity at this time, although the records, seen by Anna 
Kister are, not definite on this.  What was clear, however, was that Żak was 
hiding in this church, and that in November at the same time that the 
regional command was suspended, he was able to leave the church 
disguised as a priest.  Kister’s research shows how a strange 
misunderstanding on the part of the NKVD actually allowed Żak to reside 
in the church and ultimately escape.  During interrogations of captured AK 
officers and men, the NKVD was repeatedly told that Żak was hiding in the 
church.  However, the interrogating officers misunderstood this 
information, taking it to mean that Żak was a very religious man who spent 
most of his time in church. 65 
 
Aside from the aforementioned safe houses, Żak or using the pseudonym 
that he adopted from August onwards “Ignacy”, used the following to meet 
with other members of the regional AK command in the period between 
August and November 1944:  apartment 1,2, and 4 Ulica Kapucyński, an 
apartment on the corner of Nowy Świat and Bychawski, apartment 1, 22 
Ulica Lubartowska, apartment 5, 58 Krakowskie Przedmie ście, apartment 
22, 25 Ulica Karmelicka, apartment 1, 9 Ulica Przemyslowejn and several 
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rooms at the Catholic University.  The fact that the AK command in Lublin 
used so many safe houses in the summer and early autumn of 1944 points 
to two things: Clearly the new communist administration was as far 
reaching as the German occupation that it had so recently replaced, and 
that the AK had no shortage of locals who were willing to risk themselves 
providing safe houses for the underground.  Indeed the flat at 58 
Krakowskie Przedmieście was virtually opposite the new headquarters of 
Poland’s communist government, the PKWN. On top of this whilst members 
of the command were in and around the city of Lublin, and remained at 
large, not all the work of their organisation had been stalled by the entry of 
the Soviets.  For example, in August Kazimierz Stepniak, “Witek”/“Witold” 
commanded an underground cell that was based at 5 Ulica Dominikanski.  
Along with Mieczysław Zurawski “Włoczega” and Bohdan Kossowski 
“Zaorski”, Stepniak was working intensively forging fake identity papers 
and documents for underground members.  In particular, this unit was 
responsible for issuing false papers to those members of the 27 th Volhynian 
Division that had evaded capture by the Soviets at the end of July. 66 
 
Equally, outside of the city of Lublin, many AK units still remained in 
operation, and many were involved in military actions that were 
increasingly directed against the communist administration, killing MO 
members, or freeing their colleagues from Soviet gaols.  Soviet arrests, the 
failing uprising in Warsaw, and the stalling of the front meant that ‘People’s 
Poland’ was to be borne amidst the gathering clouds of civil war.  In the 
district of Hrubieszów, the district commander, Captain M. Gołębiewski 
“Ster” led over 100 men into the town on the night of 19th August.  In this 
raid, “Ster’s” unit was able to take control of the town prison, free twelve 
members of the AK, and in the process re-take the arms that the Red Army 
had confiscated from them.   Another good example of local AK units 
attempting limited operations during August 1944 was in Zamość district.  
At the end of the month, Józef Smiech “Ciąg” led a unit that attacked the 
prison in the city of Zamość. The attack resulted in the freeing of eighteen 
political prisoners. 67 Such attacks show that the AK in Lubelszczyzna had 
now returned to launching the type of partisan raid that they had become 
so adept at during the last years of the German occupation.  The new 
‘occupation’ meant a return to old operations.  Yet there was now a crucial 
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difference, the AK had been ordered not to pursue aggressive actions 
against the Soviets and in the absence of new instructions from London, 
that order still held good. Yet the fact that such operations were now 
happening is indicative of the heightened tensions caused by Soviet 
actions.  These tensions were also articulated by the increasingly strong 
language now being used about the Soviets in the underground’s 
newspaper the Information Bulletin.  In fact the term ‘second occupation’ 
was now being used in the press agencies of the underground.  This term 
first appeared in the Lublin region on 20 th August and was to be used 
regularly from this point onwards. 68 By the end of September the storm 
that “Marcin” had originally envisaged weathering was obviously going to 
last a lot longer than seemed likely during late July.  If this were the case, 
then would the AK alliance be able to hold? 
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Chapter 4 
 
October 1944-December 1944 
 
Where do we go from here? The complex 
aftermath of the Warsaw Uprising 
 
 
On October 2nd after 63 days of fighting in the capital, Bór-Komorowski 
announced the capitulation of the Warsaw Uprising.  The AK command had 
received guarantees from the German victors that AK troops were to be 
treated as prisoners of war and that the civilian population would not be 
the victim of reprisals on the condition that they evacuated the city.  The 
63 day long siege had cost the lives of 100,000 Polish soldiers and civilians.  
1 The AK had 5 top generals, including Bór-Komorowski, and 17,443 
soldiers taken into captivity.  2  
 
After the failure of the Warsaw Uprising, what remained of the AK’s 
command core was left in tatters.  From the ashes of this defeat was to 
come a change of direction for the organisation.  With Bor-Komorowski a 
German prisoner, his deputy Okulicki took the decision many in Lublin 
had been waiting for impatiently and identified the Soviet Union as the 
main threat to the Polish nation.  Yet there were problems with this 
change, for much of the old command network, developed to deal with the 
problems of the German occupation, were kept for the very different 
realities of a ‘second occupation’.    Further down the command structure, 
in the Lublin region, the AK’s uncertainty continued as in Moscow talks 
unfolded between Stalin and Mikołajczyk against a backdrop of increased 
mass repression by the agencies of the Soviet Union and PKWN.  This 
mixture of repression and confusion meant that this period was to witness 
the growth of fractures within the underground.  Some underground 
members, after Warsaw, and after the failure of the Moscow talks, were 
starting to question the logic of continued activity after five long years of 
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war.  The PKWN was, after all, not like the General-Government that it had 
replaced.  For all the talk of ‘second occupation’, the PKWN was not going 
to destroy the Polish nation, rather it was using patriotism and the promise 
of land to appeal to the people.  The reopening of the Catholic University in 
Lublin, children being encouraged to wave Red and White flags, and the 
enforced transfer of the Ukrainian population from the south-east of the 
region all were starting to have an effect. 
 
Yet despite these first stirrings of support, the PKWN was still struggling to 
create an effective administration that could survive once the Red Army 
resumed its advance to the west.  The expansion of the armed forces and 
the police had meant that hundreds of politically unreliable people had 
been absorbed into the PKWN’s structure, something that was evident in 
the mass desertions from the Polish Army during this period.  After 
Warsaw, the communist authorities’ response to this weakness was mass 
repression.  The growing strength of the UB was supplemented by nearly 
9,000 NKVD troops in Lublin. In Lubelszczyzna the period in which large 
areas of the province had remained beyond the reach of the NKVD was 
ending – by October they had reconnoitred the province and were beginning 
to use the information given to them by their growing spy network.  Whilst 
the increase in support for the PKWN was slow, it had recruited enough 
men (often via blackmail or threats) to enable its security forces to 
massively undermine the underground.  The underground was not 
destroyed, nor did the PKWN overcome its basic problem of legitimacy; 
what the communists were able to do in the autumn of 1944 was to destroy 
the internal fabric of resistance to them.  Between October and November 
1944, Lublin was witness to a massive sweeping campaign of terror that 
brought the underground to its knees without destroying it completely.  
Without a functioning central command and increasingly cut adrift from 
the outside world, individual and district commands continued their 
operations.   
 
The most significant impact of the failure of the Warsaw Uprising was 
however that it destroyed the raison d’etre of the AK.  The AK had been 
created in order to facilitate the restoration of the Government-in-Exile and 
to continue the fight against the Germans.  The uprising, in many senses, 
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had been the last serious throw of the dice to achieve these aims and had it 
failed.  In effect, caught in a catch twenty-two situation that was not of its 
own making, the AK had risked everything on Warsaw.   In Lublin the 
uprising, in effect, had meant that “Marcin’s” attempt to preserve the bulk 
of his forces by dispersing them had been wrecked.  Many of the units 
dispersed after Operation “Tempest” had re-grouped and been arrested as a 
direct result of the fighting in the capital.  Once the Warsaw Uprising failed, 
the Soviet Union was never going to allow the forces and supporters of the 
Government-in-Exile to return in any meaningful sense. With the Soviets in 
military control of much of Poland's pre-war territory and with it soon to be 
in control of the rest, the future of the AK and the Government-in-Exile 
looked bleak indeed. 
 
By launching an uprising in the capital, central command had, in effect 
destroyed the “Marcin” strategy that the Red Army should be allowed to roll 
over Poland, whilst the underground remained dispersed and ready for the 
moment when it could again play a role in creating an independent Poland.  
Launching the uprising meant that the PKWN and NKVD could clamp down 
on the AK, whilst other AK units were captured during their futile attempts 
to get to the capital.  This story of Polish resistance being spilt between the 
political realism of people such as “Marcin” and the romantic notions 
attached to the Warsaw Uprising were long standing ones.  The disaster in 
Warsaw was not just to seriously undermine the cause of the AK, but it 
was to ultimately mean that the romantic tendency in the Polish armed 
resistance was to be destroyed for a generation.  This was not to be felt 
immediately but it did add to the sense of war weariness, itself a major 
threat to the AK’s attempts to resist the continued imposition of communist 
rule in Poland. 
Okulicki’s New line 
 
On 12th October 1944 General Leopold Okulicki issued a dispatch to the 
general staff of the AK.  The dispatch was to fly in the face of the existing 
policy of the Government-in-Exile and so it was in essence a request for a 
major change in policy.  Clearly the experience of Operation “Tempest” on 
the ground had taught the leadership in the homeland that a new 
approach must be tried, and tried soon.  The simple idea that the Germans 
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were the only enemy had become blurred after Warsaw and the new orders 
reflected this.  In his dispatch Okulicki asserted that Operation “Tempest” 
should be abandoned in favour of a new approach, namely that, in the case 
of the Germans, the AK should only act in defensive actions and maintain 
sabotage actions against them.  As to Soviet forces, crucially Okulicki 
claimed that the AK should stop the practice of revealing itself, rather it 
should remain undercover, and that those persons most in danger from 
Soviet forces should be evacuated to the west. 3 Further to this dispatch, on 
17th October Okulicki issued instructions for the period from October until 
November 1944, while his instructions for the winter operations of 1944-45 
are telling in this respect as they show little sign of defeatism.  The 
following orders were sent to the AK’s general staff on 26 th October: 
 
(1) To reinforce the organisation and discipline in the underground 
forces which had become slack as a result of the open fighting. 
(2) To adapt work to a worst-case scenario, and survive a long-term 
period of Soviet occupation. 
(3) To limit fighting with the Germans to sabotage and defending 
Polish civilians from their repressive measures and confiscation of 
property.  To have readily available, swift, small but well armed 
detachments. 
(4) Partisan forces should be limited to such numbers as would allow 
them to survive the winter without threat of being destroyed, taking 
into account the territory and available provisioning.  The remaining 
forces should be distributed by platoons throughout villages, and 
kept in reserve. 
(5) If the Red Army approaches, small detachments should attack 
the remaining Germans in order to get weapons, drawing as much 
attention to such action as possible, and then return underground 
and hide their weapons. 
(6) To train commanders from company to divisional level and their 
staffs - since the lack of trained people in open battle was painfully 
felt.  To concentrate on the development of and training in the field 
of communications, especially radio. 4 
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The logic of these new orders is clear, the Soviet Union was now the main 
threat along with the PKWN who were seen as nothing more than Soviet 
stooges. Okulicki’s orders clearly outlined that no compromise was to be 
contemplated, even though at this time Mikołajczyk was still attempting to 
come to a compromise with Stalin.   
 
Throughout September the Government-in-Exile had been prepared to 
restart the negotiations with Stalin that had been broken off in August.  By 
October it was still arguing about the approach that it should take towards 
the Soviets in light of the events of the previous two months, and at the 
beginning of the month it launched what were in effect last ditch 
negotiations with Stalin in Moscow. As far as the British and Polish 
delegations in Moscow were concerned, the eastern border of Poland was 
an issue that was still to be resolved.  The conference would also provide a 
platform for the Government-in-Exile to present their evidence of Soviet 
interference in the affairs of their state.  5 Yet in Moscow the supporters of 
the London government achieved nothing.  At the Tehran Conference a year 
earlier Churchill had discussed the Curzon Line, but he had not believed 
that any firm commitment had been made to the Soviets on this.  However, 
at the meeting between the Soviets and Premier Mikołajczyk, the later was 
humiliated and told in no uncertain terms that the border issue had been 
decided long ago.  In response to Miko łajczyk's question on the border 
issue, Molotov stated: ‘We all agreed at Tehran that the Curzon Line must 
divide Poland... President Roosevelt agreed to this solution and strongly 
endorsed the line.’ 6 As Norman Davies points out, however, the American 
President had endorsed the Soviet border proposal a year earlier without 
informing his British and Polish allies. 7  
 
The failure of the Moscow talks only confirmed Okulicki in his tactics.  At 
home in Poland it was clear that Okulicki’s conception of the AK’s future 
role was as a primarily defensive force, but one that would remain armed 
and organised. The emphasis in his orders was very much on survival in 
the longer-term.  Clearly the AK did not see itself as a spent force, implicit 
in these orders is the acceptance of a reduced operating capacity post–
Warsaw, but equally it shows that as the autumn passed the AK was, in 
effect, preparing to re-group for action in the spring.  It is therefore worth 
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quoting a small section of the order of 26 th October, to emphasise the over-
all thinking of the central AK command in the days and weeks immediately 
after Warsaw.  Okulicki stressed: ‘(The AK should) adapt work to a worst 
case scenario, and survive a long-term period of Soviet occupation.’ 8 This 
was a clear indicator that the AK was beginning to readjust its planning 
back to the level of an underground conspiracy.  Yet, in October 1944 it 
still seemed as if there was a lot to fight for, and still a lot that could be 
changed.  From Okulicki’s viewpoint, a long term period of Soviet 
occupation may become a reality but it still seemed to be far from a given. 
Therefore, it was still seen as a ‘worst case scenario’ and not a fact.  But 
this was clearly not the only reaction to the actions of the communists.  
Whilst the mass of the population still backed the AK the different stresses 
and strains of this new period meant that people were starting to adopt 
many different nuanced opinions about the PKWN.   
 
Lubelszczyzna and the Moscow Talks 
 
The failure of the talks in Moscow, that had begun on 13th October seems 
to have had a large and depressive impact on the population in Poland.   It 
is difficult to stress the importance of the outcome of these talks for the AK 
in Lubelszczyzna and for the whole of the east of the country, a fact that 
had been compounded by the silence from London.  It must have appeared 
to the members of the AK in Lubelszczyzna that everything had been placed 
on the success of Warsaw and the Moscow talks.  Both were failures and 
the fall out from both was large.   
 
From the reports sent back to London during September and October 
1944, it is clear that the regional command in Lubelszczyzna were placing 
a lot of faith in the outcome of the Moscow talks.  From the moment 
Operation “Tempest” had started in July, in the actions of, and more 
directly through the messages sent back to command, there was a sense 
that the repressions of this period would pass.   The Government-in-Exile 
and the western Allies, once fully informed about the events in the east of 
Poland, would be able to force the Soviets into some form of climb down.  
Before the talks in Moscow in October, it was perfectly reasonable for the 
local AK command to assume that once Premier Mikołajczyk went to Stalin, 
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backed by the British and Americans, things would change.  In the first few 
months of the Soviet ‘occupation’ this did not seem to be unreasonable, 
after all the PKWN was still struggling ineffectively to form a government, 
and the vast majority of the population backed a return of the Government-
in-Exile.  Added to this, whilst the Soviets had arrested thousands of non-
communists, the Soviets had only been in the province for eight weeks and 
the NKVD had only been effectively operating in the outlying areas of the 
province for just over a month.   
 
The importance of these talks for the AK in Lubelszczyzna is shown most 
clearly in a report addressed directly to Premier Miko łajczyk.  It was sent 
on 2nd October, on the same day that Bór-Komorowski announced the end 
of the Warsaw Uprising, ten days before Okulicki’s order and only eleven 
days before the start of the talks in Moscow: 
 
From Lublin regional command on the day of 2nd October 1944 
…The 3rd, 9th, and 27th Divisions after fighting the Germans in 
Operation “Tempest” were disarmed in a deceitful manner, and the 
soldiers pressured into incorporation into the WP.  However from the 
AK command in this region over 200 officers, 2000 soldiers and the 
chiefs of the national administration…were deported to the east due 
only to the reason that they revealed their stated authority to the 
Soviets, that they were subordinate to the government in London, 
and that they could execute their own will…Until now around 
21,000 Poles have been arrested and the PKWN has announced 
further increases in arrests…Please Mr Premier (we rely on) the 
intervention of the governments of the USA and Great Britain, to 
return to the nation imprisoned AK soldiers…(for) employees of the 
state to be released from prison…(for) the cessation of further arrests 
and to enable us to continue the fight with the Germans under the 
command authority of officers and the supervision of the central 
command of the AK…We assure you, Mr Premier, that the whole of 
Polish society in the region of Lublin stand firmly and faithfully by 
you…..9 
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This report was by far the longest that was sent back from Lubelszczyzna 
in the period between July–October.  Yet this one went to the pains to 
provide in detail the size and scope of Soviet arrests.  Clearly the upcoming 
talks were of vital importance for the command, and the report of 2nd 
October can be seen to be nothing less than a desperate plea for help from 
people who must have been acutely aware that their own fate was out of 
their hands.   
 
Nothing more eloquently sums up the fruitlessness of the Government-in-
Exile’s talks on 13th October than a coded message sent back to London by 
the Lubelszczyzna command at the end of August, almost two months 
before the Polish Premier got on a plane to discuss the Curzon Line.  It 
read: 
 
Along the line of the Bug and Dubno…the towns are fortified…the 
Soviets have taken guard along the Curzon Line.  Passage through 
the state across the Bug is impeded by the Soviets…Deportations 
from Lwow to Russia…There is strong propaganda against the 
London government. 10 
 
Two months earlier, therefore, the Soviets were beginning to man ‘their 
border’ with Poland, they were deporting and arresting Poles who were 
unlucky enough to have found themselves on the wrong side of the Soviet’s 
line.  At the same time, their forces were undermining the Government-in-
Exile in what they had decided was Poland.  This report along with others 
reporting the events along the Bug, were sent to the UK, thus the 
Government-in-Exile knew of the realities of the border question before the 
Moscow talks, a fact that makes their silence to Lubelszczyzna in the build-
up to the talks all the more remarkable.   Yet, what is also clear from the 
command’s reports back to the UK from the end of August and September 
1944 is that the AK organisation and almost certainly most of the 
population in Lubelszczyzna were waiting on Mikołajczyk’s talks with Stalin 
hoping that they would end the repressions.  Yet Mikołajczyk’s talks were 
an abject failure; Poland enduring its ‘second occupation’ would have to 
live with this fact.  This must have had a huge and demoralising impact on 
the AK forces in Lublin, many of who were keenly listening to the events in 
 168
Moscow via the BBC.   Zygmunt Klukowski recorded in his diary the local 
reaction to the talks: 
 
15th October: 
During the last few days we have been following the conference in 
Moscow.  The participants include Eden, Mikołajczyk, and Stalin.  
Yesterday we hoped for the prospect of at least some positive results, 
but today the news is so terrible that Mikołajczyk will probably 
return to London without accomplishing anything. 11  
 
Indeed the results of the conference were to have terrible consequences for 
those interested in a non-communist future for Poland.  The Lublin 
command’s reports at this time paint a nightmarish picture of life in the 
region.  From the end of the Warsaw Uprising onwards, the AK were being 
directly targeted by the communist security forces, and during the Moscow 
talks, the PKWN and Soviet forces in the region had increased the 
propaganda campaign against the whole of the AK.  According to Żak, 
during the talks in Moscow the Lublin AK had been subjected to a ‘massive 
campaign of terror and propaganda’. 12 Equally, he reports how the PKWN 
had been organising rallies throughout the region to denounce the AK and 
the Government-in-Exile.  In town squares the length and breadth of 
Lubelszczyzna communist meetings were using slogans such as ‘Put the 
enemies of the nation on trial’ and ‘Enough of fratricidal struggle’.  The 
hysterical tone of this propaganda reflected deep uncertainty within the 
PKWN about its grip on power.  The issue of desertion further accentuated 
this.  Indeed the events of August and September 1944, in which AK 
support remained high and in which the PKWN started to witness 
desertions from their newly formed army, had highlighted how dependant 
they were on Soviet military muscle.  In fact the manner in which the 
PKWN began its call up virtually guaranteed that large-scale desertions 
would happen at some point.  By mid-August AK reports show that men 
had been forced into the Polish communist army by threats and coercion.  
Dr Klukowski records the reasoning of youths in his area at this time: 
 
More and more of our boys are enlisting into the Berling Army 
because they do not see any other way to survive.  Recently,  
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“Słavian” and a few others enlisted.  In a letter to “Orsza”, “Słavian” 
wrote that he had done so to gain more experience and to fight 
Communism from the inside. 13  
 
In a sense it was never likely that a communist army could have been 
established in any other manner in the short term, given the hostility of the 
mass of the population towards what was clearly a foreign controlled body.  
The emphasis on creating a large army served many important roles in 
bolstering the new regime, and one of the most important was the fact that 
many local men of fighting age, who may well have occupied themselves in 
the underground, were sucked into a communist-led force.  For instance, 
one of Lubartów’s partisan leaders, “Wicher”, was taken into the WP in 
August and was not demobbed until 10th November 1945, a long time after 
the key period of struggle between the underground and the communists 
had passed. 14 Within four months a 172,000 man army had been created.  
Whilst this number appears significant, given the population of the call-up 
area it was a poor response from a people whose murderous hatred of the 
Germans and thirst for revenge should have produced a greater result.  In 
effect, an estimated 40% of the population that was liable to conscription 
did not respond to the call of the communist dominated committee.  15 At 
the point of crossing the Bug River, at the end of July, the WP had 
numbered around 100,000, this was to be originally, and unrealistically, 
expanded to 430,000. 16  It is in this light that the number of 172,000 
should be assessed.  It should also be remembered that by the middle of 
August the PKWN had decreed that failure to register for the army meant 
trial by court-martial under the charge of desertion.   
 
Perhaps the fact that the original core of the new communist army was 
formed from former AL units did not help.  For the previous four years local 
people had consistently chosen to support the AK and the Government-in-
Exile ahead of the AL and nothing had changed in this respect.  Indeed of 
those who did join the new Polish Army, or Air Force, many deserted after 
an incredibly short time.  Waldemar Lotnik had joined the Air Force after 
being imprisoned by the Nazis in Majdanek concentration camp in July 
1944.  He was trained by a mixture of Russian and Polish officers and talks 
in his memoirs of how Russian officers referred to him at times as a 'filthy 
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laki'. 17 He and many others talk about large-scale desertions from 
communist training camps during this period.  Indeed, the attempt to 
indoctrinate Poles, and the atmosphere of intimidation, led others to 
question their own participation in the new forces.  Lotnik himself 
eventually from deserted from the Air Force to join the AK. 18 His story is 
quite typical in the Lublin region.  Lotnik’s experiences in the Polish 
communist air force, which from the beginning of September had its first 
training base outside of Zamość, are fascinating and show the mixed 
feelings of the Poles in such forces: 
 
Navigators, radio operators, ground staff and mechanics were all 
needed, not just pilots, and all received their training from Russian 
experts in Zamość.  At the beginning as many as half the officer 
cadets were Russian, generally of Polish extraction, although very 
few spoke Polish with any ease or fluency.  Like the Russians with 
Polish names who filled leading positions throughout the liberated 
part of Poland, we called them infiltrators, but for the moment we 
had a common enemy and relations were not hostile…Tensions 
between Poles and Russians smouldered beneath the surface and 
periodically threatened to burst into flame.  Leaflets from the Home 
Army detailing the Soviet betrayal of Poland appeared on the doors 
of latrines in Lublin, where the locals also risked tuning in to the 
BBC or Polish broadcasts from abroad.  The official Soviet view was 
that the Polish aristocracy had exploited the bravery of Polish youth 
in an attempt to re-establish the pre-war feudal system, but none of 
us believed that. 19  
 
Although disappointment at the Government-in-Exile's inability to shape 
Poland's future was widespread this did not mean that support for the new 
communist authorities was significantly on the increase.   However, there 
were clear signs that divisions were emerging among AK forces.  Rafa ł 
Wnuk points out that the absence of AK sources from this period mean 
that historians primarily rely on communist sources for these months.  
Independent verification is currently unavailable, but the evidence that 
exists provides a good example of the confusion and demoralisation caused 
by London’s abrogation of responsibility.  According to the documentation 
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available, during one of the regional command briefings at the beginning of 
October, the Inspector of Puławy inspectorate, Major Stanisław Kowalski 
“Konrad”, proposed sending a delegation to the PKWN to negotiate for 
arrested AK members and to explore the possibility of leaving the 
underground.  According to these sources, Żak rejected this idea.  Also 
during the same meeting, the inspectorate commanders informed the 
regional commander that differences between the AK and the BCh were 
growing as a result of Mikołajczyk’s visit to Moscow. 20 
 
These reports could just show the divergence of opinion that would be 
expected in an organisation placed in the position that the underground 
was at this time.  In addition it is true that the Government-in-Exile had 
been placed in an incredibly difficult position by the Soviets and by their 
allies in the west, yet their decision to issue no clear commands to Soviet 
controlled regions for nearly two months meant that men such as 
“Konrad”, felt sufficiently disillusioned to contemplate talks with the 
communists.  Such reports also point to the fact that between Okulicki’s 
line and the NKVD line, within Poland there were many different, nuanced 
positions being taken by different sections of the population.  For the AK, 
perhaps, the most potentially dangerous result of the failure of the 
Government-in-Exile at this time was in the fact that the BCh was drifting 
further away from the AK.  Indeed, the failure of the talks in Moscow was to 
lead to the resignation of Mikołajczyk, the leader of the Peasant Party, from 
his post as Prime Minister.  Even before this, the majority of peasants had 
no automatic loyalty to either side, being suspicious of both the 
communists and the ‘officer class’ leaders of the AK at the same time.  
Mikołajczyk’s leadership of the Peasant Party and of the Government-in-
Exile had been a crucial factor in the continued loyalty of many peasants to 
his government.  According to Anita Prażmowska, many in the Peasant 
Party wanted to play a role in the rebuilding of Poland and to prevent the 
peasants being sidelined, as they felt they had been during the 
establishment of the Second Republic.  While Mikołajczyk continued his 
role in the exiled government, the majority of the peasant movement 
continued to support London and the AK, however his resignation led to 
even more people on the ground questioning their continued loyalty.  21 
This meant, potentially, that if any BCh commanders were to eventually 
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leave the underground for the new communist administration, their 
knowledge of the AK in the area, its staff and its operating structures, 
would truly mean that the underground could be destroyed.  
 
This sense of different positions being adopted towards the Government-in-
Exile and the PKWN is shown in the creeping split between elements of the 
BCh and the AK.  On 14th October 1944, in a meeting in Lublin of activists 
from the Peasant’s organisation “Roch”, this sense of disenchantment with 
the Government-in-Exile’s alliance was clearly shown.  The minutes of this 
meeting as quoted by I. Caban sum up how many commanders in the 
Lubelszczyzna BCh were now feeling: 
 
Initially the relationship was agreeable.  The AK was disloyal to us in 
this relationship, integration was on unfavourable conditions for us.  
After integration differences…certainly still intensified. 22 
 
This process should not be exaggerated the vast majority of BCh units still 
remained loyal to the Government-in-Exile, but clearly some people were 
starting to question loyalty to London.  In short, old grievances that had 
existed during the German occupation and that had been down played 
during liberation were now resurfacing after the failure of the Warsaw 
Uprising and the Moscow talks.   
 
Defence of the State 
 
Those BCh and AK units contemplating a negotiated settlement with the 
PWKN received a cruel blow when the PKWN issued ‘The Defence of the 
State’ decree of late October 1944, officially ushering in a new period of 
draconian repression of the AK.  As with many communist policies within 
Lubelszczyzna, in practice they had been following them for some time 
before the official declaration.  Whilst Żak’s reports show that from the end 
of the Warsaw Uprising mass repression was being used, the Defence of the 
State decree was the trumpet call.    People's tribunals for political offences, 
the standard Stalinist medium through which sham justice was 
administered, were used from October onwards, and helped to feed the 
region’s prison camps with 'Fascist sympathisers'.  One of the most 
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important aspects of these decrees lies in the fact that they backdated 
legislation dealing with the underground to 15th August meaning that those 
members of the AK who had been arrested over the previous two months 
were now being held, indeed they had always been held, legally.  It was at 
this time that the notorious poster declaring 'The AK- the spit stained dwarf 
of the reaction' began appearing throughout the region. 23 This poster was 
perhaps the most famous example of the beginnings of a concerted 
propaganda campaign aimed at smearing the AK by decrying it as 
reactionary and by blaming the organisation for the debacle of Warsaw.  
The underlying meaning of this change of direction in October was that 
terror was now to be used on a national scale, and against all opponents 
actual or perceived.  Clearly the idea was to convince the population that 
the imposition and ultimate victory of communism in Poland was 
irreversible and inevitable.    
 
 
 
The above poster is one of the most famous examples of the Communist 
propaganda campaign against the AK during the autumn of 1944. It reads 
‘The giant and the expectorated dwarf of the reaction’. 
(Author’s own collection) 
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The change of policy from the PKWN was brought about due to events 
earlier in October.  Stalin had given Gomułka and Witos a dressing down in 
Moscow because of their lack of progress in Poland; the Generalissimo 
urged them to crack down on the AK without remorse and without delay, 
and to get to grips with desertion.  In addition, the halt of Soviet forces 
outside of Warsaw during the uprising had helped to bring anti-communist 
feelings to a head in many areas of Poland. 24 On the strength of an order 
from Soviet high command issued on 13th October 1944, the NKVD sent a 
Division numbering 8,850 persons to the Lublin region. 25 This new 
Division was specially raised and sent to the Lublin area by the USSR State 
Committee of Defence in order to reinforce the NKVD units in the area.  It 
was to operate exclusively in the Lublin area until the middle of 1945, 
when its operations were expanded to the whole territory of communist 
Poland.  The new unit was the 64th NKVD Internal Army Division and was 
headed initially by Major-General Boris Sieribiako, and then by Major-
General Pavel Brovkin.  The fact that the command for these 
reinforcements into the region came from the very top, spoke volumes 
about the degree of opposition that the NKVD was encountering in 
Lubelszczyzna.  It also pointed to the weakness of the Polish communists, 
that the Defence of the State repressions were to be implemented by a 
specially created Soviet force.  Clearly, the Soviet Union felt that the 
existing NKVD forces, even though they had already arrested and deported 
thousands of people, were not sufficient to bring the area under effective 
control. 26 In addition to these moves, Ivan Serov, the commander of all 
NKVD forces in Poland, personally oversaw the build up of the Polish 
security forces with the expansion of the Ministry of Public Security, 
Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego (MBP), along with the local 
Security Offices, Urzędy Bezpieczeństwa (UB).  27 At his suggestion, earlier 
attempts to include ex-AK members in the MO and WP were now 
abandoned; these people were now enemies and were to be arrested.  In the 
creation of People’s Poland the Security offices were to overshadow the 
communist party itself. 
  
The tone of the PKWN was, therefore, becoming increasingly menacing from 
the point of view of the AK from October onwards.  On 18 th October 
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Gomułka gave the following speech, that was published in Trybuna 
Wolnośći, Tribune of Freedom: 
 
There will be no civil war.  If however, the provocateurs force it upon 
us, if it provokes democratic Poland through murder and violence, 
the democratic camp will undertake the struggle with reaction and 
will destroy, ruthlessly destroy, reactionary defenders of the landlord 
rule. 28 
 
The Defence of the State decree, in effect declared war on the non-
communist elements in Lublin province.  Unreliable elements, namely 
those people whose communist credentials were in doubt, were dismissed 
from the judiciary and bureaucracy of the PKWN itself.  In addition to this, 
the decree stated that any action directed against the authorities now 
carried a mandatory death penalty.  Amongst such actions directed against 
the state was the possession of radio transmitters; it was now in effect 
illegal for the AK to contact its superiors in Warsaw and the UK.  The ban 
on radio transmitters had already been in effect since the entry of the 
NKVD into the region.  Since the end of July the NKVD had been arresting 
AK radio units across the province, yet at this stage no ‘policy’ had as such 
been officially announced.  It was only after the failure of the Warsaw 
Uprising that the PKWN felt confident enough to publicly proclaim a policy 
that the communist authorities had been following for the past two months 
in Lubelszczyzna.  In addition to the above decrees, Poles could now even 
be given the death penalty for not being vigilant enough about informing on 
'reactionary activity'.   
 
From October and November 1944 the UB was organised into several 
different bases operating out of the city of Lublin.  The regional UB was 
based at 53 Krakowskie Przedmieście, the county UB at number 41 and the 
city UB at 12 Ulica Chopina.  The UB was not large enough during 1944 to 
make an effective difference on its own.  During the last months of the year 
it was only able to launch single actions and invariably even these were 
supported by NKVD or MO forces.  Yet the important fact is the collective 
size of these forces.   For example by the end of the year the MO alone had 
13,206 members. 29 When added to the Soviet presence, this was quite a 
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persuasive force, against which the men of the AK began to look exactly 
what they increasingly were, weak and isolated. 30 
 
It was against this background, with more Soviet regular and NKVD troops 
coming into the region, that the security forces were able to inflict heavy 
losses on the Lubelszczyzna AK.  Once the Soviet Union decided to directly 
target the whole of the AK in Lubelszczyzna, its destruction as an organised 
underground was not long in coming.  The security services had gathered 
enough information on local networks and the terrain in which they were 
operating to be able to mount large-scale anti-partisan initiatives that were 
to successfully paralyse underground operations in Lubelszczyzna until 
early 1945.  The NKVD had, of course, been able to inflict huge losses on 
the AK prior to October, but they had not been able to destroy the local 
underground and ultimately to ‘secure’ the rear areas of the Red Army, 
hence the massive reinforcements ordered to the region at this point.  They 
had spread their ‘reach’ to the whole region by September, but the 
communist security forces were not able to operate in effective numbers in 
outlying areas until after the October reinforcements.  For example in 
Tomaszów Lubelski, the NKVD and UB only started to launch pacification 
campaigns in the area from 2nd October onwards.  31 Equally, in effect until 
October 1944, the Communist security forces in the Lublin region had 
concentrated on arresting, interrogating and deporting the AK’s 
commanders, after this point they focused on anyone suspected as being a 
part of the underground.   
 
However, even with this growing knowledge of local conditions the NKVD 
and UB still stuck to a relatively small range of operational methods in 
Lubelszczyzna.  This was to be the case until the early spring of 1945.  For 
example, once an area of anti-communist partisan operations had been 
identified, the area in question was combed on a mass scale.  Up to 1,000 
NKVD personnel, would be concentrated in one district and several villages 
combed simultaneously.  Certain towns or villages were surrounded and 
cut off, often on no more evidence than a hunch.  The encircling units then 
moved into the area in question and began arrests.  If and when 
independence underground units were found, they were either arrested or 
instantly liquidated.  For example, one of the first successful operations of 
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this type in the autumn was carried out in the Włodawa AK district, where 
an AK unit commanded by Bolesław Flisiuk “Jarem” was engaged and 
destroyed by a NKVD anti-partisan group. 32 Rafał Wnuk estimates that 
during 1944 and the first half of 1945 the NKVD carried out around 80 
percent of such operations.  33 
 
The NKVD units taking part in these anti-partisan operations were split 
into groups of between 25-170 people.  Such units were the spear-head for 
a determined struggle against partisan units in Lubelszczyzna.  From the 
beginning of October virtually the entire province was witness to sweeping 
anti-partisan campaigns. For example, in the eastern part of Tomaszów 
Lubelski, from 2nd-4th October the NKVD and UB carried out an operation 
that resulted in 150 people being imprisoned.34   Equally, another 
operation was carried out in the forests of Tarnogora, Piasków Szlachecki, 
and Rudnik on 23rd-25th October.  During the operation, the 25-man strong 
AK unit of the area commander, “Niwa”, was destroyed; on the 25th in 
Rudnik, another 15-man AK unit, which included eleven deserters from the 
WP, was attacked and scattered.  Later on the same day, NKVD units 
engaged another underground unit near Rudnik killing two and capturing 
a further three men. 35 Such operations, allied with mass arrests, and the 
surveillance of the region’s towns and cities, were to mean that continued 
partisan activity was to peter out during the autumn.  Jacek Wołoszyn 
estimates that the anti-partisan operations carried out by the 64th NKVD 
Division in Lubelszczyzna between October and November were responsible 
for the arrests of 2,039 AK members.36 
 
The weather also helped the anti-partisan operation.  The large-scale 
growth of partisan units in Lubelszczyzna in 1944 had really only begun in 
earnest from the spring onwards.  This was, of course, in no small part due 
to the fact that the front was getting ever closer to the region, but it was 
only from spring onwards, that it was feasible for large numbers of men to 
operate in the woods of the region.  Before April the cold temperatures of 
the eastern European winter and the leafless trees made partisan activity 
incredibly difficult.  From April until October 1944, the warmer weather 
and the foliage on the trees meant that large groups could operate in the 
forests and remain out of reach.  By October 1944 it was not just the 
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international situation and Soviet repression that was worsening; it was 
also the weather.  Soon it would be too cold to remain in the open coverless 
woods. 
Dismantling the Lublin underground 
 
That the NKVD and UB were so successful in taking apart much of the 
organised underground during autumn 1944 is in part due to the fact that 
the AK, both nationally and locally, did not face up to the new realities of 
the Soviet occupation until it was too late.  In terms of their organisational 
structure, certain operations, such as counter-intelligence were changed, 
but the AK still attempted to maintain a large-scale underground network.  
In this lay one of the major reasons for the unravelling of the network.  The 
underground alliance had come into being in Lubelszczyzna during the 
peculiar circumstances of the German occupation in which all of Polish 
society had a common enemy and cause - the removal of the Nazis from the 
province.  In this atmosphere an incredibly intricate underground army 
and state had been created in Lublin of 60,000 people.  These 
circumstances had now passed into history, the communist party and the 
Soviets provided a different threat, and they could recruit and did recruit 
informers and spies, which once inside a network could destroy it.  By not 
de-centralising its forces and by maintaining links between centre, 
inspectorate and district, the AK exposed itself to much greater risk.  
Thanks to a network of safe house meetings and communications 
developed under the German occupation, the AK in Lubelszczyzna created 
a situation whereby a domino effect of arrests could and did happen. 
 
The following events in the district of Biłgoraj highlight this danger and also 
provide an excellent indicator of the increasing polarisation of the 
population.  In November 1944 the former commander of Zamość BCh 
Edward Michonski “Lis” defected to the PKWN.  “Lis” was able to persuade 
Captain Jan Wojtala “Jez” and the former BCh commander of the Biłgoraj 
district Stanisław Makiella “Brzask” to join with him.  These three were to 
involve themselves in intensive pro-PKWN propaganda, which involved 
organizing meetings with other local members of the BCh urging them to 
hand in weapons and join the PKWN’s army.  “Brzask” ordered the 
members of the Peasant Party and BCh in Biłgoraj to submit to the PKWN.  
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According to Rafał Wnuk, this order was followed by “Brzask’s” 
subordinates and most of the BCh units in the area handed in their 
weapons to the NKVD and UB.42 To the AK in the region “Brzask” and 
“Orsza”, a fellow BCh officer, were as a result of their actions to be treated 
as traitors and liquidated if found.   The Biłgoraj BCh’s reaction to this 
resulted in the AK being destroyed in the area.  As some BCh commanders 
had been operating as commanders in AK units their knowledge of local 
networks was large.  One such commander, goaded by the AK branding his 
fellow BCh men as traitors, decided to tell the security forces all he knew 
about the AK in Biłgoraj.  In fact the relationship between the communist 
authorities and the BCh in the area was to become so good that the chief of 
the Biłgoraj UB nominated Józef Makuch, a former commander of the 4 th 
BCh region, as a chief of intelligence.  These events meant that within 
weeks the AK underground in Biłgoraj effectively ceased to exist.43 
 
That this happened in Biłgoraj is very telling about the overall state of the 
organisation in Lubelszczyzna by the end of the year.  Biłgoraj was in the 
Zamość inspectorate; it had been one of the areas worst affected by the 
German population exchanges and anti-partisan initiatives during the Nazi 
occupation.  It had, therefore, been one of the strongest districts for the 
Lubelszczyzna AK in terms of manpower.  Also Biłgoraj had been one of the 
areas in which BCh officers had been operating in positions of integrated 
command with the AK for the longest.  Yet even though this was the case, 
clearly loyalties had remained divided and this split had increased as the 
PKWN appealed to peasants and workers.  Even though members of the 
BCh had given information to the PKWN, in the minds of many BCh 
officers, loyalty to fellow BCh officers was greater than the allegiance to 
London. The AK was the official army of a Polish Government without 
territory, it was run and ordered by its pre-war codes but it was ultimately 
a volunteer force.  AK officers declaring that BCh men were traitors was 
symptomatic of their outlook, betraying them meant betraying the Polish 
Army.  Equally ‘the militias’ that were allied to the Polish Army had often 
joined the AK to fight for liberation from the Nazis - once this had been 
achieved, once the Warsaw Uprising had failed and once the leader of the 
Peasant Party had resigned from the Government-in-Exile, continued 
involvement was being questioned.   This again points to the fact that the 
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alliance forged during the last few months of the German occupation, was 
an alliance forged by the peculiar circumstances of that period.   The 
AK/Delegatura had not been allowed to restore the old Polish Republic and 
now the alliance that they had formed for that purpose was starting to 
significantly unravel.    
 
The tough new approach by the communist authorities after the failure of 
the Warsaw Uprising, added to their increased knowledge of local 
circumstances and networks meant that in the period from October to 
November much of the fabric of the AK in Lubelszczyzna was destroyed.  
Anna Kister’s research on the AK regional command in Lubelszczyzna 
reveals some fascinating insights into the nature of Soviet terror, and how 
it led to a snow-ball effect that virtually destroyed the underground in 
Lubelszczyzna as a coherent centralised force.  According to Kister, it was 
the capture of a few members of the underground at the end of the summer 
that led to a domino effect of arrests.  As a result of the interrogations of 
these individuals, who were connected to the regional command, the NKVD 
and UB were able to seize ‘more than 440 persons’.44 
 
At the end of September, the regional printing house on Ulica Narutowicza 
in Lublin city was discovered by the NKVD and closed down with its 
workers being incarcerated.  After this, during the first half of October the 
UB was able to capture the AK regional head of intelligence Lieutenant–
Colonel Aleksander Bieniecki “Łodzia”.  After a fruitless interrogation 
“Łodzia” was executed.  The NKVD and UB launched two key operations 
during autumn 1944 that were to have a paralysing effect on the central 
command of the AK in Lubelszczyzna.  The first of these operations was put 
into effect between 16th-21st October.  This operation was aimed primarily 
at the regional command and therefore took place in the Lublin 
inspectorate.  The security forces set traps around the AK’s exposed 
contact points, such as Anna Gross’s flat, which had been used as a 
meeting point for many members of the inspectorate’s command.  During 
this operation the NKVD and UB managed to capture the following leading 
men of the underground in Lublin Inspectorate: inspector of the Lublin 
inspectorate Edward Jasiński, “Nurt”, the aide-de-camp of the regional 
commander Antoni Wieczorek “Ścibor”, inspector of the regional command 
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Mieczysław Szczepański, “Mieczysław”.46 These arrests had a predictably 
debilitating effect on the regional underground.  However, perhaps the 
greatest impact of this first wave of arrests was to increase nervousness 
throughout the AK underground.  This meant that communications were 
reduced in some areas in an attempt to lesser the chances of arrest.  For 
instance the commander of the Tomaszów Lubelski district Władysław 
Surowiec “Sosna”, ordered on 5th November that units within his command 
should loosen contacts and re-orientate their operations to defence in order 
to ensure that all cells remain organised.47 
 
The impact of the arrests at the end of October was huge therefore for the 
regional command.  Even before the subsequent arrests on 6th November, 
the regional command feared for the future of its organisation.  Franciszek 
Żak sent a report back to the Chief of General Staff General Stanis ław 
Kopański at this time: 
 
Lately many officers and soldiers of the Home Army have been 
arrested.  They are being transported to unknown destinations from 
the castle in Lublin.  We will not be able to keep it up in the long 
run.  There are constant Citizen’s Militia raids aimed at getting rid of 
Home Army soldiers in the Lublin region.  38 Home Army soldiers 
were executed without trial by firing squads.  PKWN propaganda 
calls us bandits, murderers, fascists, Hitler’s servants etc.  Home 
Army officers and soldiers are interned in Brest Litovsk and 
transported to Kazan or Ryazan.  The NKVD terror is equal to that of 
the Gestapo. 48 
 
However it was not the October operation that effectively ended the activity 
of the central command, but the operation undertaken on 6th November 
1944. Whilst contacts had been weakened, the attempts to maintain the 
centralised apparatus of the underground linked to Warsaw and London 
meant that command meetings were still being called.  Due to the very 
nature of these meetings, most high-ranking and experienced officers from 
the region would be in one place at one time.  Such meetings had taken 
place during the German occupation in order to maintain links throughout 
the region, yet the risk of these meetings being exposed was significantly 
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smaller during the German occupation.  In November, not only for those 
present at the meeting but for those people across the region whose names 
and addresses might be given away during the subsequent interrogations.  
According to Rafał Wnuk, communist agents had gained information 
informing them that a Lublin regional briefing was to take place between 
5th-9th November.  It was on 6th November that the UB and NKVD burst in 
on the meeting; virtually every member of the upper echelons of regional 
AK was present.  Żak was able to avoid arrest, but the following AK leaders 
were not so lucky: the chief of the 1st Bureau “Orlik”, the chief of the BiP 
Captain Marian Tułacz, “Step”, the Chief of the 2nd Bureau Major 
Mieczysław Komarski “Wojtek” and his deputy Second-Lieutenant Leon 
Rambarz, “Dołęga”, the chief of the 3rd Bureau Major Jan Nawrat “Lucjan”, 
the head of the regional office Eugenia Wachowska “Emilia”, aide-de-camp 
of the regional commander Colonel Witold Engelking “Prot”, inspector of the 
Zamość inspectorate Major Stanisław Prus “Adam”, the inspector of Puławy 
inspectorate Major Stanisław Kowalski “Konrad”, and approximately 
seventy other high ranking members of the regional AK.  Although the 
regional commander Żak managed to avoid capture, the devastating impact 
of these arrests was reflected by the fact that shortly after this Żak sent a 
command to the inspectorates advising them to consider all existing 
contacts as burnt until further notice.  Clearly from this point onwards, the 
AK command, as a centralised and functioning entity that was capable of 
maintaining regular contacts with its component parts, ceased to exist. 49 
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the arrests lay in the fact that the 
NKVD now had most of the leaders of the Lubelszczyzna underground in 
cells under Ulica Chopina.  This meant that, sooner or later, some if not all 
of them would be beaten into denouncing both themselves and the work of 
their organisation now and during the German occupation.  Others, like 
Witold Engelking “Prot”, would be beaten to death during interrogation.  
Those captured were ultimately forced to divulge the names and addresses 
of a further 280 officers of the AK in Lubelszczyzna. 50 
 
The result of being involved in the non-communist underground was to 
face arrest, exclusion, torture and ultimately deportation or death; this fact 
radicalised those people remaining loyal to the AK.  Of the men and women 
captured in October and November 1944, many were given death 
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sentences.  The use of the death penalty was as much about instilling fear 
into the wider population as it was about removing certain individuals.  
According to the research of Janusz Wrona, the court of the Lubelski 
Military Garrison meted out its first death verdict to AK members on 14th 
November.  Up until December 1944, thirty three more death verdicts were 
passed by this court based in Lublin castle.  51 Such was the number of 
arrests that all types of prison and detention centres were filled to capacity 
throughout the region.  This meant that new temporary holding camps 
were created across the region, most of which were liquidated by the 
beginning of 1945.  For example, one of the largest such camps in the 
region was established in November in the city of Lublin on Ulica Nowy 
Świat. This particular camp was used as a concentration area for prisoners 
from places such as Biłgoraj and Tomaszów Lubelski. From 18 th November 
onwards prisoners were deported from here to several different 
destinations, to sister camps within People’s Poland, or to camps in the 
Soviet Union. 52 
Continuing Activity 
 
Even though the central command structure was suspended from this 
point onwards and many of the AK partisan units had been arrested or 
frozen, some units and regions continued to function and were still able to 
launch limited operations against the communist authorities.  For example, 
from a high point of 3,263 members in July 1944, the Tomaszów Lubelski 
AK still contained 474 cadet officers and 2,422 other ranks at the end of 
October 1944, still a considerable force and not untypical within the 
context of Lubelszczyzna.53 In the Puławy inspectorate in July 1944 there 
had been five radio stations operating in the area, by the end of November 
the inspectorate was down to three.  One station was confiscated by the UB 
on 26th November 1944 from Mieczysław Józefacki “Zych” in Rybitwa parish 
in the Puławy district.  The second station was also then seized by the UB, 
although the exact date of this is not known, from Tadeusz Marc 
“Pogromca” in the village of Dąbrowa in the parish of Godów.  Yet despite 
this, the remaining radio station continued to broadcast “Wiadomości 
Radiowe”, radio news, to the districts of the inspectorate throughout the 
autumn and winter of 1944-45.  In this inspectorate the intelligence officer 
was “Inżynier”, who was an expert in radio (how long he worked for the AK 
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or what his real name was is not known).54 Yet clearly his work was being 
directed by the inspectorate command.   
 
In Puławy, as in other AK inspectorates members of the WSK were charged 
with finding safe houses and meeting points.  In this area the following 
female intelligence officers made sure that at least some internal channels 
of communication remained open: in the town of Puławy itself, Helena 
Łukasik “Halina”, in Kraśnik district, Janina Chełmicka; and in the Puławy 
district, “Freda” from the “Orlik” group and “Joanna” from the “Orlik” 
group.  Therefore, even during this incredibly difficult period “Inżynier” and 
his fellow intelligence officer “Władysław” were still able to meet with 
“Konrad” the Puławy Inspector until his arrest and then with his successor 
at the following locations: at Halina Szalkiewicz’s house on 99 Ulica 
Lubelski in Puławy (this was not closed by the UB until March 1946); in the 
village of Witowice Puławy county, in the home of Ignący Gębali “Chudy”, 
which was also the point of contact between the Puławy district and the 
sub-districts (liquidated on 12th October 1946 by the UB).  In the town of 
Puławy itself, in the shop of Henryk Pacek on 31 Ulica Lubelski there was a 
meeting point for district intelligence and Inspectorate to regional 
organisations until 26th September 1945.55 
  
From October onwards attacks by the AK and other non-communist groups 
on those Poles now working with the new communist government were 
becoming increasingly common across the whole of the region.  Most of 
these attacks took place in the more isolated areas of Lubelszczyzna.  As 
the NKVD moved into the remoter areas of Lublin, they increasingly pushed 
the AK back into their strongholds, and so clashes became more common.  
When they did take place in the region’s towns and more populated areas, 
they often took the form of lighting attacks, with AK raiding parties 
entering the area in which the target resided, carrying out their operation 
and then retreating back into the woods before the communist authorities 
could intercept them.  For example, in the village of Zezulin near Lubartów 
on 16th October, an AK unit liquidated two collaborators of the new 
government known only as Stanisław P. and Mieczysław M.  In November, 
in Puławy inspectorate in the villages of Koszarów and Wandalin, the local 
AK carried out death sentences that had been issued by the county 
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Delegatura on two local communists and AL members, Stanislaw Roli in 
Koszarów and Wincenty Samon in Wandalin.  Equally in Puławy county, on 
25th November in the village of Końskowola, on the road between Lublin 
and Puławy a member of the PPR, Wojciech Popik, was liquidated by a 
raiding party.  On 17th November, on the other side of the region in 
Kranystaw, forty miles to the south of Lublin city, a local AK raiding party 
executed the County Commissioner of the PPR in Kranystaw, Konstanty 
Krasowski. 56 Equally, during November, in the north of Lubelszczyzna, in 
Biała Podlaska, Captain Robert Domanski led a nine-man patrol into the 
town and between the hours of six and seven in the morning his force 
managed to take the prison and free several prisoners.  The operation was 
completed without a shot being fired, primarily because of the lightning 
nature of the raid and because the unit was very familiar with the town and 
its prison.  Near Pokowice in the Kraśnik district on 19th December, 
partisans from the “Zapora”, “Jur”, “Glaz”, “Maks” and “Cygan” units were 
involved in a fight with MO units in a barn.  During this clash two MO 
members were killed and the AK partisans were able to escape.  On 8 th 
December, in Jaraczew in the Tomaszów Lubelski district, AK soldiers 
killed a local member of the UB, whilst on the 3 rd, in Słodków in the 
Kraśnik district, AK soldiers attacked and fatally wounded the PPR 
secretary Bolesław Winiarczyk. 57 These actions were of course being 
carried out against a background of mass arrests throughout these areas 
by the communist forces. 
    
In these actions, the AK was in many senses mirroring the increasingly 
aggressive stance of the communists.  Okulicki’s order for the autumn of 
1944 had talked about a Soviet occupation, and in effect identified the 
Soviets as the new enemy.  Whilst the AK was only to launch defensive 
actions against the communist forces, defensive could be interpreted in 
many different ways.  Okulicki’s order had been also made clear that the 
PKWN were usurpers, they were a part of the Soviet occupation and were 
an illegitimate body.  In this spirit, attacks on MO outposts or prison 
breaks could be seen as being defensive, but actions that would 
nevertheless ultimately help the communist authorities to justify further 
clamp-downs.  These processes fed off of one another.  For example, in 
Tomaszów county members of the underground attempted to assassinate a 
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local communist security officer on 14th October.  The attempt failed, but it 
was met by a large and devastating response from the security forces in the 
region.  Operating with lists from informants identifying underground 
members, the NKVD and UB conducted a pacification action through the 
villages of Komarów, Tyszowce, Bełżec and Susiec.  According to the district 
BiP chief within days of the failed assassination attempt, continued 
underground activity in the area was almost completely impossible.58 
 
Equally, the NKVD’s success in arresting the leadership of the AK in Lublin 
Province had a predictably debilitating effect on much of the underground’s 
provisioning.  As a direct result of the destruction of the leadership in and 
around the towns, banditry was becoming an increasingly alarming 
problem in certain areas during the last months of 1944.  Some former 
underground units, which until recently had themselves been involved in 
anti-banditry actions, now, through disenchantment and often a lack of 
coherent leadership, took part in murders, robberies and beatings.  
Zygmunt Klukowski noted the following scene in his diary: 
 
30th November, 1944 – Thursday: 
I am extremely disturbed about the growth and continuation of 
banditry, particularly when it involves former soldiers.  As a pretext 
for robbing people, they are using collaboration with the enemy; 
once it was Germans, now it is the Soviets.  More often than not, no 
guilt has been established.  Yesterday the Pikula family, owners of a 
small market, were robbed. 
Former officers of the Home Army have sometimes taken part in the 
robberies together with known bandits.  So far I know of “Gruda”, 
“Mongol”, and “Błyskawica” (local AK men).  They are working with 
Niedzielski and “Piorun”. 59  
 
Such men were still in the minority, but their number was increasing.  
Their dilema represents the dilemma of their organisation as a whole.  With 
the top level of command either arrested or being harassed by the 
communist security forces, and with their position increasingly under 
threat, some amongst the underground adopted increasingly lawless 
behaviour. One point of note here is Klukowski’s mention of the tag ‘Soviet 
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collaborators’.  Increasing numbers of local people were, in one sense or 
another, beginning to collaborate with the new communist authorities.  In 
the vast majority of cases in the province’s towns this meant a passive 
acceptance of the new authorities.  Yet young men were joining the new 
communist military forces, increasingly anti-AK initiatives in Zamość were 
joint NKVD–UB/MO/WP operations.  In reaction to these local events, 
many members of the underground saw the choice facing them by 
November 1944 as an essentially simple one.  It was a case of fighting for a 
free Poland or a communist Poland.  Many in the local population were 
classified in such simple terms; increasingly ‘pro-Soviet’ forces were finding 
themselves the victims of AK attacks. 60 This was certainly the case in the 
Kraśnik district where from August 1944 until March 1945 AK operations 
were typified by such small group actions.  In the north of Kraśnik district 
there was the large “Zapora” AK group operating, whilst in the south it was 
mainly NSZ groups.  Throughout the winter of 1944-45, AK and NSZ 
groups were launching attacks in this area on MO and PPR members   One 
such attack took place in the village of Boiska in Dzierzkowice parish on 4 th 
December 1944, when AK members killed a local PPR member, Stanis ław 
Kapica.  61 
 
By mid-November, despite the fact that he still remained at large, the AK 
regional commander had still not contacted the remaining members of 
central command.  In the weeks after the November arrests Żak had 
escaped to Warsaw where he was living in the ruined city on the right-bank 
of the Vistula.  In all probability he had escaped the Lubelszczyzna area in 
order to contact central command in Warsaw and receive some sort of 
directive from them.  Amongst the chaos of the frozen ruins of the capital, 
he was probably as safe as anywhere in Poland during its ‘second 
occupation’.  In addition to Żak’s disappearance from the region even the 
regional second in command Władysław Zalewski “Leśnik” had still not 
contacted the other commanders.  This was probably due to the fact that 
the arrests in November had made the leaders of the Lublin AK 
understandably very cautious.  Yet for the rest of the command in the city, 
it seemed prudent to re-establish contact and set up a skeletal command 
that would attempt to direct the remaining AK forces in the region.  As a 
result of this thinking a meeting was held at the beginning of December 
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1944 and a new skeletal command created with Major “Kord” being 
appointed as the new regional commander.  Present at the meeting were 
the following AK officers: “Kazimierz”, “Kord”, Henryk Bukowski “Henryk”, 
Andrzej Łoziński “Andrzej”, Captain Mieczysław Szczepański “Mieczysław”, 
Second-Lieutenant Zdzisław Glogier “Prot”, Colonel Zygmunt Wróbel 
“Iskra”.  However, this command was never able to expand its activities 
during its short life span. 62 The fact was that from November 1944 until 
January 1945 the members of the independence underground in 
Lubelszczyzna were operating without a command structure that went 
higher than the level of local inspectorate. 
 
A mixture of communist and nationalist rhetoric, the failures of the 
Government-in-Exile, splits within the independence underground, acute 
war weariness, and mass terror had cumulatively meant that the secret 
police of the new communist state, the UB, had been able to establish an 
effective web of informers and spies in Lubelszczyzna. 63  By December 
1944 the Polish communist administration had at its disposal about 2,500 
security officers, twelve to thirteen thousand policemen and 4,000 soldiers 
from the WW. 64 Amongst these forces were a large number of former AL 
men, which meant that violence between them and the underground had 
history, and as a result the increasingly frequent campaigns of these 
security forces were often brutal.  For example, Grzegorz Korczyński, the 
former AL commander who had refused the 27th Volhynian Division 
weapons during the German occupation and who had led the 1 st Lubelski 
AL Brigade into Lublin in July, now led a pacification action in Krasnystaw 
county during October that was particularly brutal.  On 14 th December in 
the village of Choina, AK member Stanisław Smyk “Bunczuk” was arrested 
and then tortured in a nearby barn.  In the village itself Korczyński’s force 
killed fourteen locals amongst them the local school-masters and their 
children. 65 
 
According to the research of Janusz Wrona the agents that the UB in 
Lubelszczyzna had assembled by the end of 1944 comprised three different 
groups.  The first group of informers were those with a convinced 
communist ideology; for them informing on reactionaries amongst their 
own society was ultimately for the good of that society.  The second group 
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recruited were those who were blackmailed into being an informant; it was 
this group that was to make up the majority of the UB’s informers during 
the first years of the communist regime in Poland, often the communist 
authorities had some type of compromising material or documents about 
these people that usually related to the period of the German occupation.  
The third group that was involved in the spy network of the UB were those 
who wished to profit from their work.  This could take the form of benefits, 
or assurances of profits from informing.  Equally, the UB was able to 
recruit members of society that were involved in semi-legal or illegal work, 
in occupations such as speculation, smuggling or prostitution.  Working for 
the security forces meant that such people’s work could continue without 
interference from the MO.  Between the three groups, the UB had been able 
to build up an effective web, and indeed given the nature of the 
‘recruitment’ of many of these people as informers, it was often in their best 
interests to maintain a high number of reports to the authorities.  
Essentially this was to mean that many people could be watched and 
identified by a few.  66 This is shown in a report listing the arrests 
undertaken by the UB in the Lublin region by the end of 1944: 
                        Compilation of arrests carried out: 
 Authority Number of 
arrests 
1 Provincial authority 1487 
2 Lublin City 200 
3 Lublin county 243 
4 Siedlce county 120 
5 Tomaszów Lubelski county 427 
6 Puławy county 436 
7 Lubartów county 460 
8 Łuków county 208 
9 Kraśnik county 970 
10 Biała Podlaska county 130 
11 Włodawa county 264 
12 Hrubieszów county 142 
13 Krasnystaw county 171 
14 Zamość county 206 
15 Chełm county 253 
16 Radzyń (Podlaski) county 220 
17 
Total 
Biłgoraj county 
 
378 
6393 
67 
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In another document relating to the same arrests, the breakdown of those 
arrested and targeted in the region is quite revealing and helps to show 
how those targeted were not just members of the AK; in many areas only 
around half of all arrests were categorised as AK members.  For example, in 
Tomaszów Lubelski, the UB had arrested 427 persons up until the end of 
December 1944.  Of this number 253 were classified as being members of 
the AK and 15 as members of the BCh.  In Biała Podlaska of 130 arrests 37 
were of AK members and 35 of Volksdeutsch.  Whereas in Lubartów out of 
a huge 460 persons arrested only 116 were of AK members and 20 were 
deserters. 68 Those AK members now being arrested were often key 
members, for both Soviet and Polish security services were, acting on 
information given via informants.  According to a report by the local NKVD 
commander Ivan Serov, from November onwards, his forces had 114 agents 
operating within the structures of the AK underground.  With UB men 
acting as agents as well, the communist security forces had informants 
operating in the inner circle of Żak’s command.  One such informer, whose 
pseudonym was “Konrad”, was able to operate in the AK Radzyń district 
from August 1944 until March 1945.  Equally, in Lublin the liquidation of 
the “Sek” AK unit was made possible by the use of an informer within that 
organisation with the pseudonym “Stefan”.69 Such high level insiders were 
vital in the new wave of arrests after October 1944.   
 
In the destruction of the Biłgoraj AK district, the information given by BCh 
members to the security forces meant that the arrests were precise and 
clinical.  It had also led to a snowball effect in which arrest had led to 
arrest.  This was still being felt over a month after the initial break up of 
much of that areas’ underground.  For example, on 8th December the NKVD 
had managed to arrest all of the remaining AK leadership in the district, 
with the local AK security officer “Szyszka”, and his deputy “Mur” being 
taken along with the district’s typewriter and radio station. 70 This 
continuing wave of arrests meant that even after the initial arrests, 
underground members who most probably would have been in a position to 
re-organise the underground were now being removed.  According to the 
work of Jacek Wołoszyn, during the Christmas 1944 period communist 
security force operations against the AK in Lubelszczyzna yielded around 
 191
1,000 arrests.  In total in the period up until the end of 1944, such forces 
had managed to arrest 2,604 members of the Lubelszczyzna AK. 71 
 
Anna Kister has shown how the Security forces often used bandits or 
thieves who had been sentenced by underground courts during the 
German occupation.  72 This phenomenon is perhaps highlighted by the 
following events in the village of Majdan.  In this village the “Podkowa” AK 
unit had been using Józef Łapiński’s farm in the village as a hiding place 
for weapons and the unit’s radio.  On 3rd December two soldiers from the 
unit stashed explosives under the treadmill in the farm.  This was noticed 
by the wife of a local farmer who subsequently tipped off the UB 
anonymously about the existence of a ‘weapons stash’. Immediately MO 
and UB members arrived on the scene and proceeded to search the farm.  
In the course of the search one of the security force members accidentally 
kicked one of the explosives in the stash killing twelve of the men.  
Amongst the dead was the Deputy Commander of the UB in Zamość, Józef 
Kowalski.73 
 
These arrests were to have a variety of impacts on the remaining 
underground forces.  Once the communist security forces had ‘top-sliced’ 
the region’s commanders in November, large numbers of AK men were left 
without an umbrella organisation to guide them.  These effects were to vary 
from region to region, with some areas retaining contact between district 
and inspectorate level.  Yet for those AK members who did lose contact with 
a higher command, it must have been incredibly dispiriting, having fought 
for years for Polish independence to be declared a bandit by a ‘Polish 
government’ and left in isolation. In some areas the November arrests 
meant that, for a matter of weeks, nobody knew what was happening.  
Against this confusion came constant NKVD surveillance for those living in 
towns, more arrests and population and land transfers.  For example, in 
the Zamość inspectorate, the November arrests meant that for a whole 
month the AK internal communications apparatus ceased to function in 
some areas.  In practical terms this meant that, as all contacts between 
Lublin and the inspectorates had been burnt no AK organisational news 
was reaching towns such as Szczebrzeszyn, no runners, no Information 
Gazettes.74 Ever dwindling members of the underground could only huddle 
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around ever dwindling numbers of radio sets and listen to the BBC, other 
than this many areas were now cut off.  In addition to this, the lack of 
communication with the AK in other areas meant that whilst commanders 
such as “Adam” had been arrested at the beginning of November, what had 
happened to him was still not known in his local command by December!  
This meant that the population was without a coherent organising force, 
the following effects in the Zamość inspectorate were observed by 
Klukowski: 
 
Lack of leadership can be seen everywhere.  People like “Adam” were 
once capable of keeping soldiers disciplined.  Now we do not have 
anyone as a real leader.  “Wacław”, who now handles the affairs of 
Inspector, is too soft, not quick enough in dealing with problems, 
and even more important, he hides so well that contact with him is 
virtually impossible.  Now more and more soldiers are joining the 
Berling Army.  Many others have been arrested, and the remainder 
do not know what to do.  Only a small group is still organized. 75 
 
The most interesting aspect of this account is in the fact that Klukowski 
attributes the collapse of most of the command to the removal of “Adam”.  
In Jarosław Kopiński’s research into banditry in AK ranks in Lubelszczyzna 
he points out that there is a direct link between banditry and the removal 
of regional commanders by the NKVD and UB.  Kopiński argues that 
inspectorate and district commanders, most of whom had been in positions 
of command locally throughout the war, played a key role in maintaining 
the AK as a coherent force that was orderly and well-disciplined.  Such 
men had built up a large amount of trust and respect amongst both the 
populations in which they moved and amongst their men in the regional 
AK.  As Klukowski’s diary entry says, once men such as “Adam” were 
removed, men of comparable standing commanding the same degree of 
respect were hard to find.  After the November arrests some inspectorates, 
such as Zamość found it difficult to prevent banditry and to maintain order 
to the same degree.  Kopiński’s research, however, is quick to stress that 
until the second half of 1945 such situations were very much in the 
minority in Lubelszczyzna.  In most areas men who commanded such 
respect were able to maintain order in their own force.  Amongst such men 
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who had a cohesive role in their areas were the commander of the Biała 
Podlaska district Stefan Wyrzykowski “Zenon”, and the Łuków district 
commander Wacław Reymak “Ostoja”.  In most of Lubelszczyzna such men 
were able to retain a hold on their men.76 
 
Winning hearts and minds 
 
The AK in the south-west of Lubelszczyzna, and in particular in the 
Biłgoraj area, had been effectively destroyed by the events of October and 
November.  Of course this question of carrying on an organised 
underground in Lubelszczyzna after the autumn arrests, was to have 
similar effects in other parts of the province.   
 
To the east, the Krasnystaw district lost contact with the Chełm 
inspectorate command after the wave of arrests that hit the central 
command in November.  This led the area commander Captain Jan Wojtal 
“Jez”, to attempt a rapprochement with the PKWN.  He managed to 
persuade the inspectorate’s deputy commander Franciszek Jarocki 
“Jadzwing” along with several members of his staff, to agree to meet with 
the communists in an attempt to come to an understanding.  On 12th 
December representatives of the local AK, and BCh met with 
representatives of the WP and the MO.  The outcome of these talks was to 
cause a fatal split in the independence underground in Krasnystaw and 
ultimately lead to its destruction.  At the meeting a declaration was drawn 
up whereby in exchange for safe passage into the WP at an equivalent rank, 
the underground forces in the area would hand in their weapons and 
submit to the authority of the PKWN.  All underground activity would be 
ceased in the area.  This declaration split the Krasnystaw underground 
down the line of militia allegiance.  As a direct result the inspector of the 
Chełm inspectorate nominated a new commander in Krasnystaw Wacław 
Makara “Lisc”, who kept the underground going in name.  However, in 
reality the area’s underground collapsed after 12 th December.   In the main 
the area’s BCh soldiers submitted to the declaration, handed in their 
weapons and ceased underground activities, whilst underground members 
in the area from ZWZ and NOW refused to follow this order.  Not all of them 
remained within the AK fold however.  In fact many of those from NOW 
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units were so disillusioned with the events since July that they joined an 
expanding NSZ in Krasnystaw rather than continue within the AK under 
new command.  77 There were not many defections such as this, but 
Makara’s decision did reflect a change in public mood.  The communist 
authorities had launched a determined effort to win hearts and minds. 
 
Following Stalinist doctrine, land redistribution was believed to be the key 
to winning over the silent majority of the population.  It was believed that 
the Polish peasantry would look on the Communists with fresh eyes after 
being handed tracts of land at the expense of their former aristocratic 
landlords.  However the attempt at land redistribution from mid-October to 
15th December 1944 did not produce the huge upsurge in support for the 
communist party that the PKWN had assumed.  In the first place, only 
212,084 acres of land were redistributed, meaning that 80% of the Polish 
peasantry did not benefit at all from the communist’s new land policy.  The 
party membership figures are telling in this respect,: in October 1944, the 
PPR had 9,000 members, by late December 1944 after the attempt at land 
redistribution, the membership was still only 21,649. The mission of the 
PKWN to convert the countryside to communism was greatly hampered by 
the actions of the Red Army.78 Lucja Urszula Swiąkowski claims that the 
food requisitions for the Red Army, from the end of 1944 until April 1945 
were three times worse than under the German occupation. 79 In fact, one 
of the most prevalent forms of food requisitioning was for Red Army 
soldiers to round up Polish urban workers by force and march them out to 
the surrounding countryside to collect food.80 Such incidents were in sharp 
contrast to the assertion made by Marshall Zhukov that 'the troops.... 
shared everything they had with the population.  In this way...we laid the 
foundation of fraternal friendship between the Soviet and Polish peoples'. 81 
 
If land redistribution did not have a great impact on communist support -
patriotism seemed to.  In Zamość and Lublin, Book Days were organised by 
the new local communist authorities in which children were encouraged to 
wave Polish flags, in addition, that cornerstone of Polish identity, the 
Catholic Church, was left largely unmolested.  Members of the PKWN 
authorities addressed rallies in the town squares of many towns talking of 
the future of an independent, free and democratic Poland.  In some 
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respects at least life seemed to be returning to normal.  In Lublin schools 
and universities were reopened, priests called mass, and in Bi łgoraj and 
Szczebrzeszyn the marketplaces were once again filled with local farm 
produce for sale. 82 Yet at the same time, the security situation meant that 
most of the province found itself under a curfew.    By the end of October 
1944, whilst the Government-in-Exile was still seen by many as being the 
legitimate government, the direction and ultimate purpose of continued 
resistance was beginning to be questioned.  Whilst only relatively few 
people were actively prepared to assist the communist regime, few were still 
prepared to openly resist it.  The communists were after all attempting to 
create a new Polish state they were not attempting to destroy the Poles as a 
nation.  Communist propaganda promised the largest groups in society, the 
workers and the peasants, social and economic advancement.  The ideology 
of communism could appeal to all, and by joining the party one could 
advance oneself in the new future of People’s Poland.  That not many 
people were joining the party, in spite of the obvious perks that 
membership brought, speaks volumes yet equally no such opportunities 
had existed under the German occupation.  Despite the fact that many 
members of the PKWN’s governmental apparatus were still merely Russians 
with Polish names, the new communist authorities were promoting the 
advancement of Poles, and they were slowly but surely expanding their 
Polish membership.83 
 
Added to this is the fact that the Polish population wanted a return to some 
degree of normality after the worst occupation in their history, and the 
power of the appeal for normalcy after years of strife cannot be 
underestimated.  After five years in which their lives, their land and even 
their nation was under the threat of annihilation, passive acceptance of the 
PKWN could seem the only thing to do, why keep on fighting if the 
government is ‘Polish’, if the government provides fruit and vegetables in 
the markets of Zwierzyniec, Nałęczów, and Łuków?  Equally the new 
administration by reopening centres of learning such as the Catholic 
University in Lublin was providing an outlet for aspiring young Poles who 
wanted to return to education.  The moment of liberation had brought with 
it great hope, but three months on the Government-in-Exile had failed in 
Moscow and the AK had failed in Warsaw.  Why keep on fighting after five 
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years when the new administration was providing the basics of life once 
again and waving a Polish flag furiously whilst doing so?  All of this seemed 
to clash with Okulicki and the Information Bulletin’s talk of a ‘Soviet 
occupation’.  Dr Klukowski noted in his diary how many in his area, 
including himself, were beginning to have such thoughts: 
 
8th November: 
The mood of the population, particularly among the peasants, is 
changing.  They are not as willing to help in the fight against the 
common enemy as they were during the German occupation.84 
3rd December: 
In spite of the repression against the Home Army, I clearly feel how 
different today’s situation is from what we had under the German 
occupation.  Under the Germans it was impossible to organize any 
type of Polish Cultural enterprise. 85 
 
For almost five months nearly one person in every three in Lubelszczyzna 
was in a Red Army uniform. 86 The presence of the Red Army and 
thousands of communist security service operatives meant that by January 
1945 there were only a handful of the AK’s forest partisan units left 
operating in Lubelszczyzna.  From a high of forty partisan units in July the 
AK were now down to a few units.  Of the units left some were led by the 
officers who were the most well-equipped to continue operations.  Amongst 
these were the “Uskok” and “Zapora” partisan units.  One of the main 
reasons why the “Zapora” unit had survived until this point was 
doubtlessly the fact that its commander, Major Hieronim Dekutowski 
“Zapora”, was a trained commando who had been parachuted into the 
region by the British during 1943.  Whilst other units commanded by 
officers who had had only experience of commanding military forces in 
‘normal’ circumstances had been liquidated, units led by men such as 
“Zapora”, with their specialist training, were the ones still operating by 
January 1945.87 
 
In many senses the period from the end of the Warsaw Uprising until 
Christmas 1944 was the key one in the history of the AK in Lubelszczyzna.  
After the Warsaw Uprising less than three months of total repression had 
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removed the regional command, arrested many of the rank and file and 
seriously undermined the system of internal communications that had 
been so carefully constructed during the German occupation of the region.  
The stalling of the front meant that the storm, which the Lublin AK had to 
weather, was not survivable.  At the central level, the skeletal command 
that had been established after the November arrests had not managed to 
organise its activities effectively by the end of 1944, and at the end of 
December even this command was rocked by a new wave of arrests that 
saw the regional chief-of-communication Zygmunt Wrobel “Iskra” amongst 
those detained.  However, these December arrests coincided with the 
return of Żak from Warsaw.  It was with Żak’s return that a new command 
was established in the region from 1st January 1945 onwards.  This 
command, unlike the one that had operated since November 1944, was 
able to resume at least some underground activities and regain contact 
with the inspectorates of the command. 88 In a sense by the end of 1944 
the Soviet Union and its Polish satellite administration had destroyed the 
framework of the underground formed to fight for independence from the 
Germans in Lubelszczyzna.  Once the Red Army launched its new offensive 
in January 1945, the communists would have to defeat an underground 
formed primarily to fight for independence from them. 
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Chapter 5 
 
January 1945-May 1945 
 
 
The Spring Offensive  
 
 
 
On 31st December the PKWN rebranded itself the Provisional Government.  
However, when Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Yalta in February 
1945, that government was not recognised by the Anglo-Saxon powers.  In 
the middle of January the Red Army’s offensive towards Berlin was 
resumed, reducing the Red Army’s oppressive presence and allowing the 
underground to begin to re-group.  If it could organise a sufficient 
challenge to the communist regime before the ‘big three’ next met after 
German capitulation, the cause of Polish independence might not be dead.  
It had taken four and a half months - considerably longer than the AK 
command in the region had expected, but when the Red Army advance 
began again, the underground was, as “Marcin” had conceived back in 
July, able to paralyse much of the communist administration in the 
province. 
 
As the spring wore on, the promises of free elections given by the ‘Big 
Three’ at Yalta and the removal of the bulk of the Red Army presence 
facilitated a flight of thousands of people to the woods of the province.  By 
spring 1945 more partisan units were operating in Lublin than at any point 
since Operation “Tempest”, and a central command had been re-
established.  Refugees from the eastern bank of the Bug, deserters, and 
those fleeing persecution joined a resurgent underground.  Once again 
people hoped that communist repression was only a phase and would pass 
after the elections, or once the Soviet Union fought the Anglo-Saxons in a 
 201
coming Third World War.  Such hopes had fuelled the movement to the 
woods, and the return of Mikołajczyk and the attempts to legalise 
opposition parties seemed to confirm this. 
 
By April 1945, the Polish communist authorities had in effect lost control of 
large areas of the province.  By day MO, UB and NKVD patrols swept 
through areas making arrests only for the area to return to the 
underground after dark.  With the administration paralysed in Lublin, the 
Soviets once again fell back on repression.  As the Second World War came 
to an end in May the leaders of the AK in Lublin were again arrested, and 
thousands of Soviet reinforcements were on their way to the province.   
 
The Impact of the Red Army’s offensive 
 
In the first few weeks of 1945 a series of new offices were created or 
enlarged in order to provide a more effective security framework for the 
communist TRJN.  Amongst these new departments that were operating 
from 2nd January onwards were the Security Officer’s School, Szkoła 
Oficerów Bezpieczeństwa, the Department of Government Security, Wydział 
Ochrony Rządu, and the Intelligence Department.  Of particular importance 
to the independence underground still operating in the region was 
Department 1 of the Department of Government Security.  This department 
was sub-divided into eight sections that were responsible for the fight 
against enemies of the state.  The most important sections and the target of 
their work were: 
 
Section 1; Germans (Hitlerites) 
Section 2; Underground (Polish underground) 
Section 3; Fight with political bandits (fight with enemy infiltrators 
in the government apparatus) 
Section 5; Provide security for the legal authorities by penetrating 
the underground 
Section 7; Observation.  1 
 
Although at first each of these sections was small, they did help to 
formalise the policies being followed by the PKWN since the end of the 
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Warsaw Uprising.  Equally, by January 1945, it was increasingly likely that 
the final advance of the Red Army from the Vistula into the Third Reich 
would take place any day.  Once the bulk of the Soviet and Polish Armies 
left the province, the Polish communist state’s infrastructure would have to 
shoulder a much higher burden.  As part of the preparations for this, on 
10th January the Political Office of the TRJN also took the decision to raise 
the size of the Polish Internal Army, Wojsk Wewnętrznych, to 15,000 men.  
However, the fact that this announcement was made in January show how 
previous attempts to enlarge this force had largely failed. 2 
 
Before the impact of these organisational changes could be assessed, 
Marshals Koniev and Zhukov began their advance towards Berlin on 12 th 
January 1945.  Known as the Vistula-Oder campaign, it would take the 
Red Army through the last of Polish territory up to the borders of the 
German Reich itself.  Pushing on from bridgeheads near Sandomierz and 
Radom, Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Front made lightning progress against the 
over stretched and outnumbered German Army Group Centre.  In freezing 
snow leaden weather, with visibility virtually nil, the Red Army's 
overwhelming numbers, wide tracks and winter suitability of their T-34 
tanks meant that the defending Germans were forced back.  It was the 
beginning of one of the most successful military campaigns in modern 
military history.  The German commander facing the onslaught on the 
morning of the 12th later summed up the Soviet advance: 
 
It was clear that their supreme High Command had fully mastered 
the technique of organising an offensive by vast mechanised armies.  
It is impossible to describe what happened between the Vistula and 
the Oder in the early months of 1945.  Europe had known nothing 
like it since the fall of the Roman Empire.3 
 
As Koniev's front moved forward, the next day General Chernyakhovsky's 
3rd Belorussian Front began its attack on East Prussia.  On the 14 th, 
Rokossovsky's forces attacked East Prussia from the Narew River 
bridgeheads, whilst Zhukov's 1st Byelorussian Army pushed off from the 
Vistula to attack towards Radom and then onwards through Łódź on the 
long road to Berlin.   Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Army was to push through to 
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Kielce, which they took on 15th January, to Kraków and on to the capital of 
German Silesia, Breslau. 4 
 
Speed and perpetual movement would be the key to preventing the 
Germans from regrouping.  This meant that, as the front swept forward, 
German forces, often of considerable size were left in the rear of Soviet 
forces, often to be swept up by NKVD units.  Thus the next phase of 
eliminating 'banditry' in the Soviet rear began.  In connection to this, on 
the night of the 15th an interesting conversation was taking place 
thousands of miles away from Poland, but it was one that was very 
revealing as to what the fate of the country would be.  On that night, Stalin 
was entertaining the American Air-Chief-Marshal Tedder, General 
Eisenhower's Chief-of-Staff.  The American report of the meeting noted: 
 
Stalin emphasised that one of the difficulties (of the Vistula 
offensive) was the large number of trained German agents among the 
Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and German-speaking 
Russians.  He said that they were all equipped with radios and, as a 
result, the element of surprise was practically eliminated.  However 
the Russians have succeeded in eliminating this menace to a large 
measure.  He said that he considers the clearance of the rear areas 
to be just as important as bringing up supplies.5 
 
Soviet forces had indeed been busy eliminating ‘bandits’ in rear areas such 
as Lubelszczyzna, and clearly the AK had been included in this analysis of 
'trained German agents'.  Indeed, the AK was regrouping as Stalin feared.  
Ironically, however, the prerequisite for regrouping was disbandment.  The 
AK had been formed in order to end the German occupation of Poland.  
With the speed of the Soviet advance through Poland in January, this 
objective had been achieved.  On 19 th January therefore, the same day that 
the Red Army took Kraków, the ancient Polish capital, Okulicki, the AK 
Commander-in-Chief formally ordered the disbandment of his force: 
 
Soldiers of the Home Army.  This is my last order to you.  From now 
on it will fall upon you to exert yourselves for the restoration of an 
independent Poland and for the defence of the Polish people from 
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extermination.....Each of you must obey self - imposed orders.  I am 
convinced that you will carry out this call and that you will keep 
your allegiance to Poland forever.  In order to facilitate your task I 
discharge you from the oath and disband the units of the Home 
Army, on the strength of the authorisation of the President of the 
Republic. 6 
 
Although Norman Davies has suggested that Okulicki’s decision to disband 
deprived the AK in the provinces of a badly needed umbrella organisation, 
in Lubelszczyzna, in effect the AK had been on its own from August 
onwards; in addition, after the mass arrests in the last quarter of 1944, 
central command in the province had been undermined to such an extent 
that inspectorates, or districts or even individual partisan units were in 
effect operating on their own from November.  7 The key part of the 
dissolution order was the phrase ‘from now it will fall upon you to exert 
yourselves for the restoration of an independent Poland and for the defence 
of the Polish people from extermination.’  This phrase in itself meant that, 
whilst the AK was to be disbanded, some form of underground activity 
against the communist authorities would continue.  The ‘Nie’ organisation 
was planned to be the realisation of this continued underground activity, 
but it was in effect a still borne organisation; in the Lublin region there is 
no known evidence that ‘Nie’ as an organisation took root at all.  In fact in 
the Lublin region, as already shown in previous chapters, by January 1945 
most of the regional command had been destroyed and so ‘Nie’, as an 
organisation that was specifically based around the idea of an elite tight-
knit force, had no real chance of being realised in the region.  However, in 
Lubelszczyzna the AK remained relatively large at the level of the rank and 
file, and so the call to ‘exert yourselves for the restoration of an 
independent Poland’ was taken to mean that the regional forces were to 
continue resistance.   
 
The irony is that the dissolution of the AK was ordered at a time when its 
supporters and members in Lubelszczyzna were starting to increase 
operations again.  Soviet forces, both regular Red Army, Smersh and NKVD 
units, did not entirely leave with the advance of the front - sizeable forces 
remained to bulk up the Polish communist forces but the sheer crushing 
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weight of literally millions of men had now left the province.  According to 
Anna Kister, the forces left behind in Lubelszczyzna were largely spare 
units composed of soldiers from the region’s army schools.  In addition, the 
communists’ attempt to raise the size of the WW to 15,000 men had still 
not materialised.  The force had been divided into companies and deployed 
in individual provinces but as of 10 th March it still had only 7,346 men in 
its ranks. 8  
 
The AK in Lubelszczyzna continued, re-establishing command links and 
recruiting men until into spring.  Żak, the regional commander, clearly 
reflects this sense of continuity within the Lublin AK in the edited form of 
Okulicki’s order that he gave to his subordinates later in the month.  In 
this order Żak informed his men that their sacrifices, both in the past and 
in the future would be the foundation for the establishment of a truly 
independent Poland; equally he talked of greater recruitment into the ranks 
of the force.  The order specifically stated that all officers who had co-
operated with the ‘illegal Lublin government’ were to be dismissed.  Further 
more the order emphasised the fact that the work of the regional AK’s office 
of information and propaganda should be improved, and lists compiled of 
those who had collaborated with the Polish communist authorities.  In the 
future, all underground members in the Lublin area were still to follow the 
rules of the AK. 9 
 
The AK command in Lublin believed that as the Second World War neared 
its end, a conflict between east and west was coming.  Convinced of this 
truth, the AK in Lublin was to remain active, organised and should prepare 
for its future role in this conflict.   In Lubelszczyzna, therefore, the 
dissolution of the AK seemed to mean that the force did not end, rather it 
was explicitly identifying a new struggle and a new enemy. 10 What did 
happen at the official end of the AK was that individual district and 
inspectorate commands in the Lublin province decorated their soldiers, and 
continued the adjustment towards surviving the ‘second occupation’ of the 
new enemy.  In Lublin county the ‘dissolution’ of the AK meant that the 
district command reduced the command staff’s size on 13 th February, 
whilst also promoting 68 members within the rank and file; in addition, 41 
soldiers were decorated for their services to the Polish nation thus far.  
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These moves were replicated in many districts within the Lublin region and 
were reflective of the fact that the force was far from dissolved.  Commands 
were shrunk in order to decrease the likelihood of detection, and men were 
being tied to the movement via the rewards of increased responsibility and 
medals.  11 
 
As the Lublin AK began to regroup, the ‘Big Three’ met at the Yalta 
Conference between 4th-11th February 1945.  The Yalta declaration on 
Poland included the promise that elections were to take place in Poland 
and that the communist government would be expanded to include London 
politicians.  While the Government-in-Exile issued a feeble protest, 12 its 
representatives within Poland were more conciliatory.  On 24 th January the 
Council of National Unity and the Home Council of Ministers met in a small 
town south-west of Warsaw to discuss their response to Yalta, and in the 
face of reported reluctance from Okulicki, the decision to accept the Yalta 
declaration was made. This decision clearly broke with London’s stance 
and pointed to the ever-weakening relationship between London and its 
dwindling forces in the homeland.  13 But what Yalta did for many of the 
people still involved in the underground was to present them with a chink 
of light.   
 
The prospect of free elections, which Stalin had publicly agreed to, meant 
potentially that those supporters of the ‘illegal’ sections of parties, such as 
the PPS or SL, increasingly felt that ending armed operations and 
attempting legalisation of their movements offered their best chance.  There 
was an increasing feeling that the current situation in Poland was only 
temporary – elections would change the current state of affairs.  In the case 
of the SL, Yalta compounded existing differences within the party, which 
were highlighted by Mikołajczyk’s decision to leave the Government-in-Exile 
and the exiled Poles.  The SL had been spilt into two parties since the 
decision of a minority group to work with the PKWN during the late 
summer, and many members felt now was the time to legalise themselves – 
in any election they would be the favourites to win a majority.  On 14 th 
February this feeling was given the official stamp by the leader of the party 
Mikołajczyk when he sent a dispatch to the leadership of the peasant 
movement in Poland telling them that he supported the Yalta declarations 
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whilst imploring them to ‘work loyally toward facilitating Polish-Soviet 
relations’. 14 This policy was formally adopted on 15 th March at a plenary 
meeting of the leadership of the peasant movement, when it decided to 
come out into the open and begin political action.  This declaration of policy 
by the peasants was then followed by the PPS, when on 18 th March in 
Kraków its supreme council decided that it too would now undertake legal 
activity. 15 
 
The underground campaign begins 
 
Feeding into the idea that the current plight of the region was only 
temporary, many displaced Poles armed themselves and entered the woods, 
to await what many of them felt was the coming and inevitable war or 
confrontation between east and west.  Such people were joined in this 
process by the remnants of the AK and the deserters from the WP and MO. 
16 By January 1945 the partisan units of the AK in the area were down to a 
few well adapted units led by men such as “Zapora”.   By spring 1945 this 
had massively changed. By the spring there was a partisan group operating 
in virtually every district of the Lublin region.  The statistics on this 
movement are quite impressive.  According to Janusz Wrona an estimated 
40,000 people were in the AK in its various guises during the period 1945-
47. 17 In addition to this, Sławomir Poleszak and Rafał Wnuk estimate that 
during 1945, mainly in the south and east of People’s Poland, there were 
up to 17,200 people in independence partisan units, with a peak of 2,400 
of this number operating in forest partisan units in the woods of 
Lubelszczyzna. 18 
 
From the beginning of February onwards, therefore, it was rare for a day to 
pass in Lubelszczyzna without this resurgent underground clashing with 
the apparatus of the communist administration.  The departure of the Red 
Army meant that the resurgent underground was now able regularly to 
attack and undermine communist forces, such as the MO, that were still 
struggling to recruit.  Below is a list of clashes that took place in 
Lubelszczyzna during the week of 10th–17th February 1945.  It is important 
to state that this does not include all of the clashes recorded in this week, 
but it shows quite clearly how the underground was now attacking and 
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paralysing communist administration in rural areas throughout the 
province.  Equally, this is a list of events from February 1945, but it could 
be from March or April of the same year: 
 
10th February Lubartów county: 
The “Brzoza” unit attacks a government transport and takes 144kg 
of butter. 
11th Lubartów county: 
Partisans from the “Jordan” unit disarmed the local MO post. 
12th Tomaszów Lubelski county: 
Agents of the UB and NKVD surrounded a group of partisans from 
the V Obwód Tomaszów Lubelski in the Palace of Narol.  During the 
fight a few AK soldiers were killed or captured.   Although the total 
losses are not known it is known that after the fight the Soviet 
troops involved ransacked and burnt the palace. 
14th Lubartów county: 
Members of the “Uskok” partisan unit shot and killed nine people in 
the village of Uciekajek. 
15th Lublin county: 
Ten members of an unknown underground unit stole 900 litres of 
spirits. 
Lubartów county: 
“Uskok” unit attacked and vandalised the local MO post and gmina 
building in the village of Ludwinów. 
17th Lublin City:  
Eleven soldiers of the AK manage to escape from the prison in Lublin 
Castle.  Amongst this number are “Kmicic”, “Muller” and “Konrad II”. 
19 
 
During this phase of reconstructing the underground, the Lublin region 
was relatively unusual in that it was able to re-establish its internal 
framework.   According to statistics gathered by Rafał Wnuk and Sławomir 
Poleszak on behalf of the Lublin IPN, between July-December 1944 twenty-
eight partisan units had operated in the territory of Poland.  Of this 
number AK partisan units constituted more than 93 percent with the rest 
being from NSZ units.  Equally of interest is the fact that, of those partisan 
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units, the vast majority were units that had come to the Rzeszów province 
from the cleared eastern territories of what had previously been the Polish 
Second Republic.  The ethnic cleansing of Poles from regions such as the 
Volhynia and Lvov had meant a concentration of partisan forces just within 
the new south-eastern border of People’s Poland.  Nationally partisan units 
had a total strength of 2,500-2,800, meaning that the average unit size was 
around 60-100 partisans.  Yet, during 1945, the number of partisan units 
nationally was to expand massively to 341 units with a total operating 
strength of somewhere between 13,000 to 17,200 partisans.  Around 
6,600-8,700 of these partisans were a part of units that were subordinated 
to the dissolved AK command.  However these numbers were not evenly 
distributed throughout the territory of People’s Poland during 1945.  In the 
west and north of the country, the underground was much smaller than in 
south and eastern areas such as Lubelszczyzna.  This is probably in a large 
part due to the fact that in these areas underground units had been able to 
function in Soviet occupied territory for much longer and had been able to 
adjust their operating structures to suit the demands of the communist 
system.  The largest numbers of partisans were found, as was the case in 
1944, in the Rzeszów province.  Here in 1945 were operating around 3,600-
3,900 partisans.  Second only to Rzeszów in terms of numbers, was 
Lubelszczyzna where around 1,900–2,400 people were operating in 
partisan groups.  What is equally important to mention in the results of 
this statistical analysis is that in Lublin, Rzeszów and Białystok the vast 
majority of these partisan units were subordinated to AK command 
structures.  The Lublin region was home to the largest percentage of units 
that were subordinated to this command with around 72-76% of partisans 
in Lubelszczyzna being a part of this structure. 20 With the exception of the 
three largest areas of activity much of the partisan movement was either 
not fighting as part of a greater organisation, or they were a part of NSZ or 
part of a purely localised force such as the Resistance Movement of the 
Home Army, Ruch Oporu Armii Krajowej (ROAK).   
 
The core units of the AK that had avoided capture and arrest in 
Lubelszczyzna had often stashed their arms in dumps that had served 
them so well before Operation “Tempest” and were waiting for the next 
phase of their struggle.  Forest based units had been ordered to appear to 
 210
disband in order that the NKVD would be put off of their scent. Equally, in 
an atmosphere of population exchanges and repression by the new 
communist authorities, this position was to remain relatively secure in the 
short term.  It was very clear that the Lubelszczyzna AK was continuing to 
grow during the last weeks of the winter of 1944-45.  As Klukowski noted: 
 
17th February 1945 – Saturday: 
Because the German armies are no longer in Polish territory, the 
Home Army is dissolved, but the soldiers must be ready for any call 
to fight again for a free and independent Poland.  So now we witness 
the end of one historical period.  The Home Army has gone into 
history, but we are now beginning a new period of struggle even 
more difficult than the last one and surely a longer one. 
A couple of days ago a briefing of all officers from the Inspectorate 
took place in Krasnobrod.  Major “Wacław”, the current inspector, 
presided.  I do not know any details yet, but the dissolution of the 
Home Army was the main topic.  The Polish underground army is 
still active but will take a new name.  Which name I do not know.  21 
 
It took time for new underground units to form, and for old units to re-
form, then they had to attempt to re-establish contact within a greater 
command framework but by March 1945 several large partisan units had 
re-formed, along with several smaller ones.  In particular, by March the 
“Zapora”, “Podkowa”, “Orlik”, and “Zenon” units were operating once again. 
22  Within weeks of the Soviet advance, Żak and the central command 
began re-establishing the links to the inspectorates that had been ‘burnt’ 
since November.  By February and early March 1945, a centralised ‘AK’ 
command was once again functioning - several weeks after the official 
dissolution of the force. 23 
 
However the existence of this re-established central command under Żak 
was to be very short lived.  On 21st March 1945, the entire leadership of the 
AK in Lublin was arrested after a meeting in Praga, Warsaw.  Under torture 
they revealed that, whilst Okulicki had officially ordered the dissolution of 
the AK, he had also intended that the regional branches should not fully 
disband; in effect the non-communist underground's remit was that they 
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should be prepared for a future struggle against the Communist 
authorities. 24 Present at the meeting were Żak, the regional chief-of-staff 
Jan Kucharczak “Kazimierz”, the chief of unit 1 Major Jerzy Iszkowski 
“Kord”, quartermaster Władysław Pawlicki “Zych”, Zamość inspectorate 
commander Antoni Pstrocki “Wacław”, Chełm inspectorate commander 
Władysław Zalewski “Leśnik” and Puławy inspectorate commander Captain 
Zygmunt Żebracki-Żyłka “Żeliwa”.  25 
 
According to Rafał Wnuk after these arrests at the end of March no effective 
command functioned at Lublin or inspectorate level, but lower down, at 
district or outpost level the underground in Lublin retained its structure in 
many areas.  26 The breakdown of inspectorate level links was, in fact, brief.  
As had happened several times in the province by this time, the immediate 
subordinates of those arrested simply took their place.  In Zamość Marian 
Gołębiewski “Ster”, became inspectorate commander, in Puławy Piotr 
Ignacak “Just”, and in Chełm Franciszek Jarocki “Jadźwing”.  However at 
regional level the command situation was to take over two months to 
resolve.  This was due to the fact that only two members of Żak’s staff had 
avoided arrest in March.  One of them Aleksander Iwanicki  “Achilles”, 
became de facto regional commander until May.  27 
 
During the spring, these former AK soldiers along with the new recruits 
moving into the woods, formed new organisations throughout the region.  
By far the largest successor organisation to the AK in Lubelszczyzna was 
ROAK.  This force was centred in the Zamość, Chełm and Lublin 
inspectorates and represented the bulk of the underground forces at this 
point.  Equally, in Puławy inspectorate former AK bands now named 
themselves the Armed Resistance Movement, Zbrojny Ruch Oporu (ZRO).  In 
Biała Podlaska inspectorate the forces now named themselves the Army of 
Military Self-Defence, Wojskowy Związek Samobrony (WZS).  Equally these 
forces sometimes operated under the names: the Poland Underground 
Army, Podziemna Armia Polska (PAP), the Resistance Movement, Ruch 
Oporu (RO), and the Citizen’s Resistance Movement, Obywatelski Ruch 
Oporu (ORO).  These forces were in essence AK, yet as this force no longer 
existed, the names were to change but the men behind them were to stay 
largely the same. 28 
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Both for reasons of ease of continuity, and for obviously symbolic reasons, 
the successor forces to the AK in Lublin province all followed the rules of 
the officially defunct AK.  After 17th January the AK in Lublin county joined 
ROAK, but this force’s operating procedures remained the same.  29 The 
defining order of RO, order number 1 sent out on 14 th April 1945 was AK in 
its tone, and its outline of the purpose behind the force.  Its members were 
to oppose recruitment to the WP, equally former AK partisan groups were 
ordered to help with materials and the strengthening of other groups, they 
were to organise groups into powerful platoons, organise a bank and 
treasury, report to the region the moves of all PPR members, and, it made 
clear it was to have a similar structure to that of the AK.  30 What is even 
more telling is that in most of the communiqués from these forces, the 
appeals, or the orders were most often made to the ‘soldiers of the AK’, and 
not to the soldiers of RO or ROAK.  Even in an order of 5 th May 1945 from 
the regional command, there were still constant references to men and 
officers as being AK members. 31 
 
In order to reinforce this sense of continuity, and set against the 
propaganda blows dealt to the AK’s cause during the previous six months, 
the underground continued the propaganda work of BiP. The major 
difference in this campaign post-January 1945 was that, with the bulk of 
the Red Army gone and with the improvement in weather conditions, this 
campaign was on a far greater scale.   Throughout the province the BiP 
began publishing propaganda sheets once again in significant numbers. In 
Puławy inspectorate the local BiP published “Głos Wolny” and circulated 
around 250 copies of this newssheet.  This paper had sixty different 
editions the first was produced in July 1945. In addition, Pu ławy BiP 
printed both “Pobudka” and “Nowy Czas”, although their circulation is not 
known.  Also circulated in Puławy were “Na straży” from Zamość 
inspectorate, and “Wiadomości bieżące” and “Zagiew”, which were 
published by the Lublin regional BiP.  32 In the districts of Lubartów and 
Biała Podlaska, the local BiP had been printing “Reduta” from as early as 
October 1944 onwards.  In addition, most of the Lublin region received the 
Zamość inspectorate’s “Nowy Zew” and the “List do marszałka Roli-
Żymierskiego”. 33 These publications were often distributed in the 
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washrooms of the region’s WP barracks, on air force training bases, or were 
circulated amongst AK members to disseminate this information amongst 
their communities.  In addition to these publications, those areas that still 
had radio communications, such as Puławy, which retained two radio sets 
during 1945, would broadcast “Wiadomości Radiowe” news reports to their 
locales.  34 
 
The other aspect to the tactics of this restored underground in Lublin 
province was the growth in the number of attacks on members of the 
communist administration.  Without the same degree of shielding by the 
Red Army, and with the rapid growth in the size of the underground, 
members of the communist administration were increasingly isolated.  
What made things so incredibly problematic for the security forces of the 
communist administration was the basic fact that at no point had they 
been able to disarm the countryside. “Marcin’s” decision to stash his force’s 
weapons at the end of July 1944, coupled with the inevitable availability of 
weapons in an area that had been until recently a war zone, meant that 
even though the security services had managed to seriously weaken the 
human resources of the underground in Lublin by the beginning of 1945, 
they had not taken its weapons.  A good example of how the security forces 
could fail in this can be seen in Lubartów district, where it is estimated 
that from August 1944 til 1947 the SB and MO confiscated in total 799 
weapons in the area; yet during the same period the underground in 
Lubartów possessed around 1,830 weapons.  In addition to the original 
weapons that dated from the area of the German occupation, the 
underground was able to replenish its weapons stocks from a variety of 
sources.  For instance, MO members who were forced to leave their posts 
would have their weapons taken from them; equally there are reports of 
Red Army and Polish Army soldiers selling small arms to the underground.  
In Lubartów, as in much of the Lublin province, the security forces were 
only able to confiscate around half of the AK’s weapons. 35 Once the 
underground started to grow again in the spring, this failure on the part of 
the communists became crucial. 
  
Armed, increasingly re-organised and confident the underground once 
again started to significantly challenge the communist administration – it 
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was unfortunate this only happened six months and 20,000 arrests after 
“Marcin” had assumed it would back in July 1944.  In Pu ławy inspectorate, 
“Just”, the inspectorate commander, set aside special diversionary units to 
disrupt the functioning of the communist administration in the area.  In 
particular, the “Orlik” group performed this role during spring 1945.  In 
Puławy, as in the rest of Lublin, there was a special focus on security and 
intelligence, with “Just” focusing on the work of the BiP in Puławy, yet the 
diversionary groups played an important role in the force’s strategy. In the 
commands given to the various AK successor groups in the region during 
spring 1945, these diversionary groups were to kill or intimidate PPR or MO 
members, weakening the communist administration, whilst simultaneously 
helping to keep their own forces undetected.  By the end of the spring such 
groups were often sizeable, for example in Puławy, the “Orlik” group at its 
height numbered around 500 people when it assembled for action in the 
Stockim Forest on 23rd May 1945.  It was the largest band in the area.  The 
other units in Puławy Inspectorate were mainly in the Kraśnik district 
where one AK unit of 50 soldiers operated alongside several NSZ units of a 
similar size. 36 
 
Thus despite the grandiose statements of intent from the communist 
administration regarding the destruction of the underground, large areas of 
rural Lubelszczyzna were under the control of independence forces at 
night. In many areas the underground was operating quite openly.  In these 
areas, MO stations were often isolated and vulnerable to social pressure 
and violence.  This meant that, in most instances, the underground did not 
have to resort to issuing death penalties against MO members, other 
methods would often suffice.  For example, some MO officers provided the 
local underground with information, or turned a blind eye to their 
activities.  In cases where MO members were causing problems for the 
underground, such men were brought into line through corporal 
punishment, oral or written warnings, or kidnapping.  Sometimes, MO 
members were humiliated in front of the communities that they policed by 
being stripped to their underwear and tied up in the centre of a given 
village.   Another way of weakening MO men who followed their orders was 
to kidnap them and take them to an isolated local church.  When in the 
church they were forced at gun-point, and before God, to renounce their 
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support for the PPR.  The fact that this often worked spoke volumes about 
the nature of the communist system being created in Poland – even the 
police force did not hold ideologically sound atheist beliefs!  Such actions 
meant that the attempts by the communist authorities to enlarge the MO, 
or to increase its influence in these areas, were being constantly 
undermined.  The MO commander in Kraśnik reported at this time that, of 
the area’s seventeen MO posts only four were actually functional.  His 
report states that the other posts had either been destroyed or disarmed by 
local ‘bandits’ who were openly operating in strength. 37  
 
In spring 1945, opposition to the communist administration was 
increasingly effective, and increasingly violent.  One of the most famous 
incidents took place in Hrubieszów.  On 3rd March 1945 local underground 
units carried out a death sentence on a security force member.  In 
response, locally based security troops along with political instructors from 
the local regiment, arrested eight people from their homes or off the streets.  
According to the underground, these people were first tortured and then 
murdered and their corpses then thrown into the Huczwa River.  This awful 
incident was followed up by the underground attempting to assassinate the 
man responsible for issuing the order for the attack, Wincenty Grodek.  A 
ten-year–old boy was sent to his home with a basket containing food, 
flowers, and an explosive device.  When unpacked, the bomb detonated. 38 
Such incidents were happening throughout the province, as the 
underground began to retake control of the countryside at night.  In 
response, several large anti-partisan operations took place during the eight 
months from January-August 1945 in Puławy inspectorate against the AK 
and this was quite typical of Lublin in general.  In Che łm district, between 
the 6th-9th of March a fire-fight outside of the town of Włodawa resulted in 
51 underground partisans being killed.  On 20 th April, in the village of 
Labunek, a further nine underground partisans, along with their 
commander Edward Lachów “Konrad”, were engaged and liquidated.  On 
the 30th a further 67 partisans were killed.  Such fights were taking place 
throughout the province during the spring of 1945. 39  The largest fight in 
Puławy took place near Nałęczów when on 12th May 1945 the NKVD 
engaged the “Szatan” group numbering 65 people with 54 partisans being 
killed.  Another clash took place in the Stockim forest on 23 rd May 1945, 
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when the “Orlik” group was involved in a two-day fight with a joint 
communist force, which resulted in twenty of the eighty partisans being 
killed.  40 
 
Clearly the underground was still operating, and in places it was paralysing 
the administration.  On 25th March, the NKVD arrested a group of the AK 
underground that had been operating in Łódź, central Poland.  Amongst 
their number was Colonel Rudkowski who had only recently been 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the AK's new air force section.  As a 
result of the arrests of even more prominent AK leaders, the NKVD was 
able to find out that even as late as December 1944 the AK in the Łódź 
region had received parachute drops from London; according to 
Prażmowska in that month the AK had been dropped 7,200 dollars in gold, 
66,000 dollars in notes, 80,000 Polish Z łoty and 400,000 Deutsch Marks. 
41 It was against this background of information on the leaders of the 
underground that the communist authorities prepared to act.  The NKVD 
had been pursuing an active policy of arresting members of the 
underground for the past eight months.  This new information, however, 
gave them the pretext on which to wipe out the entire organisation, for the 
new information seemed to confirm that the AK was not only still a fact to 
be reckoned with but, with help from London was preparing to overthrow 
the communist authorities.   
 
The reality of the situation was somewhat different.  The AK was ready to 
talk.  It was at this time that AK commander, Okulicki took the decision to 
meet with NKVD representatives in order to reach an agreement with the 
Soviets.  It is not known who made the first move to suggest the meeting, 
yet what is clear is that both parties had a motive to meet.  Okulicki must 
have felt he was arguing from a position of strength; in exchange for a 
cessation of diversionary activities, he believed that a dialogue could be 
opened with the NKVD.  It seems remarkable that men who had grown to 
be rather familiar with the workings of the Soviet system would think in 
this naïve way.  However the underground still had a strong faith in the 
Anglo-Saxon powers which were after all arguing for the Government-in-
Exile to come to an agreement with the communists in Poland.  Therefore, 
on 27th-28th March virtually the entire leadership of the underground 
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delivered itself to a villa in Pruszków near Warsaw and was arrested.  In 
one swoop the NKVD had captured the heads of the AK, the Delegatura, 
and the RJN.  The Soviets acted completely in character, but perhaps the 
biggest betrayal was that by the Anglo-Saxon powers; aside from one or two 
protests and requests to know the whereabouts of the arrested 
underground leaders, Britain and America did nothing.  It is perfectly 
conceivable that the lack of reaction to the arrests of the Lublin leadership, 
a matter of days before, had assured the NKVD that nothing would be done 
by the west. 
 
Poland’s two main political parties had decided to attempt legalisation, 
Mikołajczyk supported this process and Okulicki had probably started 
talks with the NKVD with this in mind.  The result was arrest, torture and 
ultimately a public show trial in the Soviet Union.   The impact of 
Okulicki’s arrest was not as serious as it might once have been.  Ironically, 
the now mostly fractured nature of the underground at a national level 
made the job of crushing resistance even harder for the NKVD.  Until the 
beginning of 1945, if NKVD operatives were successful in infiltrating and 
destroying an AK command post, it would be likely that the information 
found through torture would enable the NKVD to effectively round up most 
of the AK in that region.  However, from May onwards, when the NKVD 
captured underground activists, it would often mean the exposure of just 
the local command.  The chances were that this meant exposing only a 
relatively small network, just one shard of the underground in the region. 
 
Before attending the meeting with the Soviets in March, General Okulicki 
had appointed Colonel Jan Rzepecki as his deputy.  In April 1945 Rzepecki 
reorganised the networks subordinated to him.  The “Nie” organisation was 
officially liquidated in favour of the Armed Force’s Delegate’s Office at 
Home, Delegatura Sił Zbrojnych na Kraj, (DSZ).  This force was to operate 
only on the soil of post-war Poland, it accepted the supervision of the 
Government-in-Exile but, crucially, it assumed that in the case of the 
establishment of a Western-recognised political executive power centre, the 
force would subjugate themselves to it.  Clearly the new force was to be far 
more independent in nature than its predecessor the AK, far more attuned 
to the existing problems in Poland; it would not just follow a government in 
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London that must have seemed increasingly out of touch and irrelevant to 
the people in Poland. 42 The question of the DSZ command in the Lublin 
region was resolved during a meeting in Warsaw between “Achilles” and 
central DSZ command.  At the meeting it was decided, at the 
recommendation of “Achilles”, that the commander of the Biała Podlaska 
Inspectorate become the new DSZ Lublin commander.  Wilhelm 
Szczepankiewicz “Drugak”, was duly appointed and was to hold this post 
for a further ten months.    According to Rafał Wnuk, this command was 
able to keep links with the Inspectorates and below. 43  
 
What follows below is a list of the partisan units operating in the terrain of 
Lubelszczyzna in early spring 1945: 
 
AK-DSZ Lubelszczyzna 
 
Lublin inspectorate: 
“Zapora” with a strength of around 150 persons, “Uskok” with around 50 
persons, “Jordan” 30-40 persons. 
Chełm inspectorate: 
“Zagloba” around 100 persons, “Wolyniak” 20-30 persons, “Sokół” 20 
persons, “Jastrzebia” around 30 persons, and “Huragan”-“Fali” with 20-30 
persons. 
Puławy inspectorate: 
“Orlik” with around 200 persons. 
Biała Podlaska inspectorate: 
“Zenon” around 150 persons, “Tom” 30-40 persons, “Lot” 20-30 persons, 
and “Kruk” numbering around 20-30 persons. 
Zamość inspectorate: 
“Podkowa” 50-60 persons, “Konrad” 20 persons, “Wir” 40-50 persons, 
“Kostka” around 50 persons, “Mat” 20- 30 persons, “Ciąg” around 50 
persons, and “Wiktor” around 40-50 persons. 
A NSW Unit under the command of “Ojca Jan” numbering around 100 
persons was also operating in Lubelszczyzna and in the area of Rzeszów. 
A NSZ unit under the command of Mieczysław Pazderski “Szary” 
numbering around 100 persons was also active in Lubelszczyzna. 44 
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To address the ongoing threat from the underground, and to reinforce the 
point that no concession would be made, on19 th April the communist 
authorities started to reorganise the WW into the Internal Security Corps, 
Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (KBW).  This force was in effect the 
direct Polish equivalent of the Soviet NKVD.   By May it numbered around 
23,000 and it was given a remit to pacify the countryside.  The new KBW 
was staffed mainly by officers who had recently graduated from training 
schools in the USSR, and it now took over the lead role in the Polish 
authorities’ fight against the underground. 45 
 
According to an underground report the communist security forces 
launched a huge pacification campaign in the areas of Garwolin, Łuków, 
Lubartów and in the city of Zamość no sooner than the KBW had been 
formed.  The report estimates of the numbers arrested were rough, between 
10,000-20,000 arrested, but they clearly point to a huge campaign of 
repression.    In another report it was stated that around 8,000 prisoners 
were being held in Lublin castle in the month of April. 46 Equally it is 
known that the NKVD was still operating the large internment camp at 
Skrobów, near Lubartów. 47 This camp, from April onwards was operating 
primarily as a holding centre for Volksdeutsch, although many from the 
Polish underground were to also end up there.   
 
However, internal reports on Lubelszczyzna from this period almost 
constantly report the fact that across the region, the population was either 
hostile or disloyal to their government. 48 Without popular legitimacy, the 
Communist authorities found that when one partisan band was destroyed, 
another would spring up in the same area only weeks later.  For example 
the NKVD had deported or arrested 10,000 AK members in Lubelszczyzna, 
and the special military courts of the Polish communist government had 
passed 150 death sentences on AK members between July 1944-April 1945 
49 and yet the regime was no more secure in the remote regions of Lublin 
than it had been back in August 1944, with the newly reformed 
independence underground growing in number once again. 50 A pattern 
had developed whereby NKVD and UB units would sweep through an area 
to bring it under control, only for it to return to the underground when they 
left.  Of course MO units stationed in outlying areas were the most 
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vulnerable but all branches of the security forces were vulnerable, in 
differing ways, to such pressure.  Dr Klukowski talks about these events in 
the forests of the south: 
 
6th April 1945 – Friday: 
 
One officer and two cadets who had come for quota deliveries to 
Szczebrzeszyn were disarmed today.  As it happened to them for a 
second time they do not want to go back to their formation and are 
going to stay here “privately”.  Yesterday in Brody the “boys” also 
disarmed a soldier who was walking by himself near the railway 
station.  Such disarmament of Polish soldiers and officers has 
become the daily routine for now.  The same with desertions.  Many 
deserters are hiding in the villages.  This causes big trouble for the 
villagers because of retaliations, but they still help.  One has to 
admit that there are some villages that have not changed their 
stance on this matter.  Let’s take Kawenczyn.  There are still many 
“forest people” as there were under the German occupation.  
Everyone knows who keeps who, and they constantly remain on 
alert because a raid may begin at any moment, as has happened so 
many times before. 51 
 
However the military and security forces ranged against this renewed 
underground movement were still considerable, despite the advance of the 
Red Army in January.  It is also noteworthy how, even at this relatively late 
stage in the imposition of communist rule in Poland, and despite the 
creation of forces such as the KBW, the destruction of the anti-communist 
underground was still primarily in the hands of the Soviet security forces.  
Although the repressive apparatus of a Polish communist state had been 
created very quickly in 1944, even by mid-1945 the basic fact that the 
communist administration was reliant on the presence of huge NKVD 
numbers was clear.  In many rural areas the Polish communist authorities 
were still forced to create ad hoc groups to fight the underground.  These 
were often composed of WW/KBW, Polish Army, UB, MO and members of 
the PPR. For example operations against partisans in Lublin county during 
1945 were led by the following security forces- Lublin province UB 6 
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operations led, Lublin county UB 28, MO 3, WP and KBW 11, MO and Red 
Army 1, UB and Red Army 4, UB and WP 3, MO and WP 1, UB and MO 2, 
UB, WP and Red Army 3, Lublin province UB 1 and Lublin county UB 1.  52 
Even the arrest lists of these operations show how the security forces were 
struggling to identify and remove members of the underground.  In Lublin 
county in 1945 these operations killed only 125 underground members, 
injured 16, and arrested 34, yet a huge 388 were arrested for only being 
suspected of AK membership.  53 Even with these combined groups the 
Polish communists were still being assisted by large NKVD units across the 
region.  54 
 
In Włodawa district Polish security forces trapped the “Zagloba” partisan 
unit in a marsh and reported the entire force had drowned.    However, 
according to the research of Anna Kister, this unit continued to fight until 
the amnesty in August 1945. 55  Were the security forces mistaken, or did 
they exaggerate their success?  The existing documentary material 
available makes it difficult to assess the success of Polish security forces in 
dealing with the underground threat in the province.  The need to 
exaggerate successes speaks volumes for the fragility of their position. 
 
This meant that, as the Second World War neared its end, the Soviet 
military commitment to Poland had to be stepped up yet again.  By mid-
1945 the NKVD had fifteen internal army regiments operating in the 
territory of Lublin Poland, representing 43 percent of all the NKVD forces in 
Eastern Europe at this time; even after the final defeat of Germany and the 
establishment of a Soviet held zone in that country, there were only ten 
NKVD internal army regiments stationed there.  In total, the NKVD had 
stationed in Lublin Poland, in a country that was part of the anti-Nazi 
alliance, around 35,000 men.  This force was responsible for sealing the 
borders, fighting the anti-communist underground and even for the 
personal security of the communist leadership. 56  A NKVD report on the 
situation in Poland given during May 1945 is most telling in this respect.  It 
shows how the communist administration in the regions of Lublin, 
Rzeszów, Warsaw and Kraków were paralysed by attacks by the non-
communist underground. 57 The report also appealed for a further five 
NKVD regiments to be sent in order to deal with the problem.  The fact that 
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partisan units were operating in every inspectorate of the region meant that 
communist government across the region was being seriously challenged.  
The AK’s success in infiltrating the police and army prompted the 
deployment in Lubelszczyzna of seven Soviet regiments and a motorised 
battalion, to reinforce the presence of the 64th NKVD Internal Regiment.  
The 98th NKVD Internal Regiment was also based in the town of 
Hrubieszów to the east of the province. 58 Poland was now a vital bridge 
between the Soviet Union and the remnants of Nazi Germany.  Once 
Germany surrendered, the importance of Poland strategically was to 
continue. As Gomułka told the May PPR plenum, Polish communists would 
have been unable to ‘fight reaction’ without Soviet support. 59  
 
The decision to commit such huge numbers of Soviet security forces to 
Poland clearly showed Stalin’s determination to make Poland a compliant 
satellite state.  The Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact that was signed by 
Osóbka-Morawski and Stalin on 21st April 1945 reinforced the point and 
dismayed those struggling for a non-communist Poland.  Whilst not 
internationally recognised in the West, this pact highlighted the Soviet 
Union’s determination to have a veto over the reconstruction of post-war 
Poland.  The announcement of the pact was timed in order to pre-empt the 
coming discussions on Poland at the first conference of the United Nations 
in San Francisco. 60  The pact was to last for twenty years meaning in 
practice that Poland was to be a Soviet dominated satellite state for years to 
come.  As the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas recalled of a conversation 
with Stalin in 1944, it is that: 
 
This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also 
imposes on it his social system.  Everyone imposes his own system 
as far as his army can reach.  It cannot be otherwise.  61 
 
Saying this was one thing, implementing it another.  To the NKVD 
operating in Poland in 1945, the underground must have seemed like a 
hydra.  They could cut off as many of its ‘heads’ as they liked but until the 
basic problem of legitimacy was solved, the underground would always 
recruit anew.  Yet this was the problem how could a system, such as the 
Soviet one, that was based on violence achieve ‘legitimacy’.  It would do so 
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by continuing its tried and tested method of arrests, shootings, and 
deportations, until the people themselves were tired of resisting.  But by 
summer 1945 there was little sign that this was being achieved. 
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Chapter 6 
 
June 1945-December 1947 
 
Afterword and Conclusions 
 
 
When the Second World War in Europe finally came to an end 
with the fall of Berlin in May 1945 the groups operating against 
the communist government of People’s Poland were still growing.  
A grass roots movement of those avoiding the UB and NKVD, 
refugees, the politically motivated, and deserters from the People’s 
Army had helped to swell the number of people in the woods of the 
Lublin province.  The promise held out by the formation of the 
provincial Government of National Unity did not last long.  In 
August Mikołajczyk left the government and the underground 
made its third and final attempt to offer centrally organised 
resistance. Freedom and independence, Wolność i Niezawisłość 
(WiN), was created to support Mikołajczyk’s opposition in its 
attempt to prepare for the elections promised at the meetings of 
the ‘Big Three’.  However, despite the fact that the organisation 
was able to survive until those elections, it was not able to ensure 
the success of the democratic parties.   Once the rigged elections 
had taken place Stalin no longer needed to pay any lip service to 
the west on Poland.  Within a year of their outcome, Mikolajczyk 
had been exiled and the underground snuffed out.  
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Amnesty 
 
The discussions in Moscow that had proceeded the agreement 
establishing the Provisional Government of National Unity had 
been attended by Mikołajczyk at Churchill’s prompting.  They had 
been timed to take place at the same time as the trial of Okulicki 
and the sixteen captured underground leaders.  1 When the new 
government’s composition was announced on 28th June 1945, 
seventeen Ministerial posts were taken by communists or by 
people subordinated to the PPR; Mikołajczyk became Deputy 
Prime Minister and members of his Peasant Party took a further 
three, albeit minor, positions in the new government. 2 The work of 
this new government was given international approval at the 
Potsdam Conference that took place just outside the German 
capital from 17th July-2nd August, an assembly that also 
recognised Poland’s eastern border and gave provisional 
recognition to its western border.  With the defeat of Nazism, and 
the formation of a Polish government that included Mikołajczyk 
and other democratic members, the ‘Polish question’ was 
effectively settled for the Anglo-Saxon powers.  3 Members of the 
underground in Lublin were once again listening to such 
declarations, but by this late stage their faith in the Anglo-Saxons 
and politicians from the Government-in–Exile was much weaker 
than it had once been. 4 
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Warsaw July 1945, Mikołajczyk back in Poland 
(A.G. Kister, Studium Zniewalania; Walka aparatu bezpieczeństwa 
z polskim zbrojnym podziemiem niepodległościowym na 
Lubelszczyźnie 1944-1947, Krakow 2005) 
 
Once this new government was recognised by the USA and Great 
Britain in July, it no longer made sense for the leaders of the 
underground in Poland to maintain its current stance which 
linked them to a Government-in-Exile that no longer had 
international recognition.  An appraisal of the new situation was 
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made by members of the DSZ command in July, and its decision 
reflected the new realities that the force faced: 
 
A way out of the current impasse concerning the Home 
Army is possible only by means of a) severing ties with the 
London leadership and admitting its bankruptcy; b) 
confirming by way of an order that armed conflict within 
the country in the present situation is useless and weakens 
the nation; c) confirming also that units remaining in the 
forests are units which have been demoralised by the war 
(bandits) or units having their own social or political aims 
having nothing to do with the Home Army; d) a summons to 
work on various fronts in the name of the ideals of freedom 
and independence. 5 
 
Rzepecki and his officers, at this point, feared that the end result 
of continued military activities would be the increasing 
polarisation of the underground and its uncoupling from the 
people.  The liquidation of DSZ was meant to empty the forests 
and to change illegal activity into legal activity, thus supporting 
Mikołajczyk and the non-communists in the new government. On 
6th July therefore the Council of National Unity was dissolved and 
on 6th August the Delegatura ceased to exist.  Inevitably the 
military wing of the resistance would also have to be reoriented 
towards the new conditions. 6 Yet despite the hopes of central 
command, the dissolution of DSZ did not empty the forests, and it 
did not end the fighting or indeed the will and need to fight.  What 
the dissolution did do was to bring to an end the notion of an 
underground linked to the western alliance and to the government 
in London.   
 
One of the key early decisions of the Provisional Government of 
National Unity was to introduce an amnesty for those members of 
 229 
the underground who left the forests.  The amnesty was enacted 
by a Decree of the Council of Ministers on 2nd August and came 
into force for a month from 21st August.  It was an attempt by the 
government to draw the teeth of the underground by using both 
political means and repression; for it took place against a 
backdrop of sweeping anti-partisan operations throughout the 
Lublin region.  7 The amnesty was presented as being an integral 
part of the process of free elections agreed to at the Yalta 
Conference, as part of a process to involve non-communist parties 
in the government of an independent Poland.  Before liquidating 
itself, the DSZ regional command in Lublin had ordered its troops 
to take part in this process, that at the agreed time, its forces 
should hand in its weapons to the Red Army or Militia at agreed 
places.   The order stated that the Red Army would guarantee 
their immunity. 8  
 
The response to the amnesty was mixed.  Whilst some followed the 
order, other members of the underground, after being hunted for 
over a year, would never trust any Soviet or communist guarantee. 
One area that did follow the order to adhere to the terms of the 
amnesty was the Lublin county district.  On 13th July 1945 the 
Lublin county district Inspector “Jung” ordered the reduction of 
his staff to just essential operations.  From this point onwards, the 
staff in the Lublin county district was reduced to the following: 
Commander “Halicz”, Communications officer “Figus”, Training 
officer “Leszek”, Intelligence officer “Wilhelm”.  9 “Halicz” then 
ordered all members of his force to cease activities on 15th October 
and to hand in their weapons to the MO and UB in the area.  As a 
result of this, 290 ‘AK’ members in this region handed themselves 
into the authorities.  10 Yet this decision to hand in weapons and 
return to ‘legal life’ was in contrast to the decision of the Lublin 
city commander.  Up until the amnesty, the Lublin city DSZ had 
continued to operate according to the rules of the AK, thereafter it 
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changed its operating procedures.  As late as 24th October 1945 
the Lublin city district commander Franciszek Abraszewski 
“Borut” formally decided against the amnesty commanding his 
troops that: ‘The fight does not end… In place intensify our work 
through observing members of the occupying security forces and 
liquidating the most dangerous enemy agents.’ 11 Using the word 
‘fight’ to describe the work of a force which, at a national level was 
trying to re-orientate its efforts towards the support of peaceful 
elections, speaks volumes about how many among the 
underground’s rank and file actually felt.  As a result of this 
stance, the officers of DSZ in Lublin city did not reveal themselves 
at the amnesty.  The Lublin City force simply downsized using a 
smaller staff and a controlled shut down of most existing safe 
houses and flats in the city.  12 However, despite the fact that the 
district commander ordered against it, still around an estimated 
third of the Lublin city AK abandoned the underground and 
accepted the amnesty.  13 
 
This scenario was repeated across the region, with a core of the 
underground preparing to continue the fight, or at least to 
continue to remain undercover until the situation became clearer.  
For example, whilst in Puławy inspectorate less than fifty ‘AK’ 
members responded to the amnesty, the lion’s share of the 
underground was to continue the struggle. 14 Years of fighting and 
arrests had left their mark on the underground; it had massively 
weakened its structure and trapped its surviving members into a 
vicious circle of violence.  Dr Klukowski met up with members of 
the forest based units in his area during the summer of 1945, 
after which he reflected: 
 
I noticed that the years of conspiracy, the underground life, 
and specific conditions of their work have left a peculiar 
stamp on these men.  They live mostly in a relatively limited 
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world, they see only underground fighting, they are 
removed from normal social life, most of them are 
conceited, self-confident, some suffer from megalomania.  
They regard themselves as idealistic messengers, ready to 
despise and push around anyone who is not part of their 
conspiracy.  They are ready to act, fanatics of a kind, ready 
to fight out situations to problems, people of dulled 
sensitivity toward the acts of violence and illegality they 
command, for instance, various expropriations, decisions 
regarding the liquidation of dangerous people, etc.  At the 
same time they are people willing to sacrifice, risking their 
lives, being pursued, persecuted, and searched, without a 
home of their own for years, leading a wandering existence, 
often dirty and lice-infested, without shelter.  They have one 
aim in view, the final victory, in which they believe 
fanatically.  There are many things about them that shock 
and irritate me, but in spite of that I feel better than 
anywhere else among these crazy partisans.  15 
 
Five years of German occupation and one year of the Soviet 
‘second occupation’ had turned “Marcin’s” well-ordered and well-
equipped underground army into a loose grouping of bands, most 
of whom knew nothing more than perpetual warfare.  By the 
middle of 1945 such men often could not and would not come out 
of conspiracy, despite the intentions of their leaders. 
 
 
Whilst in Lubelszczyzna the majority of partisan units operating 
during this civil war were part of WiN, 16 the NSZ was the second 
largest force operating during the civil war in Lubelszczyzna.  Yet 
the NSZ had still been operating primarily in the Holy Cross 
Mountains area in the far south of People’s Poland, and were in 
effect a spent force by the end of 1945.  Unlike the AK command 
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the NSZ had never been prepared to work with the Soviets.  The 
increasingly desperate and high profile nature of NSZ campaigns 
helped to further justify the Soviet repression of AK bands who 
were tarred with the same ‘fascist’ brush.  Whilst AK-NSZ relations 
during this period were to remain in most instances cordial, they 
were to operate as separate forces throughout the civil war.   The 
NSZ was in effect a disparate number of small bands, but its 
forces operating in Lubelszczyzna were still relatively large, in 
particular in areas such as Włodawa.  They were a significant 
nuisance to the local communist authorities, with the key stage of 
the struggle between the NSZ and the communist authorities 
taking place during June 1945.  On10th June an assault group of 
the NKVD were able to surround one of the area’s largest NSZ 
groups under the command of Major Mieczysław Pazderski, 
“Szary”.  The NKVD surrounded the group in the village of Huca 
and the subsequent fire-fight resulted in the village being set 
alight and many of the villagers being killed.  The “Szary” unit was 
destroyed in this action, and the NKVD unit involved went on to 
track, liquidate and attempt to clear the province of the NSZ.  
They were not able to eradicate this force completely, but by 20th 
June they had killed 200 partisans.  In the course of this action 
the units under the command of “Szary”, Bolesław Skulimowski 
“Sokół”, and Zbigniew Góra “Jack”, were destroyed in these 
actions with many in these units simply being shot on the spot.  17 
 
Freedom and Independence 
 
One reason why underground groups were uncertain whether or 
not to accept the amnesty was Mikołajczyk’s decision to leave the 
Provisional Government of National Unity, thus seriously 
weakening its claim to represent the whole nation.  After a stormy 
visit to Moscow in mid-August, at which he felt Stalin had duped 
him, Mikołajczyk resigned as Deputy Premier.  On 2nd September 
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1945 Freedom and Independence, Wolność i Niezawisłość (WiN), 
was created as the last attempt to organise centrally the 
underground resistance to a total communist takeover.  WiN’s 
founders assumed that it was to be a temporary organisation. 
Ultimately WiN was to exist in order to support the non-
communist parties at the free elections for the new government.  
After this, it was originally intended to be dissolved.  As a part of 
this process it ordered that the military nomenclature used up 
until then was to be changed i.e. commanders now became 
presidents.  However, in Lubelszczyzna as in other areas the 
existence of large partisan units meant that this was not followed 
and the WiN underground was to remain consistently militaristic 
in its nature.  However, these military actions were not seen by 
the organisation as being essentially aggressive in nature.  WiN 
units in the region argued that they were taking part in defensive 
actions, the struggle was to preserve rather than to defeat.  
Members of these forces even considered actions that seemed 
aggressive such as attacks on MO stations or breaking colleagues 
out of jail, as acts of defence.18  
  
Individual commands made their own decisions regarding their 
policy towards the Soviets, and the formation of WiN in effect 
reflected this reality.  
 
The size of WiN was considerable.  Janusz Wrona gives the 
statistic that between 1945-1947 an estimated 25-40,000 people 
were members of WiN in Lubelszczyzna.  19 The civil war that it 
engaged in with the security services was not a war of pitched 
battles, rather it was essentially a period of tit for tat killings - a 
MO post would be destroyed by groups claiming to be a part of 
WiN and the security forces would retaliate with a sweep of the 
area.  Whilst the interrogations in Lublin had been harsh ever 
since the Soviets arrival in the province, during the period of the 
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civil war, reprisals and interrogations reached a new level of 
barbarity.  According to an underground newspaper in the 
province dated July 1945, on average twenty prisoners per week 
were dying as a result of injuries inflicted during interrogation in 
Lublin Castle. 20 One such infamous interrogation took place in 
Lublin during September 1945.  Barbara Nagajewicz-Woś 
“Krystyna” was a member of Major Heronim Dekutowski’s 
“Zapora”, WiN unit.  She was captured, tortured for three weeks 
and then sentenced to ten years in gaol. What follows is an 
account of her interrogation in Lublin: 
 
This was a terrible night. She was beaten. She screamed…. 
Investigating officer Maksymiuk beat her with a wire-tipped 
pole.  He threw “Krysia” over a chair, pulled up her skirt, 
and whipped her. Then she was prostrated on the floor and 
the torturers poured cold water into her nose.  She lost 
consciousness several times.  ‘Will you talk?’ they asked her 
when she opened her eyes. She kept silent. ‘Whip her some 
more!’ Maksimiuk yelled. She was thrown back into her cell 
at 7:00am. She was completely covered in blood…. The 
beating and torture did not help. “Krysia” kept completely 
silent. 21 
 
Anti-partisan operations continued.  In Kraśnik district, the NKVD 
and UB launched a sweeping action in February 1946 during 
which many people were arrested, detained and tortured on 
trumped up charges.  Between 1944 and 1947 in Lublin county 
district there were 161 large operations mounted by the security 
forces.  In these operations 699 suspects were held, although the 
groups involved numbered from 3-300 people.  22 In total 472 ‘AK’ 
members from Lublin county district were arrested during this 
period, of whom around 290 AK members were taken after the 
1945 amnesty; 53 had been arrested before the amnesty.  Records 
show that 70 were interned in the USSR, 11 were killed in 
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‘accidental clashes’, and that 48 of those arrested were 
interrogated but not sentenced.  23 
 
The standard method of interrogation was for water to be pored 
into a victim’s nose.  Another was for a victim to be held down on 
a table: one officer would sit on the victim’s head, the other on his 
back; a third officer would whip the soles of the victim’s feet until 
walking was impossible.  24 WiN had been formed to support the 
democratic parties until the promised elections, fighting in the 
woods to protect those whose electoral success would surely bring 
an end to Poland’s trials.  25 But when the elections were held in 
January 1947 they were rigged. 26 
 
A new amnesty was then declared on 22nd February 1947 which 
was to last until 25th April the same year. 27 This succeeded in 
neutralising many of the remaining groups in the forests; in 
Lubartów all of the district’s 85 WiN members handed themselves 
in.  28 Hand in hand with this, the force was hit by several arrests 
of its leadership at national level and whilst the Lublin leadership 
was to avoid arrest until 1947, by the beginning of that year the 
underground had been crushed by the NKVD and Polish security 
forces. 29 By the end of the year, even the most successful partisan 
leaders had been captured.   In Lublin the last partisan was not 
shot until the 1960’s, but the symbolic end of the struggle came 
when the UB finally captured Major Hieronim Dekutowski 
“Zapora” in autumn 1947.  He had been fighting since 1939 and 
had been awarded Poland’s most coveted Virtuti Militari Cross.  
“Zapora” was horrifically tortured, he had had his teeth knocked 
out, his nose, hands and ribs broken and his fingernails pulled 
out.  He was finally executed on 7th March 1949.  By the end of 
1947 meaningful resistance was at an end both in government 
and in the forests.  The fact that Mikołajczyk was forced into exile 
at the end of October 1947 was symptomatic of how successful 
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the communists had been in strangling the ‘democracy’ that had 
been effectively promised in the Yalta declarations. 30 
 
            The experience of Lublin  
 
The Soviet and German occupations of south-east Poland in 1939 
had presented Poles with the grindingly familiar dilemma of 
occupation.  The questions that had arisen after 1794 once again 
resurfaced, but this time the harsh nature of the Nazi occupation 
threatened the very future existence of the Polish people.  The 
extremity of Nazi repression therefore created a unique unity 
amongst the nation.  Nationalist, communist, right wing or 
moderate had seen the necessity of fighting the German occupier.  
In Lublin, an ethnic war and the mass deportations from the 
south had helped to create the AK Lublin underground. 
 
Yet even with this ‘unity’, there were many signs of division in the 
Polish ‘front’.  During the spring of 1944 NSZ, AL and AK forces 
had all been involved, to varying degrees in fratricidal fighting.  
The forces of the underground in Poland, as an arm of the exiled 
government, were ultimately to reflect the nature of that 
government; it was a resistance coalition that represented a cross 
section of Polish politics and society and it was one which suffered 
from significant divisions.  Throughout the period of the German 
occupation the original core of the underground had attempted to 
create a coalition in the homeland that would reflect the 
government in London.  This was a task that had varying levels of 
success.  The AK after all was a military force that was manned by 
many of the pre war Polish Army and was therefore linked in the 
minds of many in the Peasant and Nationalist camps to the 
militarization of Poland during the late 1930s.  This meant that 
the initial mistrust of the ‘officer class’ of the AK was to never 
really go away.  It was often placed in the background until the 
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enemy, the Germans, had been defeated.  Therefore, groups that 
were allied to the main AK, such as NOW or BCh, were not always 
absorbed and even when they were questions of weapons and 
command positions were to cause tension.  Yet the key issue in 
the build up to liberation was the question of the Soviets and how 
the homeland forces should react to them both during and 
immediately after the period of liberation.  Such questions, as 
preparations for an uprising in the homeland began, only 
complicated further the existing tensions between the new Prime 
Minister Mikołajczyk and the Commander-in-Chief Sosnkowski.  
Such tensions and divisions impacted down the chain of 
command, to the extent that both Bór-Komorowski and regional 
commanders such as “Marcin” were to modify Operation 
“Tempest”.  “Marcin’s” decision to create a shadow command 
showed both his distrust of the Soviets and his concerns about 
the policy of his Government.  Therefore, the start of “Tempest” 
during the summer of 1944 simply served to highlight these 
problems, as it exposed differences in approach both within the 
Government-in-Exile and between London and the AK in Warsaw 
and Lublin. 
 
At the moment of liberation, the AK did fight and did play the role 
that their government requested of them.  They launched 
diversionary attacks across the province meaning that AK soldiers 
were the first to take the city centre of Lublin, and played their 
part in the liberation of countless other towns and villages across 
the province.  In the process of this some units fought alongside 
Soviet forces, and shared intelligence information with them.  One 
of the most important aspects of Operation “Tempest” in Lublin 
lay in the decision of “Marcin” to hand in his force’s weapons and 
to disperse his troops.  This decision was a result of both his own 
personal experiences and an order from central command.  The 
order meant that much of the AK in Lublin was to avoid the initial 
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wave of NKVD arrests.  Behind his decision lay a clear strategy; by 
dispersing his forces the core of the AK in Lublin could be 
preserved, it could weather the initial storm.  In July 1944 it 
seemed perfectly feasible that the Red Army would continue its 
advance through Poland and that the current situation would not 
last for long.  In the great ‘Krakow’ tradition of resistance, the AK 
would preserve its manpower and simply wait, boycotting the 
Berling Army forcing the new administration into crisis. 
 
Yet the disclosure policy was disastrous for those interested in the 
return of the Government-in-Exile to Poland.  Within hours, or at 
best days, the Delegatura officers were removed from their 
governmental roles and the bulk of the region’s best partisan units 
were delivered over to the Soviets.  Thousands of AK soldiers and 
Delegatura men would offer themselves into the clutches of the 
NKVD whilst assisting the advance of the Red Army.   But, by the 
end of Operation “Tempest” in Lublin after the arrests of 
thousands of AK men, the core of the force, led by officers and 
NCOs who had avoided capture were able to return to their 
homes.  In fact, only a fraction of the weapons that the AK had 
taken from the Germans were handed to the Soviets.  This meant 
that, despite the massive setback of the post Operation “Tempest” 
era, a core, armed, and well structured underground still existed.  
What destroyed this attempt to preserve the AK in Lublin was the 
halting of the eastern front for five months.  This meant that 2.2 
million Soviets were operating in the areas of Poland in which the 
AK had been at its strongest.  Lublin, Vilna, Radom, Volhynia and 
Białystock were amongst the AK’s strongest regional commands 
and they were all behind the front line by September 1944.   
 
Whether the Warsaw Uprising prompted this halt is a question for 
another thesis but the launching of the uprising certainly did not 
help the attempts of the Lublin AK to weather the storm. Given the 
desperate situation that the Poles were faced with in 1944 it would 
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have been a negation of their national character not to have risen 
up.  Yet the need to prove oneself by taking up arms against an 
enemy was not just a Polish trait, the bravery of Spanish fighters 
in their civil war amazed foreign commentators as did the bravery 
of British Tommys at the Somme.  The need for the individual to 
fight and die for one’s country, in an often hopeless situation, is 
still a trait of western culture and it is somewhat myopic, 
therefore, to criticize the AK command in Warsaw for its romantic 
Polish decision.  Had they not risen up then communist charges 
that the AK were refusing to fight, that they had been dropped in 
by the Imperialists just for the sake of appearances would have 
seemed far more valid.  What the decision to stage an uprising did 
do, however, was to hasten the fate of those in the underground, 
both in the capital and to the east.  Equally, the uprising in 
Warsaw made huge demands on the men that had avoided the 
first wave of arrests in Lublin.  Across the region, area commands 
and individual units held discussions on whether to help their 
comrades in the capital.  In the event many of them did go and 
merely walked into Soviet forces.  The Uprising in the capital was 
to have a huge impact on the AK in Lubelszczyzna – for it was to 
provoke new waves of arrests by the NKVD.  This, allied with the 
fact that the Warsaw Uprising meant an unexpected halt of the 
eastern front for nearly six months, produced a situation in which 
“Marcin’s” idea of weathering the storm was severely tested.  This 
process of weakening the ties of the underground was 
compounded by the Government-in-Exile’s decision not to send 
clear and consistent orders to the province. 
 
Even so, the underground that remained, much weakened though 
it was, was able to retain its structure and to redirect some of its 
activities.  Due to the early weakness and division of the PKWN, 
AK forces were able to penetrate many of the new structures of the 
fledgling administration, including even the security services.  The 
PKWN’s early attempts to reach out to elements of the 
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underground did not have the immediate effects that they hoped 
for.  Rather, as the Uprising in Warsaw continued without serious 
Soviet help the people of the province became increasingly 
polarised.   Equally, it took the NKVD in the province time to 
establish their base, to extend their intelligence networks and to 
familiarise themselves with the whole of the region.  As a result, 
during the first few months of the Soviet presence in the region 
the NKVD were not able to cut off AK radio communications, nor 
destroy its command networks in Lublin.  By the end of the period 
of the Warsaw Uprising, the AK in Lublin was still operating.  
Ultimately the period of the Warsaw Uprising was to be a crucial 
one in the history of the AK, not just for the fighters in Warsaw, 
but for their compatriots in Lublin.  The period of the Warsaw 
Uprising in Lublin meant units regrouping and marching into 
Soviet blockades, sporadic clampdowns during the course of the 
uprising and mass repression after its failure.   
 
Ultimately it was the mass repression in the aftermath of the 
Warsaw Uprising that fatally weakened the Lublin underground as 
an organised, coherent entity.  In many senses the crucial period 
for the AK in Lublin was the one from July until November 1944.  
In this five-month period, the people who had faithfully fulfilled 
the orders of the Government-in-Exile were to have that faith 
majorly shaken. The alliance of the underground in the area had 
been an often difficult one but after months of silence from 
London, the failure of the Warsaw Uprising and the Moscow talks, 
this alliance began to collapse.  Once this began, against the 
backdrop of mass arrests and the increasing numbers of Soviet 
and Polish security troops, the process developed an unstoppable 
momentum. 
 
Therefore, by the October of 1944, what remained of the AK’s 
command core was left in tatters.  From the ashes of this defeat 
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was to come a change of direction for the organisation.  With Bór-
Komorowski a German prisoner, his deputy Okulicki took the 
decision many in Lublin had been waiting for impatiently and 
identified the Soviet Union as the main threat to the Polish nation.  
Further down the command structure, in the Lublin region, the 
AK’s uncertainty continued as in Moscow talks unfolded between 
Stalin and Mikołajczyk against a backdrop of increased mass 
repression by the agencies of the Soviet Union and PKWN.  This 
mixture of repression and confusion meant that this period was to 
witness the growth of fractures within the underground.  Some 
underground members, after Warsaw, and after the failure of the 
Moscow talks, were starting to question the logic of continued 
activity after five long years of war.  The PKWN was, after all, not 
like the General-Government that it had replaced.  For all the talk 
of a ‘second occupation’, the PKWN was not attempting to destroy 
the Polish nation, rather it was using patriotism and the promise 
of land to appeal to the people.  The reopening of the Catholic 
University in Lublin, children being encouraged to wave Red and 
White flags, and the enforced transfer of the Ukrainian population 
from the south-east of the region all were starting to have an 
effect. 
 
Yet despite these first stirrings of support, the PKWN still 
struggled throughout 1944 to create an effective administration 
that could survive once the Red Army resumed its advance to the 
west.  The expansion of the armed forces and the police had 
meant that hundreds of politically unreliable people were 
absorbed into the PKWN’s structure during these first months, 
something that was evident in the mass desertions from the Polish 
Army during this period.  After Warsaw, the communist 
authorities’ response to this weakness was mass repression.  The 
growing strength of the UB was supplemented by nearly 9,000 
NKVD troops in Lublin. In Lubelszczyzna the period in which large 
areas of the province had remained beyond the reach of the NKVD 
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was ending – by October they had reconnoitred the province and 
were beginning to use the information given to them by their 
growing spy network.  Whilst the increase in support for the 
PKWN was slow, it had recruited enough men (often via blackmail 
or threats) to enable its security forces to massively undermine the 
underground.  The underground was not destroyed in 1944, nor 
did the PKWN overcome its basic problem of legitimacy; what the 
communists were able to do in the autumn of 1944 was to destroy 
the internal fabric of resistance to them.  Between October and 
November 1944, Lublin was witness to a massive sweeping 
campaign of terror that brought the underground to its knees 
without destroying it completely.  Without a functioning central 
command and increasingly cut adrift from the outside world, 
individual and district AK commands continued their operations 
on into 1945.   
 
The imposition of a communist regime also posed different 
questions for a force whose structure had been formed to meet the 
demands of the German occupation.  An alliance that had been 
weak in areas would become untenable under a ‘second 
occupation’ in which the future of the nation itself was not under 
threat.  Żak’s August orders to create groups to hamper the work 
of the PKWN contrasted violently with the Biłgoraj BCh’s decision 
to work with the new PKWN just a couple of months later – the 
fragile alliance was clearly starting to crumble by the end of 1944.  
Therefore, between Okulicki’s new post-Warsaw line and the 
PKWN’s Defence of the State decree, lay many different reactions 
to the policies of the Soviets in Lublin.  Over-ridingly, the majority 
swung towards the non-communist forces but this support was 
often varied.  After years of horrific occupation, in which the Poles 
faced annihilation, continued repression now came hand in hand 
with patriotic book days and the creation of new universities in 
the region.  The Soviets did not want to wipe the Poles off the face 
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of the earth, they only wanted to force a communist 
administration on them.  The many shades of response to this fact 
meant that the sort of intricate, alliance-based structure created 
during the German occupation was increasingly in danger.  The 
failures of the diplomacy of the London Government and the 
uprising in the capital greatly exasperated this problem.  Set 
against a determined and ruthless adversary these weaknesses 
were exploited and much of the underground destroyed in the 
winter of 1944-1945.   
 
Yet, as a result of the command’s actions during August 1944, the 
Lublin AK was able to hamper the attempts of the communists to 
build a people’s state. Continuing organised resistance meant that 
deserters from the People’s Army or MO had an alternative force to 
turn to, providing a focus and a much-needed source of hope for 
many people in the province.  This meant that the infiltration of 
the MO and WP could be directed, at least in the summer of 1944 
and early autumn of that year. Also it must be considered that the 
presence of an organised AK force, with popular support, existing 
as it did in the cockpit of Communist Poland affected the policies 
of that body. “Marcin” and his successors ordered their men to not 
join the WP, to not help the PKWN in any way.  This was 
undoubtedly a factor in the prolonged inability of this body to form 
an effective government that was not reliant on Soviet military 
might.  The success of this AK policy gives a clear idea of how 
effective the strategy of weathering the storm could have been 
under different circumstances. It can be said that the presence 
and policies of the Lublin AK post August 1944 had a strong 
influence on the development of a body that was to ultimately 
expand and take over Poland for forty years.   
 
Whilst the framework of the underground had been almost 
destroyed by the winter of 1944-1945, crucially a framework of 
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resistance had survived the NKVD’s concerted attempts to destroy 
it totally.  The importance of this framework was clearly shown 
after the Red Army restarted its attack at the heart of the Third 
Reich in January 1945, removing the vast majority of troops from 
the region.  This second assembling of the underground was much 
more spontaneous than the first, with many of the region’s most 
experienced leaders already having been removed.  It had taken 
four and a half months - considerably longer than the AK 
command in the region had expected, but when the Red Army 
advance began again, the underground was, as “Marcin” had 
conceived back in July, able to paralyse much of the communist 
administration in the province. 
 
Fuelled by the promises of free elections at Yalta and the removal 
of the bulk of the Red Army presence, Lublin witnessed a flight of 
thousands of people to the woods of the province during spring 
1945.  By April more partisan units were operating in Lublin than 
at any point since Operation “Tempest”, and a central command 
had been re-established.  Refugees from the eastern bank of the 
Bug, deserters, and those fleeing persecution joined a resurgent 
underground.  Once again people hoped that communist 
repression was only a phase and would pass after the elections, or 
once the Soviet Union fought the Anglo-Saxons in a coming Third 
World War.  Such hopes had fuelled the movement to the woods, 
and the return of Mikołajczyk and the attempts to legalise 
opposition parties seemed to confirm this. 
 
The resurgence of the underground in Lublin meant that by spring 
1945, the communist authorities had lost control of large areas of 
the province.  By day MO, UB and NKVD patrols swept through 
areas making arrests only for the area to return to the 
underground after dark.  With the administration paralysed in 
Lublin, the Soviets once again fell back on repression.  Yet, even 
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with Soviet reinforcements it was to take nearly two more years 
before the partisan threat to the Lublin province of People’s Poland 
was effectively ended. 
 
 
In sum the actions of the Lublin AK command represent a lost 
glimpse at what the AK could have done - at policies the 
Government-in-Exile could have followed.  The attempt to avoid 
the NKVD, to preserve the body of trained manpower (the majority 
of which was against the imposition of communism), could have 
been a route to greater influence in post-war Poland.  In July 
1944, given the incredible advance of the Red Army thus far, it 
was not inconceivable that the war could have been over by 
Christmas 1944.  Had this been the case then, the Lublin 
command’s attempts to weather the storm would have been 
perfectly valid and incredibly pragmatic.  In turn, a far greater 
proportion of experienced officers, and other ranks would have 
survived until the winter.  Within a matter of weeks the front 
would have moved westwards once more and the underground 
that emerged again in spring 1945 would have been much better 
led, and a more effective opponent.  Of course such speculations 
are of limited use, but they are interesting nonetheless.  What is 
important is the fact that the AK in Lublin did not only fight in 
July 1944 but continued to do so for much longer.  For too long 
the impact of the AK outside Warsaw has been overlooked and this 
thesis has gone some way in attempting to redress this imbalance. 
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Annex 
 
 
 Appendix 1: Demographics 
 
Population density Per square Km, 1921 -1939 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population in City and village 1939 
 
Year  Poland Lublin region 
1939 City 10,455,000 520,000 
 Village 24,394,000 2,230,000 
 
Population by nationality (1921) and by language (1931) (as a percentage 
of total) 
 
Nationalities  1921 1931 1939 
Poles Poland 69.2 64.7 65.0 
 Lublin province 85.4 86 87 
Jews Poland 7.8 8.8 10 
 Lublin province 10.9 11 10 
Ukrainians Poland 14.3 16.0 15.0 
 Lublin province 3.0 2.5 2.5 
Belorussians Poland 3.9 6.1 6.0 
 Lublin province 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Germans Poland 3.9 2.4 2.0 
 Lublin province 0.5 0.3 0.1 
Others Poland 0.9 2.8 2.0 
 Lublin province 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
Taken from M.J. Chodakiewicz, Between Nazis and Soviets: occupation Politics in Poland, 1939-1947, 
(Lexington 2004), pp. 348- 349. 
 
 
 
Poland 
Lublin province 
1921 
70 
66.9 
1931 
83 
1939 
90 
79.1 87 
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Appendix 2:  Major underground organizations and their auxiliaries 
(1939- 1944) 
 
Populists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nationalists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peasant Party, 
Stronnictwo Ludowe 
(SL) “ROCH” 
Party military, Peasant 
Battalions, Bataliony 
Chłopskie (BCh) 
Party militia, Popular 
Security Guard, Ludowa 
Straż Bezpieczeństwa 
(LSB) 
Territorial (garrison 
units) oddziały obrony 
terytorialnej 
Special task force Forest units, oddziały 
leśne 
National Party, Stronnictwo 
Narodowe (SN) 
Party militia, Camp battle 
teams, Obozowe Drużyny 
Bojowe (ODB) 
National Military Organization, Narodowa 
Organizacja Wojskowa (NOW) 
Partisan units Garrison units 
Special tasks unit the 
county executive, 
Egzekutywa 
powiatowa 
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Taken from M.J. Chodakiewicz,Between Nazis and Soviets: occupation Politics in Poland, 1939-1947, 
(Lexington 2004), pp. 411-412. 
Appendix 3: Tactics 
 
An article from the Biuletyn Informacyjny , the Information Bulletin, of 1st 
April 1943 entitled: ‘Armed Action?  Yes- but limited!’  Quoted from M. Ney- 
Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army 1939- 1945, (PUMST 2000) pp. 164-165. (emboldening added by the 
author of this thesis) 
 
‘There are those who do not fully appreciate the phase of struggle with the 
enemy the country is in at present.  These people do not quite understand 
why, on the one hand, the leadership at home is opposed to the current 
insurgent mood and to taking to the forests, and is stamping out all 
manifestations of panic- struck “heroic” excesses, and on the other hand, it 
commands and organises such actions itself, as witness the battle at 
Krasnobrod, the hounding by fire and bullet of all fresh settlers in the 
Zamość region, the liberation with arms in hand of political prisoners, and 
all manner of sabotage initiatives etc.  This apparently dual approach may 
be explained by reference to the two ostensibly contradictory watchwords 
under which the Biuletyn Informacyjny  (Information Bulletin) has been 
published over recent months.  These watchwords are: “Blessed are those 
who do not lose their spiritual equilibrium in times of thunder” and “Holy 
God, Holy and Strong, Holy and Eternal- bless the brave and courageous”.  
We wish to clarify the issue: 
We have never equated “spiritual equilibrium” with inaction of the 
Home Forces.  Appropriate military units and those connected with 
the military, have been accomplishing their set and defined combat 
tasks.  Only, for a variety of reasons, we saw no need to make these 
actions public knowledge and to give them undue publicity.  It is only a 
few months ago that we recognised it as being desirable to communicate 
this or that fact from time to time. 
 
Conducting this limited form of struggle, striking not wildly but where 
and when necessary, we simultaneously categorically oppose premature 
insurgent action and any knee- jerk responses stemming from despair.  We 
do so because we fully appreciate that a National uprising cannot be 
declared every three months.  Only one uprising can be staged- and only 
one.  And such an uprising must be unquestionably successful.  An 
unsuccessful uprising, ill prepared, declared at the wrong moment- 
would be tantamount to drowning the country in blood; it would be a 
pointlessly lost opportunity and would destroy our most precious 
human resources. 
 
The principles and policies of the Soviet agents in Poland are 
completely different.  One hundred percent different.  The present armed 
action of Polish communist detachments is virtually non- existent, but the 
communist propaganda’s boasting sounds like the roar of a lion!  This 
propaganda is deafening with its tales of skirmishes and victories- 
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fictitious or “misappropriated” from others- and every day it calls upon 
our workers and peasants, women, youth, priests and city dwellers, to 
undertake wholesale sabotage and diversionary action, to escape to the 
forests en masse, and to form mass partisan detachments… 
 
We assert: the current phase of armed struggle at Home is one of 
limited not mass action- conducted by special detachments.  It is not 
amorphous but planned, with everything occurring at the right time 
and place.  Independent of any attitudes that may obtain, but among 
others, in connection with the conduct of the Germans: the intensified 
bestiality of the enemy will meet with intensified reciprocity from us. 
 
Practice has shown that the policy of limited struggle is paying dividends.  
Mean while the opinions reaching us from London reassure us that 
this is the only reasonable policy to pursue not only from the point of 
view of Polish interests, but also from that of the United Nations as a 
whole. 
 
Confirmations of the fact that in Europe the time is not yet ripe for 
mass action can be seen, for one, in the appeal of King Peter of 
Yugoslavia of 28th March of this year, in which he called upon his people 
not to start action on a wider scale before the appropriate moment arrives 
and also, on the same day, English radio’s repeated broadcast, for the fifth 
time or so, to the French population saying that: “until the appropriate 
time arrives, you should act in a controlled manner and save your 
national strength for the final reckoning.”’ 
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Appendix 4: The structure of the Polish Underground State by the summer 
of 1944  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Home Army oath of Allegiance 
Before Almighty God and the Holy Virgin Mary, Queen of Poland, I take in my hands this Holy Cross, the sign 
of Suffering and Salvation, and swear loyalty to my country, the Polish Republic, to unyieldingly guard her 
honour and to fight for her liberation from slavery with all my strength- and unto death.  I shall remain 
unwaveringly obedient to the President of the Polish Republic, to the Commander- in- Chief and his appointed 
Commander of the Home Army, and I shall keep the secrets entrusted to me irrespective of whatever may befall 
The Polish Government in London President 
Commander- 
in-chief 
Polish National Council in 
London 
Military, Political, Propaganda Activities 
Leadership of the Underground Struggle 
Commander- in- chief of 
the Home Army (AK) in 
Poland 
Home Army (AK) 
in Poland 
Diversionary activities 
Organized Military Sabotage 
Fighting Partisan groups 
The plenipotentiary of 
the Government in 
London Army 
Secret Polish 
Administration 
Political and 
Social Service 
Underground 
Justice 
Information 
Service 
17 provinces 
ie Lublin 264 districts i.e. Zamość, 
Lubartów 
Executions Verdict Civil 
Court
s 
Periodicals Dailies Radio 
Home Political Representation in Poland 
Socialists Peasant 
Movements Christian Democratic 
Labour Party 
National 
Movement 
Representatives of the 
Political Parties 
Plenipot. 
Delegate 
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Appendix 5: Before the Soviets; a breakdown of some of the AK districts 
in Lubelszczyzna.  The platoon numbers given are from the month of July 
1944 
 
 
AK forces in the district of Tomaszów 
Lubelski November 1943- July 1944 
 
 
District commander Wilhelm Szczepankiewicz “Drugak” 
Assistant commander Władysław Surowiec “Sosna” 
 
Post 1 Battalion 1 
 
From the parishes of Łaszczów, Telatyn, Poturzyn, Dołhobyczów, Oszczów, and 
Tarnoszyn. 
 
Commander Jerzy Sobieszczański “Jastrząb”  
 
Company 1 – 200 soldiers 
Commander Władysław Wiśniewski “Lemiesz” 1941- July 1944  
 
Company II – 220 soldiers 
Commander Jan Sierleczko “Szarfa” 1941- July 1944  
 
Company III- 80 soldiers 
Commander Tomasz Wielosz “Ostoja” 1941- March 1943 
Jan Opiełko “Arab” March 1943- July 1944 
 
“Żelazna” company- 120 soldiers 
Commander Andrzej Dżygało “Korczak” April 1944- June 1944 
Eugeniusz Sioma “Lech” June 1944- July 1944  
 
Post II Battalion II 
 
From the parishes of Majdan, Górny, Jarczów, Tarnoszyn and Uhnów 
 
Commander Ryszard Suprynowicz “Zawisza” October 1943- 5 th April 1944  
Błażej Czop “Czapliński” April 1944- 30th July 1944 
 
Company I “Malika” – numbering around 150 soldiers 
Commander Stanisław Pisarczyk “Malik” 1942- 5 th April 1944 
 
Company II “Czapliński” –numbering around 150 soldiers 
Commander Błażej Czop “Czapliński” 1942- July 1944 
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Company III from Tarnoszyn – around 120 soldiers 
Commander Józef Nowak “Topola”  March 1943- July 1944 
 
Post III Battalion III 
 
From the parishes of Tyszowce and Komarów 
 
Commander Hieronim Białowolski “Grot” January 1943- 30th July 1944  
 
Company I “Głaza” 
Commander Paweł Dziurbas “Głaz” January 1943- 2nd June 1944 
Bronisław Bochenek “Granit” 2nd June 1944- 30th July 1944 
 
Company II “Beli” 
Commander Jan Kulik “Bela” September 1943- July 1944  
 
Company III 
Commander Marian Pilarski “Grom” September 1943- 10 th July 1944 
 
 
 
Post IV Battalion IV 
 
From the parishes of Krynice, Tarnawatka and Rachanie 
 
Commander Tadeusz Niedziałkowski “Tomasz” April 1941- July 1944  
 
Company I AK Krynice –100 soldiers 
Commander Szary “Sęp” from March 1943 
 
Company II AK parish of Krynice- 120 soldiers 
Commander Władysław Kowalczuk  
 
Company III AK Tarnawatka- 200 soldiers 
Commander Łysak “Szarak” 1941- 20 th July 1944 
 
Post V Battalion V 
 
From the parishes of Narol- Susiec-Bełżec- Cieszanów- Majdan Sopocki 
 
Commander Marian Warda “Polakowski” February 1942- July 1944 
 
Company I “Narol” – 350 soldiers 
Commander Karol Kostecki “Kostek” from 1943 to 30th July 1944 
 
Company II “Ruda Różaniecka”- 250 soldiers 
Commander Sikora “Sosna” May- July 1944 
 
Company III “Susiec” – 225 soldiers 
Commander Witold Kopeć “Ligota” 1942- 30 th July 1944 
 
Company IV “Majdan Sopocki”-  220 soldiers 
Commander Antoni Kusiak “Bystry” 
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Company V “Dzików”- 260 soldiers 
Commander Stefan Pluta “Jodła” from 1943 
 
Company VI “Cieszanów”- 105 soldiers 
Commander Wilhelm Kolodziejczyk until July 1944 
 
Company VII “Kadlubiska”- 107 soldiers 
Commander Jozef Mazurkiewicz “Hora” 
 
Post VI Battalion VI 
 
From the town of Tomaszow Lubelski 
Commander Mieczysław Szejn “Skała” 1942- June 1944 
 
 
 
District of Hrubieszów November 1943- 30th 
July 1944 
 
 
Commander Marian Gołębiewski “Irka”, “Korab” 
Deputy commander Ignacy Krakiewicz “Wilk” 
 
Post I City of Hrubieszów 
 
Post II Battalion II 
 
From the parishes of Dubienka, Białopole, Horodło, and Moniatyce. 
 
Commander Czesław Głębski “Jawor” November 1943- July 1944 
 
Company I – 60 soldiers 
Commander Stanisław Witamborski “Mały” May 1943- July 1944 
 
Company II- 120 soldiers 
Commander Wacław Bojarski “Hucuł” November 1943- July 1944 
 
Company III- 150 soldiers 
Commander Wincenty Smalej “Orzeł” November 1943- July 1944 
 
Company IV- The “Kedywu” group 
Commander Gołdasiński 
 
Post III Battalion III 
 
From the parishes of Grabowiec, Uchanie and Mołodiatycze 
 
Commander Stanisław Panas “Grzyb”, “Orwid” May 1944- July 1944 
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Company I- 200 soldiers 
Commander Stanisław Lombardo “Poleszuk” 
 
Company II Białowody- 120 soldiers 
Commander Zbigniew Choman “Foka” April 1944- July 1944 
 
Company III- 120 soldiers 
Commander Franciszek Kasz “Szczęsny” January 1943- November 1943 
 
Company IV Grabowiec 80 soldiers 
Commander Paweł Runkiewicz “Czarny” from 1942 to 1944 
 
Post IV Battalion IV 
 
From the parishes of Werbkowice, Świdniki, Zawalów, and Gdeszyn 
 
Commander Stanisław Baran- Barski “Bis” 1943- 12 th June 1944 
 
Company I “Huragana”-  140 soldiers 
Commander Karol Drzewiński “Kociuba”, “Pirat” 
 
Company II from Zawalów- 100 soldiers 
Commander Tadeusz Błaszczuk “Grom” 1943- July 1944 
 
Company III from Świdniki- 140 soldiers 
Commander Leon Milowicz “Adam” October 1943- July 1944 
 
Post V Battalion V 
 
From the parishes of Dołhobyczów, Sahryń, Mircze, Kryłów, Waręż and Krystynopol. 
 
Commander Stefan Kwaśniewski “Lux”, “Wiktor” February 1943- July 1944 
 
Battalion V –500 soldiers 
Commanders Karol Bojarski “Wyga” April 1943- July 1944 
 
Company I “Czarusia”- 200 soldiers 
Commander Sergiusz Konopa “Czaruś” April 1943- July 1944 
 
Company II “Wyrwicza”- 100 soldiers 
Commander Aleksander Piotrowski “Wyrwicz” January 1944- 30th July 1944 
 
Company III “Wygi”- 200 soldiers 
Commander Karol Bojarski “Wyga” April 1943- July 1944 
 
Company IV –60 soldiers 
Commander “Nieśmiały”, “Sęp” 
 
Company V- 50 soldiers 
Commander Marian Plewako “Pogoń” 
 
Battalion BCh post of Hrubieszów 
 
One battalion of 500 soldiers split down into 10 platoons.  
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District of Zamość November 1943-July 1944 
 
District commander Wacław Stasiewicz, March-August 1943 
Stanisław Książek, “Wyrwa” August 1943-May 1944 
Michał Polak, “Żelazny” from the BCh, May-July 1944 
 
Post I 
Skierbieszów 
Commander Stanisław Kleszczyński, “Gniadosz” , commander Post V 1943- July 1944 
 
Post II 
Stary Zamość 
Commander Jan Denkiewicz, “Pobór”, 1943- May 1944 
Eugeniusz Jareczek, “Żubr”, May 1944- July 1944 
Commander of platoons in Stary Zamość Roman Szczur, “Urszula” 
Commander of the platoon in Wirkowice Józef Repeć, “Wilga” 
 
Post III 
Zamość 
Commander Stanisław Sobieraj, “As”, November 1943- May 1944 
Jan Denkiewicz, “Pobór”, May- July 1944 
 
Zamość platoon in the 9th Infantry 
 
Post IV 
Radecznica 
Commander Piotr Bohun, “Gromski”, to January 1944 
Józef Godzisz, “Kraśnik”, January- July 1944 
 
Post V 
Szczebrzeszyn 
Commander Franciszek Mucha, “Komar”, September 1943- July 1944 
Commander of the Kawęczyn company Leonard Kowalczyk, “Kawka”, July 1943- 
August 1944 
Commander of the Szczebrzeszyn platoon Marian Książek, “Nieuchwytny”, July 1943- 
July 1944 
Commander of the Zwierzyniec platoon Jan Paczesny, “Pocisk”, May- July 1944 
Doctor of the Szczebrzeszyn post and the Zamość district Doctor Stefan Jóźwiakowski 
 
Post VI 
Krasnobród 
Commander Stefan Banicki, “Ułan”, “Skała”, October 1943- June 1944 
Aleksander Markowski, “Alma”, July 1944 
Deputy Commander from the BCh  Stanisław Struzik, “Rolnik”, June- July 1944 
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District of Biłgoraj November 1943-July 1944 
 
Post I 
Biłgoraj 
Commander Józef Stegliński, “Cord”, 1942- June 1944 
 
Post II 
Tarnogród 
Commander Marian Melas, “Lot”, 1941- July 1944 
BCh Tarnogród platoon commander Jan Stępniewski 
Platoon II commander Czesław Wasilewski, “Grot” 
 
Post III 
Krzeszów 
Commander Józef Wójcik, “Mały”, “Błysk”, to December 1942 
Edward Pawowicz, “Baca”, to July 1944 
Commander of the Krzeszów platoon “Sulica” 
 
Post IV 
Frampol 
Commander Wacław Gniewkowski, “Wasal”, September 1943- May 1944 
Marian Miazga, “Kwiatek”, “Michał” June- July 1944 
Deputy Commander Marian Miazga, “Kwiatek”, “Michał”, to June 1944 
Diversionary platoon commander Aleksander Kośmiński, “Czerwień”, May 1943- 
January 1944 
 
Post V 
Józefów 
Commander Konrad Bartoszewski, “Wir”, 1942- July 1944 
Platoon commanders Władysław Homa, “Kula” 
Czesław Mużacz, “Selim” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the above information relating to the 9th Infantry and the districts is taken from Jerzy Jóźwiakowski’s 
Armia Krajowa na Zamojszczyźnie, (Lublin 2007), pp. 518-698 
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District of Lubartów 
 
Figures correct as of July 1944 
 
District commander Roman Jezior, “Okon” 
Deputy commander Aleksander Fil, “Foch”, of the BCh 
 
As of July 1944 “Uskok” had at his command around 4000 soldiers in Lubartów 
 
Post I 
 
 Parishes of Spiczyn, Ludwin, Łęczna, Niemce 
 
Post II 
 
 Lubartów, Łuck, and a part of Tarło 
 
Post III 
 
 Michów, Rudno, Wielkie 
 
Post IV 
 
 Firlej, Luszawa 
 
Post V 
 
 Kamionka, Samoklęski 
 
Post VI 
 
 Czernierniki, and a part of Tarło 
 
Charakterystyka File No.2, ‘AK-WiN w powiat Lubartów’(IPN Lublin archive.) 
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District of Lublin County 
 
Figures correct as of July 1944 
 
District commander: Stanisław Piotrowski, “Korszun”, “Jar” 
 
As of July 1944 “Jar” had at his command 5868 AK/BCh (of which 1425 were BCh) 
soldiers in Lublin County 
 
Post I 
 
Commander Józef Filipowski “Dąb” 
 
Post 1 commander “Pilnik” in the Parish of Jastków 
Post 2 Jan Sadowski “Mir” in the Parish of Wojciechów 
Post 3 “Grot” Parish of Konopnica 
Post 4 Józef Albinski “Nowy” Parish of Bełżyce 
Post 13 Andrzej Gorajek “Wilk” Parish of Chodel 
 
Post II 
 
Commander Józef Król “Leszek” 
 
Post 5 “Ryś” Parish of Brzeziny 
Post 6 Wacław Borowiec “Boryna” Parish of Jaszczów 
 
Post III 
 
Commander Edward Grabinski “Grabina”, “Proch”, “Młotek” 
 
Post 7 “Przemiana” Parish of Piaski 
Post 8 Piotr Kosmala “Kret” Parish of Mełgiew 
Post 9 “Ludwik” Parish of Wólka 
 
Post IV 
 
Commander Władysław Hoffman “Chmura”, “Ordynat” 
 
Post 10 commander unknown Parish of Krzczonów 
Post 11 Bolesław Bolibok Parish of Zemborzyce 
Post 12 commander unknown Parish of Piotrków 
 
Post V 
 
Commander Józef Kukuła “Derwisz” 
 
Post 14 “Bór” Parish of Niedrzwica 
Post 15 Władysław Rydz Parish of Piotrowice 
Post 16 “Deres”, “Kłos” Parish of Bychawa 
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Post VI 
 
Commander “Gozdawa” 
 
Post 17 “Skrzydło” Parish of Dorohucza 
Post 18 “Pifel” Chełm County 
 
Charakterystyka File No.6,  ‘Nielegalnej organizacji AK- WiN obwodu Lublin- powiat działającej w okresie od 
lipca 1944 do Kwietnia 1947’, Lublin dnia 17 lipca 1979r.’,  (IPN archive, Lublin) 
 
 
 
 
 
District of Radzyń 
 
Post I 
 
Miłków 
Commander “Puchacz” 
Post II 
 
Gąś 
Commander “Rola” 
 
Post III 
 
Radzyń 
 
Post IV 
 
Polskowola 
Commander “Bogdan” 
 
Post V 
 
Tłuściec 
Commander “Ryok” 
 
Post V a 
 
Misolzyzec 
Commander “Szczesny” 
 
Post VI 
 
Biała 
Commander “Gryf” 
 
Post VII 
 
Suchowola 
Commander “Wilk” 
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Post VIII 
 
Przegaliny 
Commander “Marny- Kropka” 
 
Post IX 
Ruomo 
Commander “Zegota” 
 
File No. BULU-55110-59/07, (IPN archive Lublin) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6: The leadership structure of the Lublin regional AK-DSZ-
WiN 1944-45 
 
 
 
 
 
August 1944 – May 1945 
 
Regional command August –December 1944 
 
Commander; 
 Franciszek Żak codenames “Zuzia”, “Wir”, Ignacy” 
Deputy Commander; 
 Władysław Zalewski “Leśnik” 
Adjutant; 
 Antoni Wieczorek “Ścibor” (arrested November 1944) 
Chief of staff; 
 Jan Kurcharczak “Kazimierz”, “Andrzej”, “Stefan” (arrested 
21st April 1945) 
 
Skeletal command December 1944 – January 1945 
 
Regional commander; 
 Jerzy Iszkowski “Kord”, “Orczyk” (arrested 9th January 1945) 
Deputy commander; 
 Henryk Bukowski “Henryk” 
Chief of staff; 
 Jan Kucharczak “Kazimierz”, “Andrzej”, “Stefan” 
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Regional command January- March 1945 
 
Commander; 
 Franciszek Żak “Wir”, “Ignacy”, “Zuzia”, “Róg” (arrested 
21st March 1945) 
Deputy commander; 
 Władysław Zalewski “Leśnik”, “Dąb”, “Janusz”, “Nowina” 
(arrested 21st March 1945) 
Adjutant; 
 Zdzisław Glogier “Prot”, “Ney” (arrested March 1945) 
Chief of staff; 
 Jan Kucharczek “Andrzej”, “Kazimierz”, “Stefan” (arrested 
21st March 1945) 
 
Skeletal command April- May 1945 
 
Aleksander Iwanicki “Achilles”, operated as unofficial 
commander of the province at this point 
 
DSZ/WiN Regional command June 1945- January 1946 
 
Commander; 
 Wilhelm Szczepankiewicz “Drugak” 
Deputy commander and chief of staff; 
 Marian Gołębiewski (arrested 24th January 1946) 
 
 
Bureaus of the regional command 
 
 
Bureau 1- organisation 
 
Unit commander Robert Bijasiewicz “Orlik”, “Jadzia” (arrested 6th 
November 1944) 
Jerzy Iszkowski “Kord”, “Orczyk” (arrested January 1945) 
 
Bureau II- intelligence 
 
Unit commander Aleksander Bieniecki “Łodzia” (arrested October 1944) 
Leon Żurek “Lech”, “Leon” (arrested 2nd November 1944) 
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Bureau III- operations 
 
Unit commander Jan Nawrat “Jan”, “Lucjan” (arrested 3rd November 
1944) 
 
Bureau IV- quartermaster 
 
Unit commander Władysław Krzanowski “Bronek”, “Bronisław”, 
“Justyn” (arrested 7th December 1944) 
Władysław Pawlicki “Zych” (from December 1944)  
 
Bureau V- command and communication 
 
Unit commander Mieczysław Komarski “Wojtek” (arrested 6th November 
1944) 
 
Bureau VI –Office of information and propaganda 
 
Unit commander Marian Tułacz “Step”, “Wierch” (arrested 6th November 
1944)   
“Tarkowski”  -actual name not known 
Jan Zadrag “Ostoja” – commander June 1945- January 1946 
 
 
 
 
*All of the above information is taken from Rafał Wnuk’s Lubelski Okręg AK DSZ i WiN 1944-1947, 
(Warsaw 2000) pp. 248-267. 
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Appendix 7: Security structures of the communists in the province of 
Lublin, 1945-1947 
 
Taken from M.J. Chodakiewicz,Between Nazis and Soviets: occupation Politics in Poland, 1939-1947, 
(Lexington 2004), p.438. 
 
 
 
Red Army Command NKVD Command 
64th NKVD Division 
Provincial Security Zone number 2, 
Wojewódzka strefa bezpieczeństwa 
nr. 2 
Polish People’s Army Provincial Liaison office of 
the NKVD, Biuro Doradcy 
Provincial Security Office, 
Wojewódzki Urząd 
Bezpieczeństwa (WUBP) 
Provincial Command of the 
Citizen’s Militia, Komenda 
Wojewódzka MO 
Lublin Military district 
number 7, Okręg Wojskowy 
nr. 7 
Zone/Operational region i.e. 
Tomaszów, Lubartów etc, 
Strefa/rejon działania  
Regimental Liaison Powiat 
command of the Red Army 
Powiat Liaison Office of 
the NKVD, Biuro 
Doradcy 
Individual NKVD 
Battalions 
Powiat Security Office, 
Powiatowy Urząd 
Bezpieczeństwa PUBP 
Citizen Militia Powiat 
command, MO 
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